BRITAIN'S NAVAL STRENGTH

Evening Star, Issue 9915, 29 January 1896, Page 3

BRITAIN'S NAVAL STRENGTH

An iuterview with Admiral Bridge while in Tasmauia was obtained by an 'Argus' correspondent. Admiral Bridge was connected with the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty. He declined to express any opinion on the political aspect of the difficulty with Germany, but was delighted to sec that Admiral Dale had been appointed to the command of the new flying squadron. This squadron, said Admiral Bridge, was one of several capable of being moved rapidly from point to point, and, in fact, was of a character such as had long been advocated by many naval officers, himself included. Admiral Dale, who was an officer of the highest ability, was in command of H.M.S. D.amond on the Australian station when he (Admiral Bridge) commanded H.M S. Espiegle.

When asked what was the extent of the naval force immediately available at the Cape, the admiral replied that eleven veEsels were there. Concerning the opinion that Russia was desirous of obtaining foothold in the south-cast of Africa, Admiral Bridge expressed the conviction that either Dutch or Portuguese territory would be useless to Russia. "The possession of fortified stations adds little to the naval power of any country," he remarked, " unless accompanied by a corresponding addition to a movable naval force. Turkey has the most powerfully fortified coasts in tho world, and yet her naval power may be regarded as not far from insignificant; but if she doubled the strength of her coast defences her naval power would be unaffected. Some people think powerful material the most important characteristic of war efficiency—the Dardanelles, for example; but the history of war defence leads to a different opinion. In reality no strength of fortification would defend any country from naval attack unless it has a sufficient military force to combat an assailant wherever appearing. It cannot be too often repeated to people in various parts of the British Empire that, although considerable additions have been made to the British navy in recent years, there still exists ample reason for maintaining an efficient military servico ashore. Misunderstanding on this point is deplorable. The British navy Admiral Bridge con sidercd strong enough to hopelessly ruin any enemy's attempt at conquest, and to give reasonable protection to our vast ocean trade. Still it would not be strong enough to guarantee every port in the British Umpire against attacks which might be of sufficient magnitude to cause intense damage and mi?ery. To give reasonable security against such attacks every place should be provided with sufficient trained soldiers to beat off an enemy. Our navy was strong enough to prevent any large hostile expedition slipping through its fingers, but not to furnish an absolute barrier to all raids within, say, twenty-four hours, but a few hundred men, well armed and trained, would make a raider think many times before attempting an attack. Still, the British navy was so strong that we need not fear anybody but ourselves. Its force at present numbers over 95,000 available officers and men, without counting the reserves, and this was considerably more than the aggregate war footing of two of the most powerful navies in the world. The position in the Mediterranean at the present time was that Russia had one small vessel there, her other vessels being as far off the West Mediterranean as those men-of-war on the British coasts. France had seven first and one second class battleship and two cruisers, all of modern type, there, and ten smaller vessels, but her reserve was not manned with full crows, except at manoeuvres. The British had ten first class battleships, all of modern typo, one first class cruiser, three second class, aud throo third class, and twenty torpedo vossels, besides eight small vessels of tho Karrakatta type in the Mediterranean, in addition to the Channel squadron usually wintered at Gibraltar.

Referring to the disposition of the Australian squadron. Admiral Bridge said that it was oommonly believed that the ships would be well employed in the defence of particular localities, but this was opposed to as well-undorstood naval strategy, and completely refuted by nearly every page of British naval history. " There is only one position in war time," His Excellency continued, " for the British man-of-war to occupy, and that is in olose proximity to the enemy's ships." The Australian squadron could not be considered a social institution to steam from port to port, but had incomparably higher functions to perform. In past history badly-managed naval combinations had invariably been due to interference by shore-going people sufficiently influential to be effective in the wrong direction.