OCCUPATION FORCE

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 79, 1 October 1945, Page 6

OCCUPATION FORCE

When requested by the United Kingdom Government to share the responsibility for the occupation of Japan, New Zealand could not do otherwise than comply. This is part of the war job, for Japan, as Mr. Fraser has pointed out, must be disarmed, her war industries dismantled, and her militaristic spirit subdued. We cannot permit bowing and smiling [Japanese to end the war with an apologetic "So sorry," and then begin immediately preparations for another war that will not end with apologies. And when New Zealanders say "we" cannot allow this, they must be ready to take their part in preventing it. This means more than passing resolutions for the punishment of Japanese war criminals, for the establishment of bases, and,generally for a firm peace. It means supplying the men, the arms, the resources, and the money to assure that "Japan is kept in subjection till she can safely be admitted to a free place among peaceful nations. Of course New Zealand can do but a little towards this, but her readiness to do that little has significance now and for the future. If we cavil at contributing to an occupation force six weeks after the war has ended, what reliance can be placed upon any claims we may make for a responsible share in pacifying the Pacific, say, six years hence? A token force now is a token of capacity and willingness to play our part according -to our! strength.

There are further good reasons for complying. The wording of Mr. Attlee's original message suggests one: "We trust that we may rely on your assistance, and indeed we regard your assistance as indispensable." We.cannot interpret Mr. Attlee's meaning, but we may safely assume that the British Prime Minister did not mean that a brigade, an air force squadron, and a few ships from New Zealand were in themselves indispensable for the successful occupation of Japan. That force can be but a small part of the total armed strength to be employed in occupying Japan, completing the liberation of East Asian and Pacific territories, and generally sealing the peace so dearly won. Rather we would assume that Mr. Attlee underlined his request so that it. might not be regarded as a mere wish for material support. Britain, through her Prime Minister, said to us in effect: "We.have won the war together; let us show the world that we will keep together." One cannot read the news of any day without, perceiving the value of such a demonstration. All over the world may be seen the evidence of post-war tension. Never was there a time when the unity, solidity, and stability of the British nations should be more carefully preserved. And to be worth while it must be unity in action, not only in words.

On the Government's plan in detail for responding to the United Kingdom request there is, however, room for difference of opinion. This is a matter for New Zealand. Except that there appears to have been an original suggestion of brigade groups from the various British oountries, it was entirely for New Zealand to say how the force she contributed should be constituted and how recruited. The Government proposes to recruit it in the first place by compulsion from men now overseas, and later by voluntary enlistment from men in New Zealand. The difference of method is hard to explain. If the argument for using the men overseas is time and urgency, then why has there been delay? Mr. Fraser states: ". . . when it became clear that Japan intended to surrender Mr. Attlee .... consulted me" regarding the occupation force. That was evidently before the actual surrender, and at a time when the 16th Reinforcements had not been demobilised. Though not sufficient for a brigade group these men with possibly others who could have been made available would have gone a long way towards supplying the strength required. Special personnel and certain officers and n.c.o.s would have had to be obtained elsewhere, but that is to be done if the force is taken from the 13th, 14th, and 15th Reinforcements. The Government proposes to form the brigade "from the single men of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Reinforcements of the 2nd N.Z.E.F., who have seen little or no actual fighting." The sentence is unfortunately worded. Does it mean that the force is to be formed by selecting single men "who have seen little or no actual fighting," or that the reinforcements named are classed as a whole as. "having seen little or no actual fighting"? This cannot be correct, at least as affecting men of the 13th Reinforcements, who have been overseas a year and many if not most of whom were in the final offensive in Italy—and that offensive could not come within the phrase "little or no actual fighting."

The point is that, if non-participation in battle is a reason for drafting the overseas men for further service, then that reason applies much more strongly to the men who have not left New Zealand. There is another side of the argument, too. If the lack of battle experience does not make the overseas men unsuitable (and apparently it does not, as the more experienced are to be excluded) then it should not be a bar to employing a proportion of men recruited in New Zealand. Regarded from the angle of ensuring equality of service, the whole weight of. argument favours the men overseas. Many of them are the "eighteen-year-olds" who served two years or more in the Dominion before entering on overseas service. They are entitled to ask for the earliest opportunity to begin training for a career, and not to have even a few months added to their service for the relief of somebody else. This applies to the single men, some of whom are single because they have never had an opportunity to marry, and may not get it for years if their career preparation is deferred. Why the Government demobilised, the 16th Reinforcements so quickly when this call was being discussed is difficult; to understand. A proportion of the men who thus had early release had been held in industry for a long time, and personally had suffered little war hardship. They could more reasonably have been asked to remain longer. That emphasises the marked inequity in the compulsion for men already serving and free choice for those in New Zealand