JAPAN'S ANSWER TO SAIPAN?

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVIII, Issue 11, 13 July 1944, Page 4

JAPAN'S ANSWER TO SAIPAN?

Saipan, now completely in the hands of the Allies, is a milestone of the Japanese Avar. There, have been other milestones, Guadalcanal toeing the first. Nothing is more illuminating than to compare Guadalcanal with Saipan. When thS American marines landed in ifyis lower island of the Solomon chain in 1942, the Japanese were sorry for them; today the Japanese are sorry for themselves. In 1942 Jfapan regarded the recapture of Guadalcanal and the death of the garrison of marines as a foregone conclusion;'today they offer no such boasts. In 1942-43 Japan reacted to Allied forward moves with fleet actions—a whole series of them; but they «have not accepted any offer of naval battle in 1944, though they almost did so recently north of the Philippines, when their aircraft-carriers attempted to intervene aerially in the Saipan fighting, but were damaged and fled. The net result, to date, is that in 1944 the Japanese navy has taken no action comparable with its earlier pugnacity, which led to a series of battles which were decided mainly by air action, but which yet entailed heavy ship losses, not confined to one side. This taming of the Japanese navy is all the more remarkable when it is seen that two years ago Japanese warships rushed in even to avenge an insult on the far horizon; but today,, with the Saipan pistol pointed right at Japan's heart, the Mikado's navy no longer rushes in. Japanese strategists have placed on record statements that make the taming of the Japanese navy still more remarkable. They said that Japan/though forced to submit to Solomon losses, certainly would not tolerate the loss of Rabaul. But today Rabaul is lost to them as an offensive factor, and so is the still more vital Truk, while the even more sacred island of Saipan has passed altogether to the Allies. One Japanese authority has admitted that Saipan is a vital part of Japan's inner defences—but still the Japanese navy bides its time. Tokio, it thus seems, strains at a gnat-the Guadalcanal gnat —yet swallows a. camel like Saipan, the' Allied occupation of which means both insult and injury to the land of the Rising Sun. "Already," says a New York message, "American fighter aircraft are operating from Saipan against the, Japanese." It takes less time to repair airfields than to repair a port, but the Japanese and the Germans are really in the same boat when the Allies turn against them a Saipan or a Cherbourg. In each case inner defences have been breached. With Cherbourg functioning in the Normandy.battle, all the world will look to the German army for an answer. Equally, all the world looks to the Japanese navy for the answer "to Saipan. And, so far, looks in vain. Japan's naval inactivity is not compensated by her land activity in China. This war cannot be won by Japan's invasion of China or of any part of China. Nor could it have been won by a Japanese invasion of Australia. Australians and New Zealanders are very fortunate in that Japan tried the invasion theory on China and not on Australasia; but the sufferings of China, deep as they are, do not conceal the fact that Japan cannot win her war by any action she may take on the mainland of Asia, though she may lose it there, and definitely would lose it if Russia's eastern armies marched against her. Unless the Japanese can wholly transfer- themselves to -the Asiatic mainland, to the extent of becoming a continental Power, they must stand or fall with their home territory, the Japanese islands. Two years ago it seemed that the Allies might find the continental route (which, in its widest meaning, involves Burma and Malaya as well as China) the surest and quickest route to Japan. But since then the art of by--1 passing and the general technique of "triphibious" war in the Pacific area have made tremendous progress under the spur of American genius and American war production capacity. Even a disaster like Pearl Harbour has been cancelled rapidly. The whole story of the last year has tended to emphasise the speed of the "triphibious" approach to the Philippine islands, the coast of China, and to Japan herself. The great coup by which Japan might reverse the situation—a naval battle ending in decisive Japanese victory, the answer to Saipan—is still lacking. Meanwhile Nimitz and MacArthur have not merely bypassed Truk and Rabaul. They even aspire to bypass Burma, Malaya, arid the East Indies by striking at the east coast of China and at the heart of the enemy empire. This is the big stake that is now being played for; and the very fact that such a coup is even thought of indicates how radically the strategy of the Asia-Pacific war has been influenced by technical and tactical achievements. The "triphibious" effort of the Allies to short-circuit the approach to Japan's doorstep is the most serious challenge the Japanese navy has faced. since it sank the Russian fleet at Tsushima. Both Japanese honour and Japanese interest seem to demand that the challenge at no distant date must be accepted.