THE VLAKFONTEIN MURDERS.

Evening Star, Issue 11668, 1 October 1901, Page 7

THE VLAKFONTEIN MURDERS.

A report from Brigadier-general Dixon on the ■'operations at vlakfontein on- May 29, 1901, has been issued as a parliamentary paper. The following letter, dated July 10, from Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War, is prefixed- “ Rumors having been circulated regarding the shooting of some of our wounded on'the field by the enemy, inquiries have been made, and from affidavits obtained there seems to be no doubt that' five or six cases did occur.”

The report of Brigadier-general Dixon contains the following:—

“My force arrived at Vlakfontein on May 28. A convoy and. a certain number of Boers were seen on,that day; but nothing pointed to the presence of a really large force. On the 29th, however, I left sufficient to guard the camp, which was in a good defensive position. The force marched to Waterval at 8 a.m. to search for two guns supposed to be buried there. I left the party and went west, along the high ground to a position about 2,000 yards to the east of a very large and deep valley, which runs roughly north and south. , The centre which I accompanied • ■frent-to the farms at Waterval; while the right went along the line of kopjes parallel to the left. The place where the guns were supposed to have been buried was found, but the guns themselves had been removed. I then turned about with the centre to look for some ammunition reported to. be buried at Vlakhoek, the original left party covering the movement as a rearguard. On arriving at about 2 p.m. I found that to dig up ‘the ammunition would require an extensive movement, for which there was no time that day; so I ordered a general return to camp. A certain amount of firing had been heard for some time from the direction of the rearguard, which became very heavy as the centre'party was crossing the valley towards the camp. It was also observed” that a largo veldt fire was burning on the high ground, on which the rearguard could he seen. About the time the firing was heard to be increasing in volume—2.3o p.m.—a messenger arrived from Major Chance, saying he was hard pressed. I immediately sent a message to Lieutenant-colonel Duff to hurry all his troops to Major Chance’s assistance; while I galloped across the valley to the scene of action, catching up the pom-pom on the way. arid -bringing it along with me. On arriving at the west picket of the camp I found that the two guns and a howitzer which had been with me were in action west of the picket, and that these guns, together with the company of Derbvs which had been on picket, and the details which had been left in camp, were hotly engaged, some of the enemy being within 800 yards of the picket. Our guns and camp were shelled by the enemy at about 1,600 yards range. “ I then realised that the guns with the rearguard had been captured. The Hashes of these guns could be seen through the smoke of the veldt fire, and the position was very critical, so I immediately gathered together all available men and advanced west along the high ground. The two guns with Colonel Duff were shelling the enemy, who were advancing along the valley from the Waterval farm, while the twj companies of the King’s Own Bcotcish Borderers, with a maxim, which were also with Colonel Duff, came across the valley and secured my right. The Boers held on to their position until the general advance, moving by rushes, had got to within 600 yards of them. They then mounted and galloped off, and we recaptured the guns and occupied the ground over which the enemy had advanced. Having no mounted troops at this point, I was unable to pursue. Our casualties were very heavy, and mostly occurred among the gunners of the captured guns, the Derbyshire Company, and the Imperial Yeomanry. We can account for forty-one Boers killed, and they must have suffered heavily. From the officer commanding the rearguard I gather that as soon as the retirement from the donga commenced the Boers lighted the grass, and, under cover of the smoke, advanced along the ridge towards the camp. They were seen and shelled, which stopped their direct advance. The guns then retired for about one mile on to the infantry company, which was extended on each side. The guns again came into action, and checked the advancing Boevs, the Imperial Yeomanry falling back on to the infantry. The wind was blowing from north to south, and the veldt fire drove back the Yeomanry flank guard on the left of the guns (as facing in action). The Boers suddenly appeared through the lire on the left of the guns, and infantry shot down the gunners and inflicted great loss on the infantry and yeomanry. An attempt was made to fire into them with ease, but the cartridges in the magazine bad been set on fire, and before anything could be done the guns were captured. The drivers attempted to get away both the 1 fin hers and waggons, but the horses were shot. Ambulance and stretcher parties were out .all the evening and on the morning of the 50th collecting and bringing in the dead and wounded. General Kemp sent in a flag of truce, at 10 a.m. on the 50tb with a letter asking to be allowed to remove his dead and wounded. He was permitted to remove the dead. I thought it advisable to return to Naauwpoort for the reasons given below, and started at 9 p.m. on the 50th : —(a) I did not see what good a single force like mine could do under the circumstances in the neighborhood, and by returning here I could secure a few days’ rest for my men and horses, which was especially required for the Yeomanry after what they had undergone; and also that I should be in a better position to make good the casualties and deficiencies, (b) If I had remained and sent the wounded to Krugersdorp, which is the nearest hospital, I should only have had two doctors, one ambulance, and very little- hospital equipment available for future operations. The gathering in the valley now is phenomenal —anything over 3,000.”