The Evening Post WELLINGTON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1945. A WORLD PARLIAMENT

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 127, 26 November 1945, Page 6

The Evening Post

WELLINGTON, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1945.

A WORLD PARLIAMENT

No holder of the office of British Secretary for Foreign Affairs has gone farther than Mr. Bevin in advocacy of a World Parliament. Probably none has ever gone so far. Later reports of his speech in the House of Commons show that he advocated a world assembly of sovereign power, elected by the world's peoples. Such an assembly could not be created without going past the national Governments of all countries, big and little. In an interpreting broadcast, Mr. Crossman, Labour member of the House of Commons, defines Mr. Bevin's proposal as a World Parliament "the members of which would be elected by the people of the world and not nominated by the nations"; that is to say, not by the national Governments. Each national

Government therefore would have to stand by and see its people join with other peoples in electing, by direct popular vote, an assembly which would be greater—if measured by the yardstick of the votes of the peoples—than any national Government itself. And if such an assembly would in that way be greater than the popular Governments, the logical conclusion would be that the assembly should choose a World Government greater than all Governments, just as the popular authority behind the World Parliament would surpass the authority of all Parliaments. But are all national Governments prepared to so subordinate themselves?

When Mr. Bevin speaks of popular elections he speaks of elections free and unfettered. Surely he means that the existence of a fetter such as a one-party system with a one-party candidature, or such as a single Government-approved list of candidates ofi approved colour, would be inadmissible in free elections. The recently reported General Elections in Portugal and Bulgaria were, it was cabled, single-list elections. The question therefore arises whether "oneparty democracy" could qualify for voting for the World Parliament. Where the election of a World Parliament is the objective, could a oneparty election in, say, Russia or Bulgaria, and an election in a country

where two or more parties compete, be regarded as one and the same thing? Under any genuine ballot-box test, the popularly elected members of a World Parliament would be answerable directly to their peoples, not to their peoples' national Governments; if so, how could the World Parliament and the World Government co-ordinate with the parallel national institutions, unless the latter yielded sovereignty? Clearly, sovereignty is the acid test. And Mr. Bevin's proposals do not stop at a World Parliament and a World Government. He speaks of a world law, a world judiciary, and a world police; he is reported as saying that "a great world sovereign elected assembly would hold in its care the destinies of the world." But,' once again: Would the national Governments step down?

"Meanwhile."., says Mr. Bevin, "there must be no weakening of the institution which was built up at San Francisco; it must be the prelude to further development." But between the Security Council and Mr. Bevin's World Parliament there is a difference of kind, a profound difference. So far as preventing war is concerned, each one of the Big Five in the Security Council will go with the Council only if each one so decides. But surely a World .Parliament presupposes that each Government of the Big Five will bow to the superior authority of the peoples of the world as embodied in a World Parliament which is superior to any national Government? To bridge the gap between the Security Council —braked by any one of the five Governments, or by a combination of other Governments —and a World Parliament, braked by no Government except its own World Government, requires something colossal in international architecture. How will Governments that profess to serve the proletariat face the possibility of being out-theorised by a Government they regard as capitalist?

Leftist opportunism has capitalised the physical situation that was created when Japan's sudden surrender caught the Allies in strategic situations, which were the wrong situations for a speedy acceptance by the Allies of the surrender of enemy armies, and for a speedy occupation of territory such as the yielding up of Japanese arms, and the release of prisoners and internees, required. Mr. Bevin shows, by dates, that it was physically impossible for British forces to immediately occupy all Indonesia on the Japanese surrender, and therefore reliance had to be placed on Japanese commanders to maintain law and order; which arrangement "broke down in Java." What Mr. Bevin said with regard to an ally's duty to an ally, with particular reference to Holland.and Java, should be read' carefully. Critics destroy one another's criticism when they blarrie Britain for being both too slow in Java and too fast.

Political philosophers will find something to ponder over in Mr. Bevin's contention that the best time for a popular vote for or against monarchy is a time when "the country should be as tranquil and prosperous as possible, so that judgment, and not prejudice and starvation, can be the guide." Under this prescription, Greece's vote for or against the King should be taken on a full stomach. In keeping with his World Parliament idea, Mr. Bevin declares that policy must not be based entirely on the Big Three. But, vetoes and all, the heavily-braked Security Council is at present the world's only crutch. This fact Mr. Bevin admits. Yet he hopes to limp to better things.