GETTING JAPAN FIRST

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 100, 24 October 1942, Page 7

GETTING JAPAN FIRST

Dangers Seen If Tokio Organises Empire

(By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright.) . (Special Correspondent.)

SYDNEY, October 23. An immediate major counter-offensive against the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland is being urged in many quarters.

The danger is foreseen that if Japan's successes in Asia are further extended, her defensive position will become so strengthened that her defeat will certainly be delayed some years, and she may even become impregnable because of her manpower resources and the impossibility of cutting off supplies of raw materials.

It is contended that advantage should be taken of Japan's present preoccupation with the South-west. Pacific, where she has been forced to divert considerable strength by the American success in the Solomons.

Some well-informed observers are quoted as believing that, following the rehabilitation of the Pacific position, Japan's next moves will be:— 1. An invasion of Bengal to begin the conquest of India State by State. 2. The capture of Yunnan bordering ' Upper Burma, to prevent the /Allies from restoring the supply- line to South China. Siberia will not be invaded until Germany achieves the maximum penetration of Russia in Europe, and then only if Hitler destroys the Red Army's offensive power. Mr. Edgar Snow, now Far Eastern correspondent of the "Saturday Evening Post," and author of "Red Star Over China," says .that Japan is reported to be planning to join her home islands to the Asiatic continent with an undersea tunnel to Korea. RAILWAY SYSTEM PLANNED. , Japan is also working feverishly to complete the railways linking Bangkok, the capital of Siam, Rangoon, the occupied Burmese capital, Lashio,, the Burmese terminus of the gupply route | to China, Saigon in south Indo-China, and Singapore, in order to ensure the free flow of vital rubber, oil, tungsten, land chromium supplies. "The Allies can defeat Japan today only by a major campaign cutting her off from these essential resources she is trying to secure," says Mr. Snow, j "The alternative —a successful invasion of Japan proper—can hardly be conceived without a continental base." . The primary move in the land drive on Japanese-held territory from India advocated by Mr. Snow must be one of political strategy—the proclamation of freedom for all advanced colonial peoples. The Allies could thus count on the full mobilisation of India's and Burma's 400,000,000 people, he believes. FLEETING OPPORTUNITY. "Then, with only a small fraction of the American forces now being poured into Europe, we could safeguard the remaining bases in east Asia , and launch an early counter offensive to reopen Burma and restore China's .active front," says Mr. Snow, urging that America should reinforce India at much greater strength. "In a few months that oportunity will no longer exist. What can be done now with five divisions and 100 planes will afterwards require ten times that force. A war which can be fought now largely with Indian supplies on the spot may afterwards have to draw entirely on American bases 15,000 to 18,000 miles distant." Mr. Snow observes that Japan today is the world's second largest empire, populated by 500,000,000 people. If India were conquered, Tokio would rule more than half the men and women, on earth. "Naturally Japan loves our 'Get-Hitler-first strategy'," he says. "Tokio hopes we will continue to neglect our Asiatic bases till we shall have none left when the time comes to support our eventual Pacific counteroffensive."

liable to severance at any time that suits the interests of either party. •< DANGEROUS FALLACY. "The Pacific leaders are concerned over the dangerous fallacy in American opinion that once the Germans are defeated Japan will be a pushover, and express the opinion that if Japan is allowed to consolidate her gains while we undertake the laborious process of bringing Germany to her knees, the Japanese will become so strong and secure that it will require years to defeat them. "Furthermore, if Japan is allowed to march to further. victories, the consequent effect upon the global strategy might be disastrous for the Allied cause in Europe. "Accordingly, we cannot fight a pro-, tracted delaying action in the Pacific. We must hit Japan without respite to prevent her from consolidating \her gains, but this must be done while we exert our main effort against Germany. "This is the dilemma of the Pacific. We are fighting a major campaign on a shoe-string. The recent operations in the Solomons, costly to both sides, | well illustrate the problems confronting us. LEADERSHIP PROBLEM. "First, leadership is perhaps our greatest problem. The defensive complex and over-caution on the part of: some naval leaders have resulted in errors of judgment and costly and unnecessary losses. "Secondly, there still exists underlying bitterness of feelings between Army and Navy personnel. This has been exacerbated by the more virulent writers and critics at home. "Thirdly, the over-stringent censorship and lack of a co-ordinated joint public relations'policy not only make the Pacific an 'unknown war' for the people but intensify service rivalries and hurt morale. "Fourthly, the Australian situation is disadvantageous and the problems related to the .coalition of the war have greatly .complicated General MacArthur's position. "Fifthly, a handicap has been imposed by the arbitrary division of the Pacific, which is really a strategic entity, into two theatres, one under Admiral Nimitz, the other under General Mac Arthur. FORCES WEIGHED. "Summing up the relative advantages of the opposing forces in the Pacific, we have a considerably greater war potential, yet Japan has hitherto had a quantitative air and naval superiority. The enemy has the great advantage of an inferior position, giving him shorter lines of communication. "Comparing, the troops en masse, the enemy is clearly superior in jungle warfare and also more experienced in amphibious operations. He likewise possesses the will to win and a firm belief in Japan's invincibility. "However, we possess a clear-cut qualitative air superiority, and also qualitative superiority. In some tactics and technique of warfare, particularly carrier operation and submarine commerce raiding. "In addition we have shown greater flexibility and readiness to learn, and far greater ability to analyse and diagnose.- correctly the enemy intentions, as! was illustrated in the Coral Sea and Midway Island battles,"