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NOTES ON THE WAR

ANZIO QUERY

WHAT WENT WRONG?

Things are going very well in Russia, where Marshal Zukhov's army in the Western Ukraine has cut Mannstein's "life line," fhe Lvov-Odessa railway. The Italian front is quiet again in immbolising rain. ,

, The Anzio beach-head affair still presents a big query, and any information that can suggest a clue to an answer is worth consideration. Mr. William Barr, an Australian war correspondent, representing the combined Empire Press, who landed with the first Allied forces to disembark on January 2, gave his impression of the sojourn of 18 days spent in the beachhead on his return to London.

"To some observers," he writes, "the conclusion is now inescapable that an exceptional opportunity to end the campaign in Italy quickly—if that was the Allies' immediate aim—has been missed. This impression began to take shape on the bridgehead four or ,flve days after the first Allied soldier put foot ashore, but at that time, when a vital military operation was proceeding, most stringent limitations were imposed on newspaper comment emanating from the beach-head—and properly so. -.That stage has now passed. "I heard, both at the beach-head and when I returned to Naples, various explanations of our inability or unwillingness to exploit our 'miracle' landing in which a great Allied army poured ashore, and took up battle positions on the enemy's seemingly vulnerable flank. Landing- Order Not Changed. "The view most widely held among observers on the spot was that our plan lacked elasticity, that our schedule called for the disembarkation of large forces of infantry to meet expected initial enemy opposition, and that when this did not take place we, for some reason, did not or could not change the order of landing, and put light armour ashore to race across the countryside to the high ground from which the Germans are now dominating our positions. Only a highly-skilled observer, with full knowledge of the circumstances, can say whether this explanation fits the facts, but it was certainly one widely quoted. "Another theory is that a miscalculation was made about the ability of the Fifth Army to push on—even with substantial reinforcements—and so expose the Germans to the threat of pincer movement, and oblige them to retire and enable our two forces to link up and advance to Rome. That, again, may, or may not be true, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the Allies' principal aims was to shake loose the whole enemy front on the west coast of Italy. This, in fact, did not happen. Vigour Lacking. < "I have also heard it said that the weather impeded our landing operations. Certainly the exposed portion of Anzio, with even a slight sea wall, is not the. most suitable place which could be chosen for discharging cargo, but in that regard three facts should be borne in mind. "First, any port—even if partly destroyed by shellfire—is better than the sharply shelving beaches on which it was initially thought that all our forces and equipment might have to land. Secondly—probably because we captured the port almost intact—we took only 16 days, eight or nine days ahead of schedule,' in unloading operations. Thirdly, the weather, in spite of one or two unfavourable days, was better than any army commander had a right to expect in winter, even in Italy. "The truth probably lies among all three of these explanations, and is possibly influenced also by other factors. From the very beginning the operation seemed to lack the vigour and aggression which might have been expected to mark such a bold venture. "This thought was in my mind on the first day of the landing, when I stood pn the beach with a conducting officer, Captain Denis Heck, former British gunner, who now has charge of the party of war correspondents. There were few signs of bustling animation or urgently directed effort: The atmosphere of a vital amphibious operation was missing,. and it seemed to many that it was never subsequently acquired. "Our great invasion armada lay idle for hours in the roadstead, while occasionally small landing-craft scurried in to put a party of infantry ashore. As the days dragged on, with the Allied activity confined mainly to patrolling and prudent consolidation of our original positions, with little apparent effort to capture the all-im-portant high ground beyond the perimeter, much of the optimism which marked the initial stages of the operation evaporated. Opportunity Passes. . "Word got round among the troops in our area that our party of correspondents was staying at a farmhouse near by, and sometimes when we emerged to do our daily round we were greeted by groups of soldiers anxious to learn how the battle was faring. Mostly they asked, 'When shall we be in Rome?' But some, with a better understanding of the situation, wanted to know whether there were any signs of the Germans reacting to our thrust on their flank and beginning to withdraw. We gave them no more than the facts of the situation, which were meagre enough, but I well remember one American veteran spitting on the ground and exclaiming, 'It looks like Jerry outsmarted us.' "Only a historian, of course, with the full facts in'his possession will be able to say whether he was right or whether we 'out-smarted' ourselves by excessive caution in a situation which, perhaps, contained all the elements of decisive success. One thing seems certain—if the opportunity for such success was there, it is not there now, unless the whole military pattern should be changed by the introduction of other factors." p It has to be remembered, of course, that war is full of disappointments. It is the unexpected that often happens to upset plans made to meet carefully calculated conditions. Tunisia was an example. It is conceivable that if a little more risk had been taken in more forward landings, Bizerta and Tunis might have fallen to General Anderson, instead of to the Germans, who got there first, and the war in North Africa ended six months before it did. There was much disappointment, vocal in the British and American Press, over the first four months of the Tunisian campaign, but it ended in the greatest victory the Western Allies have so far won 'in this war. It may be the same in Italy.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19440307.2.33

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 56, 7 March 1944, Page 4

Word Count
1,055

NOTES ON THE WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 56, 7 March 1944, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 56, 7 March 1944, Page 4

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