REASONS FOR NON-SUCCESS IN THE WAR.

Evening Star, Issue 11681, 13 February 1902, Page 8

REASONS FOR NON-SUC-CESS IN THE WAR.

"The desperate attempts we have made and the enormous numbers put into the field having proved inadequate to subjugate the Boers in their guerrilla, warfare, the above question is forced upon us in the baldest manner. I contend,"' writes a correspondent whose letter is published in the London ' Spectator,' "we were overcautious, and made most elaborate preparations for contingencies which never even nearly occurred. We were too particular about' advanced bases, and tin? danger of running short of supplies; and were fearful of allowing small bodies of troops to operatp, lest they should be captured. \. multiplicity of supererogations sapped oik energies on the one hand, while excessive caution produced apathy on the other.

"Food and ammunition, the jrre»t indispensables, could have been sirpplied with less than half the trouble our lumbering system entailed. A man can carry sufficient coffee, sugar, and Hour with, two horses to Inst him a month, while the country at the initial singe of the guerrilla warfare was literallv bursting with grain a-nd cattle. A months ball cartridges can be carried by the man similarly; to his food. Gurts and waggons, almost without an exception, could have been dispensed, with.

"Our plan of work should have been guided the motto ' Beat them at their own game.' The situation could have been viewed, from the point of view of + be individual and bis horse or horses, and measures taken for a bountiful supply of remounts. The right personnel was on the spot Many thousands of our infantry are nsed to horses and can ride, and there is no lac l r of budding Buffalo Bills who would nave jumped at the offer of a lively bout of Boer-chasing with its intendant dangers. The enlistment of the new Yeomanry was not "-eqwred. Hnnger would not have proved a deterrent. Hunger? Why, there w no dsnger of that even now if your convoy runs dry, after a year of the guerrilla business, during which time we have bad a hundred times the strength of Ptckfords carting food out of the theatre of operations. A reward of £1 per head for captured guerrillas would have very largely discounted any hardship in this direction, and would ha-ve jnoved an excellent inducement to keen hunting. The men could have been picked from volunteers from all the forces in Sonti> Africa, given three horses each, and formed into columns varying, in strength from fifty to 300. Just such a roving life, sparkling ■with dangerous incident, would have suited onr troops Al, and the end of the war would have been attained cheaper :ind more quickly. Leaders of the Ijo Gallais and Kimmgton type should have been given commands. Speed has been the quality

we lacked. What only speed could accomplish has been left to superior numbers and strategy to effect, and the reaut .has spelt failure. How is it we failed to deriee some such plan? It look* as though we trusted to fortune smiling on «s. Shall we never get rid of the stereotyped division and brigade organisations, even for each abnormal situations as guerrla warfare brings? Are we always to be fnl' of the idea of 'Waggon Establiehmen*,' 'Spare Stores Establishment,' 'Fourteen men to a kettle,' ' Sixteen men to a tent,' ' So many steps a minute,' ' distance from front to rear of column so mnch'? Do let tm relax a little. Leave the drill books behind and try to forget them. Give men's common sense and natural aptitude a chance. Yet all these things have been said before; nay, are now being complacently spoken of as actually in effect. But are they? N<>! The chains of custom and of atrtiquated, inflexible, inelastic formulas of war were forged around us too tightly, and instead of snapping them with a violent severance we contented ourselves by a simple slackening of our bonds, placidly imagining that would produce the desired effect. We are still bound. Strike, in pity's name, some lusty wielder; of the axe, and sit us free from deadening conventionalisms. "We don't want a Moltke, but we do want some cowboys of the Wild West and their like. V"- hear of a great gallop with a capture at tlte end of it about once a month. We should hear of ten such every day. G^lop! Of course we must gallop! Do we imagine the Boers are to be caught with the four-miles-an-hoar walk, six-miles-an-hour trot, eighkmi!es-an-hour canter, ten-miles-an-hour gallop of tht peacetime riding school? We must not be afraid of giving a horse colic in Boer-chasing. Let us even dispense with the j;reat scientific, strategic, full-of-technique commanders if they cannot cast off their technicalities and appear as natural, clear-thinking men. If you'll let us have an 'Old Noll, 1 an ' Abe Lincoln,' a ' Garibaldi,' and a 'De Wet,' we'll send you an 'lron Hand,' a M—st—r of Ind--n, Fr—nt—r a Gr—t C—-v—-rry L—d—r and a D~-«n—ng G—rdsni —n by immediate return, at sender's risk. That column commander there, who so carefully calculates how much whisky he can put on his " mobilu waggons, and who carries complete bed <uA toilet requisites, how many Boers is Ire going to bag? That other one there, who has a hundred horses unfit for work in hi'- column, and is expected to drag them into a garrison fifty or eighty miles away, what splendid gallops in chase will he exeerte? "Our garrison (owns represent % state of | things utterly opposed to the ".dea of a vigorous prosecution of the war. Numerous officers in possession of staff billets are snugly ensconcing themselves in. able bungalows, obtaining 'lodgings' instead of 'field' allowance, and drawing ration allowance. In fact, the liberal allowances to officers in South Afr ca seem to counterbalance their desire for the end of the war. Sport is all very well in its way, but on active service the caiv? of golf links and tennis courts should not exercise officers' ability and attention, while the thousands of pole and racing pontes kept by officers throughout South Africa (fed on Government rations) might profitably be used to augment- the parsimonious supply of remounts to the mobile columns. The manliest, hardiest, most go-ahead Tien with the keenest fighting instincts were required to prosecute the hardest physical fight falling to man's lot. No smooth, insouciant 1899 British militarism will suffice for this deadly earnest game. Man U> man the advantage should have lain with the pursuers (with the possibilities open to our side) in 95 per cent, of instances. Frequently the dashing spirit, of officers and men hail been damped by over anxiety to save life on. the part of general officers, and their desire to do the work with a low casualty lists."