POLITICAL PHASES OF WAR DEEPEN

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVIII, Issue 83, 5 October 1944, Page 6

POLITICAL PHASES OF WAR DEEPEN

Describing the present war in Europe terms of the Great Powers engaged it, the war began as two against ie, Britain, and France v. Germany; icame a war of one against two, when c falling of .our ally France brought aly in as Germany's ally; later (in 41) became a war of three against /o when Hitler and Tojo attacked ussia and America, and placed them Britain's side; and still later (in 43) became a war of three against ie when Italy caved in, leaving Gerany to fight Britain, America, and ussia. The co-operation between the Lg Three, it will be seen, was forced l them. They did not enter the war ; three members of a long-standing xlitical and military alliance —such an liance as has all its military mutual Tangements and its political and ■rritorial objectives blue-printed for jars in advance of hostilities. Hitler as so precipitate in June, 1941, and ajo was so sudden in December of Le same year, that the Big Three, ritain, Russia, and America, had no me to blue-print anything. In accord iththe law of self-preservation, their rst need was military mutual help to :ive back Germany; therefore this ilitary co-operation came at once to ie surface, and those differences of Dlitical and territorial objective which ere likely, at a future date to confront ich suddenly cemented Allies were [lowed to lie latent. In 1942 Poland ■as very far from being liberated. If nyone had said that the new Poland rould be a hurdle for the Big Three, ie answer might have been: "We will ot jump our hurdles before we come > them." At the same time it. was quite yident to any thinking person, in the ght of history, and in the light of LI human experience, that a Hitlerictated arid Tojo-dictated military coperation, such as the Big Three, rould run into political snags as soon s it had laboriously removed the bulk f the military snags. As rapidly as ie soldier improved the military avigation, with equal rapidity the olitical navigation would be obtructed by the appearance above water f the political snags—so much was ertain—and it might even be possible tiat in the end the. politician might teal from the soldier the bulk of the Icture. And this new phase—which lay be called politicalisation, for want f a better word—has duly kept its ime-table, and has developed with auch emphasis now that two of the Jig Three in the west, and Russia in he east, are on or across Germany's, rontier. During the military coiperation of 1942 it did not sound right o talk of dividing the German tiger's kin before first killing the beast; it vas recognised that we had to kill the iger first, and that fact placed a great nilitary emphasis on the "we." But in .944.Germany's enemies feel so close o securing Germany's skin that it is proposed to compensate the Poles with German territory taken and given- to Poland to make up for Polish territory vhich Russia has decided—unilaterally, t seems—to take for herself. It is in iccord with human nature, and with iie history of loose alliances, that such a surgical operation on Poland md Germany should -not have the leadlines when the German army was lear the gates of Moscow, bnt should jnter the limelight with the Russian re-entry into Poland this year. Most people are inclined to be saints when they are ill—and war is a desperate illness when you appear to be. losing—but how many take the same views in recovery, and in a recovery that now seems, to amount to victory? One of the charges against the Versailles Peace Conference'was that annexation crept .- in—either directly or in the form of mandates — when a "no annexation" atmosphere had been created. In the present case, Russia gave notice in advance of her territorial intentions with regard to Poland by her occupation of part of Poland in agreement with Germany in 1939; but this bilateral act in 1939 was not binding on the Poles without their consent, nor would a Russian unilateral action today, in the absence of their consent, be binding on them. The only easy escape from this difficult position would be a voluntary agreement between Russia and the Poles—for which Britain has worked diplomatically— but an initial difficulty is that Britain recognises one Polish Government in London and Russia appears to recognise another Polish Government in Moscow. The difficulty has been intensified by the reported fall of Warsaw to the Germans; by factual disputes as to the circumstances of the Polish uprising in Warsaw, which has cost so many Polish lives; and by allegations that the Poles in Warsaw looked to London, that therefore Russia was slow to help them, and that some Poles had been arrested in Poland by Russia for refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the Polish Government in Moscow, which Moscow calls the Polish Committee of Liberation. A few days ago, in the House of Commons, the following exchange was reported: Sir A. Knox, Conservative M.P. foi Wycombe: Is it not true thai several individuals have beer arrested and deported because thej refused to take the oath of allegiance to the so-called Committee of Liberation? Mr. Eden: As soon as these reports were brought to my notice I brought them to the notice of the Sovie' Government as I thought it my dutj to do. You will understand tha there is no matter which causes more concern to H.M. Government at thi: time than relations between oui Polish and our Russian allies. Earl Winterton, Conservative M.F for Horsham: Is it not a fact tha the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden cannot be responsible for difference of opinion between our allies am that it is not for this House to sa? how' they should be resolved? . . Could Mr. Eden not make it clea that H.M. Government can only b responsible for the conduct of H.M Government and cannot be respon sible for the conduct of othe nations? Mr. Eden: You are absolutel; correct. That is why I explained tha I was asked a question about affair which concern two of our allies fo which my responsibility is not direc Sir A. Southby, Conservative M.I for Epsom: Whiie it is a fact the these are matters of delicacy, are nc matters concerning our responsibilit to our ally Poland also matters c principle? Mr. Eden: Yes sir, and oi ' responsibility has been fully and, might add, gallantly discharged. Without entering into the question c merits or demerits, it is quite cleE that such exchanges would not ha\ been heard in the days of 1942 whe jiziiiixmzL was in, :t/hft ibslailC© .Wit

victory in sight, the political rocks emerge. Will they endanger victory by impeding navigation?

Newspaper opinion in London seems to be divided on the question whether a solution of differences of opinion with Russia concerning Poland—and according to today's news, concerning Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Balkans —would be better served by reserve or by plain speaking. The "Tribune" is quoted as inclining to the opinion that if Mr. Stalin is permitted to know that Russia's present policy trends are opposed by "the great majority of British public opinion," and that Russia through her immediate frontier gains may sacrifice the long-range advantages of Anglo-American co-operation, then Mr. Stalin will dull the edge of Russia's • immediate demands. It will not be "the first time that Stalin revised a policy which had been driven beyond the limit by hotheads inside the Soviet Administration."