FRANCE BEFORE THE FALL

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 59, 7 September 1945, Page 4

FRANCE BEFORE THE FALL

SOLDIER AND CIVILIAN

IDEAS OF AN ARMISTICE

When the chosen leaders of France, Petain and Weygand, summoned by the Premier, Paul Reynaud, at a critical stage of the German invasion in May, 1940, to save France, began instead to show signs that they were already "despairing of the Republic"—something- the Romans in their darkest hour never did—the idea of an armistice with the Germans sapped the essence of war effort. If the leaders of the armies thought they were beaten, what was to be expected of the rank and file and the masses of the civilian population? M. Reynaud resumes his story of these tragic times.

evitable, Weygand drew the darkest conceivable picture ... in striking contrast to the confidence he was subsequently to show on July 11. He demonstrated that the Army was fighting against odds of three to one and that it had lost four-fifths of its armour. He concluded that, should we be beaten, we should have to prepare ourselves to meet peace proposals. I replied that, even admitting his premises, there need not be any immediate • armistice. The decision we had to take was to settle where the Government would go if the Battle of France should end in our defeat in order to avoid the Government falling into the hands of the enemy. I expressed the opinion that Tours was too near the front; that the central massif (the Auvergne) might too easily become a prison, and so I voted for Bordeaux. Marshal Petain said a few words. He was prepared to go even farther than Weygand. He stated that France's only obligations to England were those commensurate with the assistance given her by England, as, in his opinion, that assistance had been very feeble. Weygand observed that England was threatened with invasion. He urged pressingly that immediate conversations be opened between the French and British Governments on this matter. I replied that such conversations would not be of the slightest use, since the British Government's determination to carry on the war was unshakeable. This closed the debate. Weygand's attempt had failed. FROM NORTH AFRICA. I set to work preparing for a continuation of the war from North Africa. Four hundred thousand men had already been mobilised there. Not only had the Ministry of War taken no steps in the matter, but when I told General Colson, Chief of the General Staff, that I intended calling up two classes and sending them to Africa, he exclaimed: "But that is impossible! You would not have any rifles to give them." General Weygand later gave evidence at Riom that only 5000 rifles remained in the stores. Despite everything, I resolved to levy 125,000 men and to buy rifles in Spain and America. The evidence given on this point at the Riom Court gives an idea of the prevalent disorder at the Ministry of War. During the trial the commander of an arsenal remarked amid general laughter: "If anyone had asked me, I could have given them arms. I had as many as anybody could want!" On June 5 I telephoned to President Roosevelt to tell him that I had made up my mind to carry on the war in North' Africa, and to ask him to be good enough to send 75mm. field guns to Casablanca. He said he wbuld. I came up against fresh difficulties concerning the housing and training of the half-class of recruits I was calling up to go to North Africa. I was informed that it would be impossible to j find accommodation for them. On June 2 General Nogues sent a telegram [detailing the difficulties. On June 3 General Colson sent me the following memo: ". . . The Army General Staff considers it desirable that this contingent be not incorporated in North Africa." I sent for General Colson and told him of my determination to take action despite these objections. I reminded him that there was a war on and told him that if there was a will to accommodate these recruits a way would be found. As he was going out of my office General Colson, to whom I made it clear that. I was going to smash any obstacle put in the way, said to the director of my military secretariat: "Please draw the Premier's attention to the fact that it was only a memo. ' On June 16 General Colson became Minister of War in the Petain Cabinet, and I learned from the Marshal's biographer that Colson "was another of I the Marshal's men."

REYNAUD'S DILEMMA

By Paul Reynaud. It was at the beginning of the last week in May that the Marshal began to show his cards. Now I found Petain and Weygand combining against me to say that, if we were beaten in France, we must ask for an armistice! In vain did I urge upon them that we could not, whatever the price, part from our Allies. Furthermore, I pointed out that France could ill afford to be the only one of Germany's enemies to capitulate while she retained, untouched, the second largest Empire in the world and the second largest fleet in Europe. Finally, and above all, I argued that France had pledged her word and she could not dream of breaking it. To this the Marshal replied: "You are placing yourself on the international plane, whereas I remain on the national plane." 'General Weygand energetically supported the Marshal's thesis with the extraordinary argument: "We have got to keep an army in order so as to maintain (internal) order." Weygand improved on Petain's proposal by suggesting that, should we lose the battle being fought on the Somme and the Aisne, the Government and public administration should remain in Paris and there await the arrival of the Germans just as Roman senators had sat in their chairs awaiting the arrival of barbarians. GET ON OR GET OUT. Despite the -feeling of gratitude which I had felt towards these two illustrious soldiers, had I followed my impulse I should have immediately sunimoned a Cabinet Council, got it to reject the Petain-Weygand proposal, and invited the two men to submit or clear out. But I had just appointed a new Commander-in-Chief. Could I. be expected to give the French army a third Commander-in-Chief within five days—at a time when the supreme test was taking place and when the invasion of the whole of France depended on the result? The appointment of Petain and Weygand had, both in the army and in the country, given rise to a great wave of confidence. Was I, by provoking the sudden departure of Petain and relieving Weygand of his command in the middle of a battle, t~> deal a mortal blow to this public confidence? Anyway, whom could I put in Weygand's place? In September, 1939,' General Gamelin was the only one of our generals who had been a major on the outbreak of the 1914 war. All the others had been captains or lieutenants. Petain and Weygand were perfectly well aware of the strength of the position they had taken, increased by the praises which I had just publicly bestowed upon them. That is why I prepared the following plan:—To avoid an open break, to prepare with the General Staff the continuation of the war in Africa, and to reconstruct my Cabinet by eliminating those of its members who I had reason to suppose might vote for an armistice. I intended undertaking a second surgical operation a few days later on the body of the High Command. I hoped that, should we lose the Battle of France, the patriotism of Petain and Weygand would allow them to alter their convictions when faced by a unanimous decision of the Cabinet and I could thus avoid a break with them. Right up to the end I" looked upon these two men as mistaken patriots. . WEYGAND'S DARK PICTURE. At the sitting of the War Committee held at the Elysee on May 25, 1940. General Weygand, with Marshal Petain's support, tried to _ obtain the opening of negotiations with the British Government with a view to the conclusion of an armistice in certain possible circumstances. In an effort to represent his conclusion as in-