Evening Post. SATURDAY, APRIL 22, 1944. NAZIS FACE WAR ON TWO FRONTS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 95, 22 April 1944, Page 6

Evening Post. SATURDAY, APRIL 22, 1944. NAZIS FACE WAR ON TWO FRONTS

A true picture of the German army's reaction against the Russians in the Tarnopol area and in the north is not easy to draw. At the moment there is a tendency to regard the German army's limited offensives as being really defensive in character, and not as indicating any comprehensive attempt by Hitler's generals to regain the military initiative. A German commentator—whether his purpose is to inform or to misinform is not yet clear—is "damping down" the idea of a big-scale German counter-offensive by "cautioning the German people against expecting too much from the German counter-thrusts at Stanislavov and Tarnopol, which 'are local operations designed to improve and strengthen the front.'" Northward, on the Baltic sector, "the Germans launched a very heavy attack to throw the Red Army from its bridgehead in Latvia .. . the attack failed."- Now, is this heavy attack a prelude to a big German counter-offensive, or is it designed to put off their balance the Russians now regrouping in the north for another big Soviet drive? Drew Middleton seems to support the latter answer to the question when he writes that "the Russians are making huge regrouping preparations for a campaign across Poland this spring and summer, where the Russian High Command hopes at last to catch and destroy the main body of the German army in the east."

According to Middleton, the Red Army, amid all its .successes in the south, has not forgotten the need of striking this summer at the very heart of Germany; and that blow at the heart will be timed with a knowledge of the timing of the AngloAmerican invasion of western Europe. Fighting on two fronts, Germany may be compelled to radically alter the disposition of her military forces, responding to relative pressures against her in the east and in the west. Whether the heat will be turned on against Germany firstly in the east and secondly in the west, or vice versa, is not evident. If there is an excessive concentration of German power in the west, the Red Army may displace it by opening the spring-summer offensive; if the German concentration is in the east,, the Anglo-American invasion may come first; and the main purpose will be, in any case, to draw away German reserves, and draw them into battle, until no strategic reserve, sufficient for a war on two land-fronts, remains at Germany's disposal. There was a time in 1917-18 when, the Russian war.effort ceasing, Ludendorff could transport his huge eastern armies westward to concentrate against Foch and. Haig in the west. Today it is very different. The war that could not be won by Germany on one front in.1918 has to be won by Germany today on two fronts—one present, one potential. And the great hazard that will make or unmake the western land front is imminent. / ■

The war of nerves has now.gripped Germans for a long time.' They exist under the shadow of the sword. How helpful to them, morally, would be a great German counter-offensive against Russia! Why does not. the German Government give them that moral help by ordering the once invincible German army to wipe the Red Army out of existence? Must the answer be that the German army cannot or dare not risk its fortunes on a campaign eastward, while the shadow of the western sword impends? Evidence of the war of nerves is found in a number of questions posed —with sedative answers appended—by the ''Kurier" of ' Stuttgart: "Everywhere, in restaurants, railways, offices, and factories, many problems are now being discussed. .. . . Why do we not throw our reserves into battle? How long do we want to wait with our bombing retaliation? Until all our cities are smashed to dust? Why don't we use our aviation reserves if we have them? Is it not a fact that the British and the Americans are now literally swamping us with their unlimited material, that by the continuous invasion threat our reserves are immobilised in western and southern Europe, and that during this time we are bleeding to death in Russia?. Why don't we do something about it?" The answers that the "Kurier" attempted to give were not cabled; the significance lies in the fact that sucli questions could be publicly asked. Meanwhile the air "blitz" on Germany intensifies. The Germans know that the big blow in the west is coming. It would be a relief to them to know when, but no such relief will be given. Like the people of Rotterdam, they will know the hour of the deluge when it arrives.