EUROPE'S ITALIAN HEEL IS SMITTEN

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 121, 24 May 1944, Page 4

EUROPE'S ITALIAN HEEL IS SMITTEN

The first big land operation of the northern spring—so far as the Western Allies are .concerned —is now in full swing in Italy. It represents one blow on the perimeter of Germany's defensive circle —on part of the southern sector —but it must be considered in relation not only to its immediate environment but to the dispositions of German forces around and within the whole circle. These dispositions are so extensive and so delicately balanced that a major blow on one sector can powerfully affect the whole. Only a few days ago the German defence in Italy seemed to have succeeded in making the position there static— almost in creating a stalemate. Such a stalemate, if it could have been established and preserved, would have simplified the German strategists' problem in the disposing of their forces and reserves throughout Europe. German strategists could have said: "We have hardened the 'soft underbelly of Europe'; we have 'sealed off1 the breach made by the Allies in Italy; we have preserved our carefully-thought-out defensive dispositions; we have prevented the foe from putting our scientifically distributed strength out of balance." Only a few days ago Germany could have made that boast —but how the front in Italy has been

swiftly widened and electrified, and Germany is committed there to great and costly and continuous battles, so that she can hardly draw out her divisions or prevent other divisions from being drawn in.

It will be recognised that this feature of the latest Italian developments gives them an importance which not only affects the southern sector but shakes the defences of the whole "fortress of Europe." That "underbelly" of Europe which was soft, and then became hard, is now again softening. Can Germany once more stiffen it? And, if it is physically possible for the German army to again make the "underbelly" hard ; in Italy, without weakening it in the Balkan Peninsula and in south France, can German strategy afford to make the required diversion of forces to the south from the west and the east, where much mightier armies than the armies in Italy are crouched to spring? The local moves along the widened Italian war-front may be followed on a map of Italy. But behind the map of Italy the strategist sees the map of Europe, and he sees a group of men in Germany absorbed in organising new movements of military power—movements which are exhausting in themselves, besides which they provide targets for the AngloAmerican units that fight continuously on the air front. The strategist sees the encircled foe no longer capable of expanding ■ his circle by "blitz" warfare, but compelled to retract it, and to constantly cut his military coat according to the cloth he possesses now, or will possess after the costly and exhaustive "flare-up" in Italy has run its course.

Kesselring's task was to show that Germany has no Achilles heel in Italy. He thought he had succeeded.- Now he is not so sure. He put a military tourniquet on the Italian ankle to stop the flow of German blood. Concerning Italian blood he did not worry; it suits Germany that either her enemies or her allies should provide her battlefields. But the German tourniquet now is being roughly dealt with, and Germany today bleeds more heavily in Italy than- she has bled there for many a month. Bulgaria and the Balkans take note of this; they also note that even a limited beach-head like Anzio-Nettuno could not be destroyed by the attacking Germans. Bulgaria, now in crisis, must picture a Europe with several Allied beachheads and with at least two fiercely fought land fronts. Italy provides the writing on the wall. The revived Italian campaign is the early swallow of a summer in which the German fortress, softened all round, will fall to ruins.