THE THIRD FRONT AND THE SECOND

Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 72, 22 September 1943, Page 4

THE THIRD FRONT AND THE SECOND

The war against Germany on three fronts is already operating, with "the mass invasion from the west" hanging like a sword over Hitler's head. Although the master-stroke of "mass' invasion from the west" is withheld, its influence is very direct and active, because German strategy must be ever ready for it, and the expectation of it pins down, in heavily bombed areas, a great part of Hitler's military strength. How Allied strategy dictates to the Nazi dictator the disposition of his forces becomes more plain every day. A London message dated Tuesday quotes a Berlin Press statement to the effect that the new Allied campaign in Italy—called by Mr. Churchill "the third front," as distinct from the second front yet to be —reacts directly on the campaign in Russia. The Russian front and the Italian (or "third") front are connected up strategically by a Berlin paper in this way: "The general retreat [by Germany] in Russia has set free new reserves for us [the Germans] and it is because of these reserves that the British and American invasion of Italy is not a walk-over." What clearer admission could there be that the Anglo-American Italian advance aids the Russian advance, that Allied strategy dictates German military dispositions, and that Hitler in the 1943 summer lost the initiative?

When the western "mass invasion" of which Mr. Churchill speaks augments the continuous western air blitz, Hitler's defensive strategy and his physical power to implement it will be submitted to an additional and tremendous strain. The AfricaMediterranean strategy, the Prime Minister tells the House of Commons, was always intended to be an essential preliminary to "the main attack on Germany and her satellites"; and the former (the Africa-Mediterranean operation) was never intended to be a

substitute for the latter—that is, for attack across the Channel. A London message, anticipating the House of Commons proceedings, stated that "certain voices" would be raised "concerning the 'breathing space' allowed the Germans in the interval between Mussolini's fall and the signing of the armistice." The owners of these voices are not known at time of writing, but Churchill rebuts the suggestion that valuable time was lost in Italy, and states that "the time for the Salerno landing was, in fact, advanced several days." The implication of the Prime Minister appears to be that the timetable of the Allied military operations in Italy was dictated by factors that were military, not political. Not politics, but the fact that the airfields in the Rome area were under German control, prohibited the idea of landing in Rome an American air-borne division. Such a coup was too daring.

That the Allies do not lack audacity is proved by the fact that the Salerno invasion was "the most daring amphibious operation we have ever launched." By accepting an Italian war-front, Hitler does not regain the initiative. He merely creates a new drain for German blood. Nothing can redeem his strategic weakness except a successful resumption of the submarine war. Try he will, but the Üboats' bolt is probably spent.