ENGLAND’S FIGHTING STRENGTH AT SEA.

Evening Star, Volume VII, Issue 1924, 6 July 1869, Page 3

ENGLAND’S FIGHTING STRENGTH AT SEA.

Ou the subject of the reduction in the Naval Estimates, in connexion with a possible war with France, or with the United States, a daily contemporary remarks :—“ What we look in vain for in Mr Childers’ statement a consistent and defensible theory of what the Navy of Great Britain ought to be. Taking one class of ship with another, our naval strength is, perhaps, about equal to that of France. Ought this presumed equality to satisfy -us 1 It is something, of course, to know that, if we had to fight France alone, and could concentrate all our maritime force in the Channel, the chances would not be against us. But it will be seen that this hypothesis involves two very questionable assumptions. If England is again involved in a great war—and the main reason why the Admiralty exists is the possibility that she may be so involved—she may have to fight single-handed. But it is very unlikely that she would have to fight Avith a single-handed enemy. Whether our loye of non-inter-vention and the general tone of our diplomacy will ultimately keep us out of Avar may be questioned ; but there can be no doubt that it is admirably calculated to keep us out of allies. In proclaiming our indifference to European “ complications,” Ave are apt to forget that it may not be in our power to be equally indifferent to European combinations. A policy of entire abstention from continental affairs is a policy Avhich dispenses Avith the aid of friends; and, consequently, it requires, more than any other, an adequate supply of physical strength. Supposing France and Russia Avere ou one side, and Great Britain Avere alone on the other, what Avould be the probable history of the contest ? Again, in measuring our fleet Avith that of any other P.oAver, it must always he borne jn mind that’ it cannot be completely concentrated in the Channel without involving consequences almost as disastrous as a defeat. Wo shall have to protect our colonies and our commerce; and to do this effectually avc may have to detach a far greater number of ships than may be required on the part of the enemy to put them in serious peril. A small squadron of Avhich the destination is unknoAvn, may give ample employment abroad to two or three squadrons of the same size just at the moment when every ship is urgently wanted at Home. The omission of this element front the calculation is very conspicuous in Mr Childers's reference to the United States. ‘ They possess,’ he says ‘ no sea-going armoured ships, but they have an immense fleet aA'ajlable for defensive purposes.’ Perhaps this is exactly what"' they Avish to fiave. It must not be assumed that the want of sea-going armoured ships is, under all circumstances, a weakness. In a Avar between Great Britain and the United States, the policy of the latter might bo to undertake no offensive operations against our fleet, but to confine themselves to the defence of their own coast, and to the destruction of opr mercantile navy- Epr the former purpose Mr Childers tells us they ave well equipped. What he does not tell us is how they are off with regard to the latter. The example of the Alabama abundantly show* what a few fast cruisers may do

in the way of destroying commerce, and our turret ships with their 25-tou guns and twelve knots an hour would be about as competent to deal with them as a rhinoceros would be to overtake a greyhound. At present all we know is that a war with the United States is not, unhappily an impossible event, and the kind of warfare which would most harrass us is also the kind which would best suit American interests and the American character. In these two facts there is sufficient cause for anxiety.”