RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT.

Evening Star, Volume IX, Issue 2683, 22 September 1871, Page 2

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT.

This Day. (Before A. C. Strode, Esq., R.M.) Civil Cases. Hutchison v. Drummond.—L29os4d. Mr Stout for the plaintiff; Mr Catamoro for the defendant. This case was adjourned in order to obtain the evidence of Mrs Drummond respecting the arrangement with the plaintiff for fitting up the Octagon Hotel with gas. Mrs Drummond, on examination, said that Mr Hutchison fitted up the gaslittings for the sake of inducing the proprietor to take the gas, as just at that time there was an agitation in favor of using kerosene in hotels He said, “ I will make you a present of the gas-fittings out of friendship to you.” His Worship, in giving judgment, said he had heard of a present of jewellery to a lady, hut never heard of gas-tittings being given before. The evidence was a balance of probabilities, and they seemed to be strongly in favor of the plaintiffs claim. One circumstance, a slight one, seemed to confirm this view, as the defendant before opening the house said he “hoped the gas would he ready before the day of opening the house.” Judgment for the plaintiff for the amount claimed with costs. Moore v. Brown. —L4O 16s 4d, the amount of a dishonored acceptance, with interest, ndgment by default for the plaintiff for the amount claimed, with costs. Butterfield v. Spray.—L2, for balance of account for a quantity of fruit bought. The defendant pleaded a declaration of insolvency, but admitted the correctness of the account. Judgment for the plaintiff for the amount. Cullen y. Toucher. — : L10, a claim for damages for the removal of a fence. Mr Holmes for the plaintiff 5 Mr Stout for the defence. Mr Stout pleaded—lst. The Court had no jurisdiction. 2nd. Not guilty ; and 3rd. Complete justification, inasmuch as Toucher was servant of the Road Board and acted in that capacity. This was a case which, arose under the provisions of the Roads Diversion Ordinance. It appeared that by proclamation in the Provincial Government Gazette, notice had been given to close a road for which the plaintiff' was to have an equivalent, but the road was never formally closed. The plaintiff had erected fences, however, across the road, which were removed by the defendant, Mr Stout for the defence, said that the road was Crown property, and therefore the plaintiff had no power to deal with it. The Council itself had no power to deal with the road, and in addition to that the road had never been formally closed. His Worship had no doubt that the plaintiff had no case, for the road never was legally closed. The General Road Board had stopped short of what they had agreed to do. Mr Cullen might have a good cFaim to damages for npn fulfilment of contract by the General Road Board. The plaintiff was nonsuited with costs. Johnson v. Alex. .Stevenson. —L 8 9s Gd, for balance of aacount for Blacksmith's work. Judgment by default for the plaintiff for the amount with costs. Cutten (acting Provincial Treasurer) v. M‘Donald. —His Worship delivered judgment as folloM’s After giving the points raised by defendant’s counsel in this case every consideration, I am clearly of opinion that the plaintiff, as holder of the bills of exchange, is entitled to sue, notwithstanding any provision contained in the Provincial Lawsuits Act, 1858. There can be no doubt that the Superintendent of the Province under that Act would have been entitled to sue, the bills in question being the property of the Province ; but taking the bills of exchange as the contract between the parties, it appears to me to be clear that the holder of the bills is, under the terms of the contract, entitled to sue upon them. The Provincial Lawsuits Act, 1858, is to my mind a measure merely to enable the Superintendent of any Province to do certain things which lie could not do before—the preamble, 1 thmk, setting forth that view very jilainly. As to the second objection urged to the plaintiff’s recovering, 1 am of opinion that the fact of a payment to any person being the holder for the time being of the bills would prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations and therefore in the present case the statute only began to run on the 28th August, 1855. Judgment for plaintiff, LBB 3s 9d, together with costs.