THE GOD OF POWER

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIX, Issue 121, 24 May 1945, Page 6

THE GOD OF POWER

The age-old battle between principle and expediency has flared up on the San Francisco front, where the exponents of self-determination fight a losing battle against the holders •of power. In theory, every democratic national Government, backed by its Parliament and people, has a right to determine what shall happen to it, in peace and in war. In practice, nearly every national Government has discovered that its rights are no greater than its power to preserve them. A world war, for instance, develops against the will of many Governments of limited military power; some of them become involved, as in 1914-18, and still more of them become involved in the "total" war 1? 939-45, nearly always against their popular will, and because power is greater than principle. Because the kind of collective security erected after 1918—a collective security which paraded principle rather than power—proved to be no protection against first Japan,

then Italy, then Germany, the United Nations today feel themselves ■ driven towards a power-based security. This is the working of necessity, not of choice. So long as the possessors of power are few in number, an even apportionment of authority among all the contracting Governments is a manifest impossibility. Almost inevitably the Governments who are powerpossessors will claim the right of decision, including the right of veto. This is not in line with the representative principles of democracy, but it is in line with facts. The only question at issue is the degree to which the power-possessors will allow the other Governments the right of being heard and of exercising in some directions a limited authority.

At San Francisco principle can win its battle against expediency only by rejecting the whole plan of peace based upon power, and bringing it to naught. But this would appear to be no • victory, and would seem to be — judging by the. experience between the two World Wars—a method of inviting renewed efforts to destroy all the smaller nations by warfare. "The Times," in view of the continuing threats, in the European field, to a precarious peace, and in view of the struggle between expediency and principle at San Francisco, urges in an editorial that the nations of Europe cannot face the prospect of AngloRussian non-accord. Without it, the prospect for both Britain and Russia, and all the European States, Would be "dark." In its technical perfection, principle has no chance of ruling the new international power-based order; but power may make concessions voluntarily, saving the face of principle. To save the face of the general assembly of Governments, the Big Five of the security council may allow the assembly certain rights of discussion and even of initiative; but it is still not certain how far those rights will go. There is also a vagueness concerning the executive powers of regional combinations —such as Latin America— that do not include in their membership any member of the Big Three (or Four or Five). What is certain is that the demands of lesser States that are based on principle can be met only in degree, which is another way of saying that expediency rules. If Hitler did nothing else, he succeeded in forcing the post-war world to take that view, at any rate for the time being. The merits of the new order, and its duration in point of time, are another question. In' approaching war prevention, .'the-United Nations must consider the Real, and the Moment, before they consider the Ideal and the unpredictable future.

Outside of war prevention, there is more scope for long-term vision; but the limitations governing the immediate question of how to deal with aggression are sufficiently indicated by the power of veto resting in each individual of the Big Five. This power of veto, so far as one of the Big Three is concerned, might stop the whole machine. At first, it was reported that Russia claimed right of veto of the use of force in an alleged aggression in which she herself is concerned. Lately, it was. further reported that the Russian delegation at San Francisco interprets the Yalta agreement as "giving Russia the right to veto proposals for the peaceful settlement of a dispute when Russia herself is not a party to the dispute." Next to aggression prevention, perhaps the most ticklish question is trusteeship. According to the latest news, Egypt moved to place all League of Nations mandates under a trusteeship council. Australia, like New Zealand, has on several occasions voted independently of the British delegation •—exploding the idea of a British bloc at San Francisco —but on this occasion Australia joined Britain and America in voting against the Egyptian amendment. As to New Zealand, "Mr. Fraser indicated that he favoured the Egyptian amendment, but refrained from voting because he was chairman of the committee. Mr. Fraser said that the committee's action left the question of the disposition of mandates in midair." It would be interesting to see how Dr. Evatt and Mr. Fraser expound their respective attitudes, with regard both to principle and to the expediency which may be inherent in the particular circumstances of present Australian and New Zealand mandates and their relation to Pacific defence.