PESSIMISM.

Evening Star, Issue 111548, 6 February 1900, Page 1

PESSIMISM.

It is not surprising that somewhat hazy ideas as to the situation in South Africa should prevail in New Zealand when in England, as we gather from articles and correspondence in the Press and the speeches of public men, there has been, despite the full information afforded by official communications and war correspondents of the leading journals, so much misconception. Members of the Government have with reason expressed great regret at this, since the influence of misdirected public opinion has been the cause of much embarrassment, and put a rms, so to speak, in the hands of enemies at home and abroad. The Right Honorable Henry Chaplin, president of the Local Government Board, and a member of the Cabinet, at a dinner of the United Service Club in December expressed himself very strongly on the subject, saying that there were a large number of people who were not only impatient, but much disappointed, because more decided results in the war had not been obtained. It was asked why the reinforcements and the Army Corps were not sent three months ago. • He thought that the question had been satisfactorily answered by the Prime Minister, who had pointed out that an ultimatum could be sent by wire, but troops could only be sent by sea. The effect of sending out troops and Army Corps three months earlier would only have been that the war would have commenced three months earlier than it did. The disloyal element was a second factor which added to the difficulties of the British forces in a variety of ways. It gave the Boers opportunities of getting inlormation as to the movements of the Imperial troops, which are of great advantage to them in the kind of war which they are especially well able to carry on. Again, the War Office had admitted that the number of Boers was greatly larger and their discipline better than had been expected; that their armaments were enormous ; that they had many skilled officers, from whatever country they might come ; that they had been preparing for this great issue for years ; and that they had choseu the moment which suited them best for the declaration of war. When, said Mr Chaplin, all these things were considered, surely there was small reason to complain if more decisive results had not been obtained than had as yet been apparent.

'ihus effectively Mr Chaplin deals with the question as to the unreasonableness of the very general expectation that the long-husbanded and skilfully organised military power of the Boers would fall down like the walls of Jericho at the very sound of the British trumpets. He does not touch specifically upon the misapprehensions and misrepresentations fcs to the progress and incidents of the war so far, which, persistently promulgated, have been and are having a. very mischievous effect, particularly in regard to international relations. In an early December issue of ‘The Times’ (London) a distinguished naval officer, Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, takes the matter up in a remarkably able letter, in which he discusses the state of affairs in South Africa ; his reasons for doing so being, ho says, because he finds so many people who dwell on the British ‘reverses and ignore the successes, alleging the incapacity of the generals in being unable to make headway against a handful of farmers. It was desirable, he considered, to show our successes since the war commenced. The Boers were convinced at the outset of the war that they could rush on Cape Town and conquer Natal in a short time. Sir George White arrived on the ground three days before war was declared, and found inadequate forces, for political reasons, assembled at Glencoe and Ladysmith. With these the victories at those places were gained by him and Sir W. P. Symons, thereby ensuring the retreat of the Glencoe forces from the greatly superior number of .their foes. Ladysmith, although an open town, has been successfully defended against vastly superior numbers and heavy artillery, to which blit little reply could be mad a until the Naval Brigade arrived. Other engagements and sallies of the beleaguered garrison detained the Boer forces and prevented them over-running Natal. It appeared to the Admiral that through the action of General White and his Imperial and colonial forces very considerable material success had been gained. On the other side, again, Mafeking and Kimberley were still unca pin red ; frequent successful sallies had been made from these towns, and the Boers had been taught effectually a lesson of caution, never daring to meet General French's troops in the open if a few cavalry were in sight. Lord Methuen’s advance drove the invaders of Cape Colony before him. He gained three victories in a week, and was repulsed on the fourth attack, although, if Boer accounts arc to bo believed, he had really gained the victory. In three weeks after Buffer landed in Natal the Boers retreated a considerable distance, and subsequent reverses of the British did not make up to them for the lost looting ground. Ho had no hesitation in saying, the Admiral proceeds to declare, that it the Boers at any point in the campaign had attacked a position hold by the British in the open they would have been entirely defeated. As to the reverses, real and alleged, sustained by Buffer and the other generals, ho would ask how many retreats after victory was Havelock obliged to make before finally reaching Lucknow ? Three years running the great Duke had to retreat from Spain into Portugal, although in each year he gained a victory’. When the Home Government, on account of the expense of the war, told him they must recall the army, ho replied : “ If you don’t fight them here you will have to do it at homo,” as we may have to fight our enemies if we fail to bring the Transvaal under a settled civilised government. What, he asked, have the Boers gained by their looting and robbing the farmers and blowing up a few bridges ? What have been these injuries to British colonists in comparison with what they must themselves have suffered ? Homes broken up, farms uncultivated, a despotism oftheworstkind established,and only maintained by plundered gold; and, after all their boasting, in less than throe .months to be driven back almost to their own doors by an army the very large proportion of which were 6,000 miles distant by sea when the war broke out, with a long lino of communication to maintain, with many traitor’s and spies in the Cape Colony and in Natal giving information of every movement, whilst nothing could be ascertained as to their designs, operations, and forces. ■ Heleft it, said the Admiral in conclusion, to the croakers to prove, if they could, in the face of steady advances on the part of the British and as steady retreat on the-part of the Boers, that the reverses predominated over the British successes.