THE GUN COTTON EXPLOSION AT WELLINGTON.

Evening Star, Volume 8505, Issue 8505, 2 May 1891, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE GUN COTTON EXPLOSION AT WELLINGTON.

REPORT OF NAVAL EXPERTS.

The Commissioners appointed to inquire into the cause of the gun cotton explosion at Shelley Bay find “ that it was due to overheating a loaded primer tin in the process of soldering the lid.” In a confidential report attached the Commissioners find that on the morning of the accident there was one primer being soldered by Ross and Cornwall at a bench, two without lids near a small forge, and five with their lids soldered on standing on a bench on the right of Ross and Cornwall. When the Work of soldering the lid of one of the primers was about two-thirds completed the soldering iron was borrowed from Ross and returned in a few minutes. Ross must consequently have reheated the soldering iron to complete the closing up of the primer, and it was in applying this iron to the primer that suffi oient heat was communicated to ignite the dry gun cotton contained in it. Although Cornwall gave evidence that he must have felt any undue heat, yet the Commissioners are of opinion that the overheated surface was of small extent, and nearer to the dry gun cotton than to his hands. The Commissioners traced the several explosions to the following cause: When the heated oases and flames from primer tin No, 1 reached the detonator the remainder of the gun cotton below the dry primer detonated. Then the two primers which were standing uncovered near the small forge were ignited, and in their turn, when the heated gases reached the detonator, the detonator and lastly the primer tin on the bench near the door ignited and detonated. With regard to the procedure of Captain Falconer in preparing dry primers for experimental charges, the Commissioners could not acquiesce in' the method adopted. The Commissioners considered that the application of solder to cases containing dry gun cotton is attended with very great danger, and individuals employed in submarine mining should forbid those under their orders to apply heating In any form to cases containing gun cotton, wet or dry. The stowage of live charges fitted with de-

tonators in the mine stores is against the recognised rales, particularly when the simple and ordinary precaution of insulating the ends of led wires from detonators is not observed. Still more irregular is the permitting of primer tins containing charges of dry gun cotton to be taken into a smith’s shop unprotected by cover when a forge was alight. Long custom and practical familiarity with gun cotton appear to have assured Captain Falconer that there was no danger to be anticipated by the above system of procedure. It appeared from the evidence of Captain Falconer that he had never been made acquainted with the existence of the War Office confidential memo, of 20/2/86. Captain Powell stated that this circular was brought up with others by Captain Falconer in June, 1889, and evidence received at Auckland from P.O. Grant, Corporal Boyle, and Torpedomen Barclay and Inglis tends to substantiate this. But there is no evidence to show how these circulars were obtained by Captain Falconer from the Defence Office, and Captain Falconer denies having brought any circulars at all with him when visiting Auckland in 1889. The Commissioners also observed on visiting Shelley Bay that oases containing the gun cotton supplied for filling mines, were not under cover; also, that the cases in which gun cotton cuttings from slabs and quadrants for filling mines were also open and exposed to the rain and sun. Suitable pits for gun cotton and for storage of such material are desirable. They also gathered from the evidence that the periodical testing of mines and spare gun cotton bad not been regularly carried out. However, the oases from which the slabs of gun cotton were taken for filling mines were previously weighed, but no returns of this or testing have ever been recorded apparently at Shelley Bay, or other submarine mining stations. The above remissness points to the necessity of there not only being a commanding officer to each of the submarine mining stations, but also to the necessity of a permanent responsible head, who should be answerable for such returns not only in connection with torpedo stores, but all warlike materials in the colony, in order that remissnees and departures from the regulation may be immediately checked. In conclusion, the Commissioners state that they found the Shelley Bay submarine establishment in creditable order. Captain Falconer is familiar with the details of submarine mining, and appears to be a steady, zealous, and intelligent officer in submarine mining work of every description. Whether mines or experimental charges are being prepared for action, service, or otherwise no precautions as laid down from time to time by the War Office should be neglected, and sure steps should be taken by the defence officer that such memoranda when issued as orders to commanding officers should be by them copied, noted, and returned. This would ensure acknowledgment on the part of commanding officers and a punctual adherence to them.