Evening Post WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1942. ARMY LOST, AS WELL AS BASE

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 47, 25 February 1942, Page 4

Evening Post WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1942. ARMY LOST, AS WELL AS BASE

"I sent nine convoys to Singapore. . . . The Japanese claim 73,000 troops prisoners of war. Larger numbers than that were in the Singapore fortress^ at the time of attack. We face loss of the base, of troops, and of equipment —of a whole array, in fact. ... I will not attempt to pass any judgment." The above sentences are not Mr. Churchill's exact words or sequence, but they are grouped in ,a sequence that tells in the simplest manner the story he related to the House of Commons. He said that if the defence of Singapore had been a successful defence, "the speedy reinforcement of Singapore by no less than nine convoys would have been judged a splendid achievement." The meaning of this statement seems to be that the failure of the defence did not lie with the Government or with those responsible for supplying the means of defence. If that be the meaning, then the 'failure rests with the defence itself. Mr. Churchill, however, stops short 'before drawing that conclusion. He !"will not attempt to pass any judgment."

The arrival # of nine* convoys at Singapore is not in itself proof that the Singapore army was" fully supplied. Nine convoys should be equal to full supply quantitatively; qualitatively, the question remains open. Consider, for instance, naval supply. Quantitatively—and, in a strictly narrow sense, qualitatively, too —the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were a tremendous contribution to Malayan defence. But, because of shortage of aircraft protection and of cruisers and complementary craft, the gift of the heavy ships proved to be a snare and a delusion; they were destined to be sacrificed to Japanese air attack. Thus Britain made a tremendous naval contribution to Malaya, yet the result was not naval security but a naval disaster. Therefore all oversea naval and military contributions to Singapore defence must be valued not according to their volume, but according to what they consisted of —were they balanced contributions strong at all points of defence and offence, or were they merely magnificent but ill-balanced contributions? Questioned concerning the Prince of Wales and Repulse and their lack of air support, Mr. Churchill stated some time ago that when these two heavy ships were sent to the Far East, no aircraft-carrier was available. It may be that similar questions will arise in the' near future with regard to the contents of the nine convoys.

Did the nine convoys lack some vital element such as the late Admiral Phillips's squadron lacked when it faced Japan's air fleet? Until the details of the nine convoys are known, that question remains unanswerable. But if it be answered in the negative, then the whole onus of culpability or non-culpability is thrown on the defence—on those whose responsibility it was to use well-equipped forces for the foiling of the Japanese. This responsibility clearly falls on the Singapore command; does the responsibility also reach up to General Wavell? After the Japanese sank the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, established a sure hold on the upper part of the Malay Peninsula, and began to march south, there was time for the Allies to decide to withdraw from Singapore base after destroying it. That withdrawal would have meant great loss of prestige as, well as ofr a strategic site, but it would have saved an army and the contents of the nine convoys. Now, what was it that influenced Britain and the Allies to hang on to Singapore with results that might have been brilliant but which have proved to be depressing? The answer to this question was supplied in the House of Lords by Lord Cranborne, Secretary for the Colonies. He states that not only the responsible authorities in London ("everyone here") and not only "the commanders on the spot," but also the Governments of Australia and New Zealand "believed that the island might stand a long siege." Thus a military decision was arrived at by la composite military-political or

political-military jury—a decision based on a sort of consensus of opinion, which reflected hope, belief, anxiety about prestige, and perhaps some exact knowledge. The only virtue of a composite decision seems to be that so many people become implicated that nobody can kick very hard if things go wrong. In one respect this is just as well, because kicking is not likely to improve matters. The interim blunders of democracies engaged in building armies in a hurry (a hurried job that is never fully efficient) have not impaired the prospects of long-range success; and, galling though these blunders are, it is still a fact, as Mr. Churchill says, that "if we do not fall out among ourselves we have a right to look forward to a sober and reasonable prospect of complete and final victory." Malaya seems to be another Gallipoli with the evidence this time tending against the man on the spot rather than against the man overseas. It will probably be admitted in the future that the nine convoys were indeed "a splendid achievement." Probably an achievement due in part to a passing phase of non-success in Hitler's U-boat operations. But now shipping losses are mounting again. They have increased to a point at which Mr. Churchill issues a warning. If he had to supply a second Singapore tomorrow, it is doubtful whether nine convoys could be sent. The limit of reinforcing distant points is not armies but shipping. But no Empire can go on losing armies as at Singapore. When the year of the great Allied offensive arrives, may Heaven grant the Allies military brains equal to their manpower, for both are needed.