NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 78, 29 September 1942, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

WHERE AND HOW?

THAT SECOND FRONT

; Behind the fighting that is raging ! in Russia, especially in and around ! Stalingrad, and the mOre sporadic operations in the other theatres of war, lies the burning question of the second front in Europe. This is the crux of the whole military problem of the war, for the circumstances in Europe may never again be so favourable as they are now with Germany fully occupied in Russia and the oppressed peoples of occupied Europe ripe for a rising in favour of the Allies.. If the ; Allies were ready, now, it is generally admitted, would be the time. For the last few days the news has been full of "second ■ front," with authoritative comment by papers like j the "New York Times" and observations by men of mark as far apart as Mr. Wendell Willkie in Moscow and General Wavell in New Delhi. The position has not Changed greatly, except on the point of urgency, since the naval correspondent of the "Christian Science Monitor" surveyed the problem \ clearly at the end of July. In the course of a long article, he said: The strategy of establishing a ' second front in Europe reduced to its most elemental requirements consists of effecting the landing of a force of the required strength at a locality or localities where it will be the most difficult fof- the Nazis to offer resistance, provided, however, that from the selected location it will be possible to project an immediate offensive against Germany's industrial centres, seaports, or vital lines of communication. , Norway's Possibilities.^ j Not all military critics would accept the proviso for an immediate offensive against Germany's industrial centres, but if it is accepted, it rules out Greece. Spain, and Denmark for various reasons—distance for Greece, neutrality for Spain, and the difficulty of getting into Germany from Denmark. The correspondent proceeds: "Norway offers certain possibilities. It is probably none too strongly garrisoned, its road system is inadequate for the operation of mechanised equipment in great strength, its occupation would clear Nazi aeroplanes away from tlie Arctic route to Russia, some bases used by submarines and larger vessels would be eliminated, reinforcement from. Germany would be none too easy. Moreover, Norway's mountainous territory makes it peculiarly suitable for the operations of infaiitry and light motorised equipment such as an expeditionary force would expect to use, while the heavy motorised equipment in which Germany specialises would be at a discount. Difficulty of communications would also assist the land-, ing force." The disadvantages are that1 initial air superiority would have to be attained by carrier-borne aircraft which due to certain constructional requirements are inherently inferior to land planes, and the length of the line of communication over which reinforcements and supplies must pass. Superior Nazi air power previously drove the British out of Norway. An expeditionary force established in Norway would have little, if any, effect on industries in Germany. Some

iron, food, and miscellaneous materials now going to the Nazis would be cut off. Neither would such an expeditionary force" draw German troops from the Russian front to any great extent, although the psychological effect upon all the enslaved people of Europe would be a factor of practical import- | ance. | Nevertheless, a landing in Norway would be in the nature of a contributory effort to a main attack delivered 1 elsewhere. i Low Countries and France. The Low Countries are in close juxtaposition to industrial Germany and their occupation woiild result in N an almost immediate termination of the war in Europe. On the other hand, they are probably the toughest nut on the Continent for the United Nations to crack. A large part of Germany's internal lines of communication, both rail and water, gravitate towards and into the Low Countries. The flat expanse of country lends itself to mechanised Warfare and Germany should be able to throw such equipment against an invasion force in quantities far greater than can be brought from overseas. This area is now d6tted with | Nazi aerodromes and is within easy flying range of numerous other airfields Germany. furthermore, the coasts of Belgium and Holland have numerous outlying sand bars which make havigation difficult. The north coast of France is invitingly near to England, but presents many of the difficulties 'that deterred Hitler from attempting the invasion of Britain. However, the United Nations can control the air with planes based in England until aerodromes in captured territory can be placed in operation, and they control the sea. The French coast has been intensively fortified by the Germans, however, and will prove to be no push-over.

Prospects in Italy,

Italy is a possibility for a second front. Its population lias never been enthusiastic about this war, and might give an invasion force considerable assistance. Its occupation would not afford access to industrial Germany, but it would deprive the Nazis of considerable industrial facilities now being utilised in .Italy. The principal , objective attained would be the re- ! establishment of a United Nations ! control of the Mediterranean. It would I also exert a tremendous influence upon the .pro-Allied French people. But invasion via Italy would have to be made without the element of surprise. The long haul by meahs of heavily-guarded convoys would, while subject to attacks from numerous Axis bases, afford time to the Nazis to meet the invasion. Nevertheless, once a landing had been effected, the operation, if carried out ~ with dash, might achieve some surprising results. Any occupation of France in considerable strength will unquestionably have the effect of changing the Nazis' Russian campaign from the offensive to the defensive, but otherwise it will not necessarily affect Germany's capacity for waging war. This desideratum can only -be attained by carrying the war into Germany, which means the West Wall must be breached or the air so completely dominated that German industries and communications can be seriously crippled. The complexities attending establishing a second front in Europe are so involved that the most detailed planning is required. Transporting a force of from 500,000 to 1,000.000 men and their equipment to France and getting them ashore in positions that can be held, although a tremendous undertaking, is but the beginning. Exactly what each sizable component is to do, how, when, and where, must be planned with : mathematical exactitude, superimposed on whiich is the insuring of ah adequate How of reihforc'emeht's and supplies. ,-Altc-*?pthei--this is ah-.-.Undertaking of a--magnitude never before attempted.