Evening Post. SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 1943. CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AFRICA

Evening Post, Volume CXXXV, Issue 25, 30 January 1943, Page 6

Evening Post. SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 1943. CAMPAIGN IN NORTH AFRICA

I ■ ■ : ■ •-■■■■ — —♦ —■—— , Strategically, North Africa is one Allied front. It is true that the Eighth Army has not yet joined hands with the British and American forces in Tunisia; but it is equally true that the two German armies, yon Arnim's and Rommel's, have not yet functioned, although they are now both within the boundaries of French Tunisia. At the moment, it would not be too much to say that the prospect of a complete linking of Allied armies across North Africa is more likely than the linking of yon Arnim and Rommel. Unless Germany and Italy land very heavy additional forces at Bizerta and Tunis, the prospect of their launching an offensive that could prevent British, French, and Americans creating a continuous front in the North African hinterland is remote. But the chance that the Americans and the French in southern Tunisia may intercept Rommel and prevent his joining yon Arnim cannot yet be called remote, although it may be true that every day of bad weather helps Rommel's northward movement by discounting the intercepting progress of the Americans and French, operating in what may be called the Central Tunisian sector. Their chance of effectively intercepting Rommel should neither be overemphasised nor ignored. While it is the task of Anderson's First Army and of American cooperating forces to deal with yon Arnim in Bizerta and the port of Tunis and in North Tunisia generally, the Americans and French in the central sector, as well as the Eighth Army in the south sector, are more immediately concerned with Rommel, If Rommel's main purpose is to junction with yon Arnim at all costs, it certainly will not be easy for Allied forces in the central and southern sectors to prevent him. They will have to put their best foot foremost, but they' will be helped if Rommel is tempted to linger in defence of the Tunisian port of Gabes. And that raises the question: Does the Axis North African plan, which excluded Tripoli from Tunisian defence, include Gabes, or is Gabes also to be relinquished after rearguard action? The only light on the Axis attitude to this question is a partial light. It is provided by yon Arnim's recent thrust, made on a considerable scale south and south-west, probably for the double, purpose of keeping the road open for Rommel's retreat northward, and for clearing the area of Allied patrols that had been menacing both the retreat of Rommel and the outer defences of thej Axis northern ports. Considerable British and American forces, including armour and artillery, had to be employed to stop yon Arnim's thrust. Evidently the Axis is anxious to keep the road open between Rommel and yon Arnim. Rommel's alternative js evacuation by sea, in which case the Allied naval and air forces would have a new target.

The fact that January, 1943, finds the Allies on the eve of completing a continuous North African front, while yon Arnim is still digging in and Rommel is still groping, seems incredible when one remembers that only seven months ago (in July, 1942) Mr. Churchill found himself compelled to admit to the House of Commons that "the military misfortunes of the last two weeks in Cyrenaica and Egypt have completely transformed the situation, not only in that theatre but throughout the Mediterranean, where at the moment the present recession of our hopes in the Middle East and Mediterranean has been unequalled since the fall of France." To think that a situation which in July last had been transformed to Dunkirk level is now transformed back to a situation which, in Africa and Russia, has unloosed a perfect flood of Nazi crocodile tears! And it is worth recalling that in July last the Germans did not neglect to rub it in. Leutzow declared, on the 15th, that the fall of Tobruk "narrowed" British naval power and made Egypt vulnerable. In the following month, August, Goebbels implied that Britain was covering her con^ fusion by reminding Germany that "we [the Germans] have not achieved the aim in our mmd —the capture of Egypt." Barely half a year has passed, and now the capture of Egypt is not even in. the German mind, much less in the sphere of things practical. In September the first signs of the turn of the tide were recorded, for on the Bth of that month Mr. Churchill told the House of Commons that the Eighth Army "is now stronger actually and relatively than ever before." Then, in October and November, came El Alamein, where Rommel also realised the Eighth Army's strength. Another sign of changing times was hoisted in the same month of November, when (on the Bth) Hitler told Germany: "'lt is understandable that in this worldwide struggle one cannot expect to gain new successes week by week." Hitler saw the turn of the tide. The rest is recent history.