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NOTES ON THE WAR

NEW GUINEA

STRATEGIC KEYSTONE

The air war in Europe proceeds on a rising scale preparatory to the combined Allied onslaught on the Axis European fortress now believed at last to be imminent. News from the Pacific suggests that the Allies may attack there also. In any operations in which Australia, New Zealand, and America are likely to be directly concerned in their own area of the war New Guinea stands out, with its adjacent Melanesian. Archipelago, including Npw Britain and the Solomons and, possibly, Timor, as the strategic keystone of the Jap--1 anese defence system and therefore a proper target for Allied attack. New Guinea is the only extensive area in the Japanese defence system in which 1 the Allies have already a considerable foothold. Attu in the Aleutians and Guadalcanal in the Solomons are, by comparison, only minor, though cmi- ! nently useful, footholds and stepping- ! stones or hopping points for air and I sea attacks on enemy-held islands. New Guinea is so large that while its I eastern end covers the air approaches ito Rabaul in New Britain and the northern Solomons to the east and the Japanese "Gibraltar" of Truk to the north, 500 and 900 miles away respectively, its western end brings the Southern Philippines, the Celebes, and. Timor all within big bomber range of under 1000 miles. New Guinea itself , is nearly 1500 miles long, east to west.. It is therefore of vital Importance to both sides and a real "bone of contention." Tropical Conditions. It has often been pointed out, here and elsewhere, that the Japanese carried the frontiers, the outworks of their new-won empire, very cleverly to a perimeter which is difficult for the Allies to attack and pierce on a sufficiently wide front for deep penetration in subsequent loperations.. Everywhere, except in China and Eastern Siberia, the Allies will have to attack in tropical countries, subject to tropical climates and their concomitants. This applies to Burma —or at least its frontiers with India—to the East Indies, to New Guinea, and all the Melanesian islands. The Allied High Command in this theatre of war has therefore to become reconciled to the problems involved by the conditions. The country everywhere is difficult and the climate trying. Man is up against Nature as well as the human enemy. Yet so much has1 been done, for instance, in Northern Australia under pressure of war where peace failed to make much impression in terms of years compared with months or even weeks of war, that there is reason to hope that the Allies will conquer not only their human enemies in the Pacific, but also the difficulties of terrain and climate. The Baldwin View. It is interesting in this connection to note what Hanson Baldwin, mostquoted and most level-headed of commentators, has to say in a passage cabled from the "New York Times" in today's news: "The Allies now probably have the necessary naval strength in the South Pacific, plus ground and air strength, to carrythrough an offensive operation. Salamaua and Lac ought to be cleaned out as a necessary preparation to conquering or neutralising Rabaul. This should be done whether or not the southern Pacific areas are to become the theatre of an Allied offensive. The obvious approaches to Rabaul are from the northern New Guinea coast and from Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomons." ■ , . Mr. Baldwin was formerly a strong opponent of Allied concentration in the Pacific and an advocate of dealing with Europe first, but he has visited both the Pacific and the Mediterranean theatres of war, and this is now his considered opinion. The country between Wav and Mubo in the Bulolo goldfieid area and Lac and Salamaua on the coast in the Huon Gulf is exceedingly difficult, so bad, indeed. that s=!tftfe Bulolo gold companies to carry out all. their ly'ansport'by air from the coast to the plateau rather than build a road or railway or both. War has made all the difference in even worse country between Port Moresby and the Allied "front outposts over the Owen Stanley Range in the Bulolo country. Here there must be something of the nature of a,road for transport, though no details have-been published..... The army which con-, quered Buna and:Goha could hardly be left dependent on..airtransport alone. The fair-weather season is approaching ' in northern New Guinea, and we! may expect to see developments which may go far to achieving even more than the objectives mentioned by Mr. Baldwin.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19430629.2.98

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXXV, Issue 152, 29 June 1943, Page 5

Word Count
747

NOTES ON THE WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXXV, Issue 152, 29 June 1943, Page 5

NOTES ON THE WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXXV, Issue 152, 29 June 1943, Page 5

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