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Evening Post. FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1942. STRATEGY STILL PIVOTS ON RUSSIA

A redistribution of military strength, it was pointed out yesterday, is only possible within the limits of available transport. Under present conditions of sea and land transport, the mobility of military forces (men and weapons) is restricted; in fact, Mr. Churchill has been reported as saying that it takes at least six months to get a tank into the Hands of the Army of the Nile. From the Nile point of view, this is a weakness; but from the broader strategical point of view, the position has compensations. Britain would not, even if she could, disturb the main strategy of the Europe-Africa war, which is to help the Russians and at the same time to destroy Rommel if possible—but, above all, to maintain the Russian front. If the question be asked whether Russia derives, greater help from a concentration of aeroplane j and tank strength in Egypt than from j similar concentrations in Britain and in Russia herself, there can be but one answer. The . aeroplanes and tanks and war machinery that Britain and America send to Russia are of more direct aid to her than similar weapons in Egypt and Libya can be. And bombers concentrated in great numbers in Britain to meet the wastage of mass raiding over Germany must be of more indirect aid to Russia than can be given by mass raiding of enemy positions in the desert.

These two statements remain true, even if the highest value be placed on the operations of Auchinleck, viewed as a diversion of Axis strength.^ Certainly thd Axis cannot maintain Rommel's effort in Africa without suffering some subtraction from Hitler's drive against Russia; therefore, Auchinleck's operations have a diversive value as well as a value to Middle East strategy. But the strategy of maintaining die Russian front remains the higher strategy so far as the war against Hitler is concerned. Hitler himself would far sooner see Allied bombers pouring into the secondary theatre (Egypt) than occupying positions where they can be used directly or indirectly to help the Red Army. What the Western Allies must do is to crush Rommel if they can, but above all to give Russia the most valuable aid —direct or indirect —that modern weapons can give, by operations over Germany and the western countries of Europe, and in Russia herself. One of Rommel's aims is to break down the primary purpose of Britain to give Russia maximum aid in Europe. And one of Britain's determinations is not to be stampeded into an African policy to the detriment of the policy of maintaining against Hitler the priceless Russian battle front, and of ultimately establishing against him, in Europe, a second front.

It takes some nerve to send firefighting equipment to your ally's citadel when one of your own bastions, farther away, is burning. But nerve is required by any Government that is determined to stick to its main strategy, and not to be diverted into strategical expedients of less permanent importance. The Churchill Government is in the position of having to ration its own fronts in order to supply an ally. Rationing, as everyone knows, arouses individual' criticism but yet retains the collective approval of communities as a war-winning measure. In the case of weapons and war supplies, a rationing or scarcity position is the more easily accepted by the people affected when they realise that " a far-flung redistribution of war strength round the globe is opposed, for the present, not merely by strategical considerations but by physical considerations, since it is physically impossible to move military strength in greater degree than shipping and transport permit. The different portions of the Empire must therefore accept philosophically things that cannot be avoided. Mr. Churchill has paid a compliment to New Zealand for the fact that, in the face of potential invasion of her own shores, her Government advised the fullest use of her troops in the Middle East. And very opportunely these troops stepped into the breach where and when wanted, where they fight New Zealand's battle as well as that of the United Nations.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19420710.2.39

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 9, 10 July 1942, Page 4

Word Count
690

Evening Post. FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1942. STRATEGY STILL PIVOTS ON RUSSIA Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 9, 10 July 1942, Page 4

Evening Post. FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1942. STRATEGY STILL PIVOTS ON RUSSIA Evening Post, Volume CXXXIV, Issue 9, 10 July 1942, Page 4

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