NOTES ON THE WAR
FALL OF
FRANCE
LIGHT ON FINAL PHASE
There is again in the war news today no single event of outstanding significance, but tire Allied offensive on all fronts is continuing successfully with increased intensity, and in Sicily and Russia is approachng a climax. Meanwhile the current of change is flowing: inside Hitler's Europe. Fresh evidence is forthcoming on such earlier events as the fall of France.
There has always been more or less a mystei-y about the final phase in the fall of France, the period between the formation of the Petain Government at Bordeaux, with power to negotiate an armistice with the Germans, and the actual signing of the armistice— June 19 to June 22, 1940. Marshal Petain had definitely decided to stay in France to give what protection he could to the French people against undue oppression. But, according to Elie J. Bois's account, in his book "Truth on the Tragedy of France," M. Baudouin, Petain's Foreign Minister, "swore to Lord Lloyd and to "Mr. A. V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty) in Bordeaux on June 19, as he did to Sir Ronald Campbell and to other Ambassadors, that the Government was going to set out for Perpignan, Port Vendres, and thence to Africa. Lord Lloyd and Mr. Alexander cabled the news to Mr. Churchill, but when they returned to London it had already ceased to be true." M. Bois speaks of "M. Baudouin's lie," but three months ago M. Pierre Vienot, formerly Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Premier Leon Blum, after many months' imprisonment in France, escaped and came to London, where in an interview he said that the late Admiral Darlan (assassinated in Algiers) had made all arrangements for the transfer of the French Government to North Africa.
The Vienot statement attracted the attention of M. Camille Chautemps, a former premier of France and a member of the Bordeaux Government of Marshal Petain, who is now an exile in America.
In a letter to the "New York Times" he says: "This is a question of a very important historical fact indeed, and it is advisable to clarify its details. I am able to do that, since the transfer of the Government had been decided in a meeting between Marshal Petain and myself and since I was to be the chief of the new Government abroad. This is the way things happened: "In the afternoon of June 19, two days after Marshal Petain's accession to power, the President of the Republic, Albert Lebrun,. who had with him the two Presidents of the legislative assemblies, Messrs. Jeanneney and Herriot, summoned Marshal Petain and told him that, with the Germans continuing their advance towards Bordeaux in spite of the Marshal's request for an armistice, his Government was going to lose all liberty of discussion, of the terms of. armistice. A Talk With Petain. "After this talk Marshal Petain called me to his private residence in the evening. I was alone with him. "He reported to me the remarks of the Chief of State, which I supported as strongly as I could. But he added that he did not want to break his promise of staying among the French people. Then we decided that he would delegate me to go to North Africa to direct the Government abroad, while he himself would remain in France to protect the people against the abuses of the victor. "The next morning, supported by the President of the Republic snd by me, he had our decision confirmed by the Council of Ministers, despite a strong opposition led by General Weygand, as well as by Messrs. Baudouin and Bouthillier. "The President of the Republic and the Presidents of +he Assemblies were to leave Bordeaux in the aftarnoon;. the Ministers were to follow them in the evening, and the Council of Ministers was convoked for the next morning at- 9 o'clock in the home of the Prefect of Perpignan. "Admiral Darlan took charge of having in the harbour of Port Vendres the destroyer on which the President and the Ministers accompanying me were to make the trip. It was also he who put at the disposal of the members of Parliament the ship Massilia, which was to convey them, to Casablanca. Moreover, he gave a naval division which was cruising in the Mediterranean the order to guard the Presidential trip. "Thus he did not have a part in the decision, but he worked loyally for its' execution. What Might Have Been. "This historical decision—not well enough known—was, in fact, .of great importance. It it had been carried out France would have nemained at the side of her allies with* French unity ■ and we would not have experienced the distressing quarrels which are now so cruelly dividing Frenchmen. "If it could not be executed, it is, as M. Vienot has stated, because Laval, who was not yet in the Government, intervened violently against President Lebrun and Marshal Petain, and because they surrendered to him under his threats. "This episode of our history ought to enlighten the public about the real feelings, of certain men at the time, as well as about the intricacy of events, which everyone ought to refrain from/ judging for himself before knowing all their aspects well."
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 37, 12 August 1943, Page 5
Word Count
878NOTES ON THE WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXXVI, Issue 37, 12 August 1943, Page 5
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