The Evening post WELLINGTON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1944. REMARKABLE NAVAL-AIR BATTLE

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVIII, Issue 133, 2 December 1944, Page 6

The Evening post WELLINGTON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1944. REMARKABLE NAVAL-AIR BATTLE

Of the several sea engagements that make up the Battle of the Philippines, the engagement north of Leyte was of particular interest, and some needed light is thrown on it by the commander of the American task force, RearAdmiral Sprague. He shows that the Japanese had succeeded admirably in placing the Americans in a position, locally, of great inferiority; and this fact in itself serves to show how great were the risks that the American High Command took (open-eyed) when it proceeded against Saipan and later against the Philippine Islands. To carry out the Philippine operations Admiral Nimitz had to divide his naval-air forces; he could not be sure that his task forces, in the course of their widespread operations, would each of them be equal to the Japanese force it might meet; and it was quite in accord with this American policy of audacity at sea that Sprague's task force might (and did) "run against a greatly, superior fleet. After all, one of the strategic purposes of the Allies was' to force the Japanese navy to fight. Already, at Saipan, Nimitz had given his naval enemy a considerable inducement to come out and do battle for that island, and the inducement had to some extent succeeded, for it will fie remembered that the Japanese fleet took tip a battle position with a view to relieving the Japanese garrison on Saipan and driving the Allies away; but the preliminary air fight resulted in such damage to the Japanese ships and aircraft-carriers that they withdrew with losses, and declined a fight to a finish. Then, in due course, Saipan fell, and became later a base for the bombing of Tokio.

But if the seizure of Saipan provided an inducement to the Japanese fleet to commit itself to battle, the Allied attack on the immense and' vital Philippine Group represented not only inducement but almost compulsion •to the .Japanese naval command to solidly intervene. If the atfcjck on Saipan necessitated some diversion of American forces at sea, the attack on the Philippines required still -more diversion, and a time-tabled plan of such complexity that a single hitch on the attacking side might provide an excellent opportunity for the Japanese offensive defence. Ordinary luck might enable one of the three naval divisions sent out by Japan to find in its path an inferior Allied force which it might gobble up, And this was just the luck that befell the Japanese naval division that steamed south (apparently from Japan' or Formosa) to a point north of Leyte Island, at which point it was located by Rear-Admiral Sprague at 5 o'clock in the morning. The Japanese commander had a compact and formidable force of four battleships, seven cruisers (heavy and light), and "about nine" destroyers. Against this array of .heavy guns and fast ships of lesser armament Sprague had six ships of the kind called escort carriers, three destroyers, and. four destroyer escorts. The disproportion was terrific. "We figured," says Sprague, "that we would be blown out of the water." Well might the Japanese commander borrow Cromwell's words: "The Lord hath delivered them into our hands."

But though luck had favoured the Japanese commander fully as much as he could have presumed to hope, the cup of victory did not reach his lips. He did not miss it because his inferior enemy sought safety in flight. Sprague decided that as he was "for it" anyhow, he might as well attack and do as much damage as he could. It was here that the luck turned, for a torpedo attack resulted in one hit on a Japanese battleship; but the story of the entire action is still incomplete. It must have required much more than a torpedo hit to turn back the Japanese commander from his objective—relief of the Japanese garrison on Leyte by destroying the Allied shipping there— and to leave Japan such a poor strategic return for her achievement of local superiority. The turning back of the Japs is the more remarkable because of the fact that their heavy guns were able to take toll of the American escort carriers; for instance, one of the latter (the Gambier Bay) was sunk by a 6-inch shell, while another (the St. Lo) wag lost through causes unspecified. The fact that 1400 men were rescued from these seems to indicate that the enemy ships were unable to press their initial advantage; and it may be found, when the full story of the battle is told, that the inferior Allied force was again saved by air power. It is one of the virtues of air power that widely separated task forces, if they haye t aircraftcarriers, can help one another. After noting that the Japanese "fired about 300 salvoes in 150 minutes," American reports conclude: "Meanwhile aeroplanes from another Allied "task force were working over the Japanese ships, doing considerable damage. The Japanese finally turned for home at 9.35 a.m. Every one of their ships had been.sunk or damaged."

One would expect the Japanese Government. to be profoundly discouraged by the fact that (1) its naval power failed to save Saipan; (2) its naval power so far has failed to save Leyte; (3) even when only a very inferior enemy naval force stood between Leyte and "a major portion of the Japanese fleet," a two to four hours' battle had to be broken off by the Japanese with the balance of loss probably against them and without achievement of tfyeir strategic objective. It is a striking fact that even when the Allies are heavily outgunned by Japan in a local area, air power can turn the tide. The fact that Sprague, in his inferiority, fought and did not run, has put some clear writing on the wall. Its purport is not favourable to Japan.