Evening Post TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1942. THE ENEMY'S GAME

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 46, 24 February 1942, Page 4

Evening Post TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1942. THE ENEMY'S GAME

Hitler, when dreaming and planning for world conquest, gave particular thought to the art of lying. For his own people he laid it down that the big, audacious lie would always succeed. But for his enemies he devised a move subtle mixture of lies and truth. In two and a half years Berlin has built up a system designed to take full advantage of any weaknesses in the democratic armour, to create suspicion, to promote questioning, to breed [doubt, and, if possible, to create disaffection. Japan has watched this campaign, studying it closely, sharing in it from time to time as her nonbelligerency moved nearer or farther from a state of actual warfare. Her entry into the Avar was marked by the most dastardly and treacherous example of deception that history has recorded. While the ambassador of pacification, Kurusu, was assuring Washington of Japan's desire for a peaceful settlement, the Japanese navy was steaming silently and secretly to Hawaii. Kurusu's protestations 'of peace were still being made when the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour was loosed. The initial success of Japan was gained by deliberate treachery. The campaign was prepared and planned —and the planning for perfection in detail must have taken months— upon a foundation of lying. It could not have worked without it. Yet there are people in New Zealand who say: "Tokio radio seems pretty reliable. I wonder if we are being told everything"!

Such simple and confiding credulity is amazing. It has been called child-like; but it is not, for a child with its trust destroyed by cruel deception would never again believe the deceiver. Rather the credulity has its origin in a foolish assumption of cleverness. The hearer thinks he is clever enough to sort out what is triie and what is false in the news from Tokio and Berlin —and too clever, much too clever, to accept what is given ill the Press and radio of his own nation. The 8.8.C. is all right for simple people; but he is too smart to be lulled. Have these clever ones never read and understood the proverb: "Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird." Neither Tokio nor Berlin spreads a net in the open. It is hidden to catch the feet of those who think they know the way so well that they do not watch their own steps.

The smart victim of the international confidence men of Tokio and Berlin may say: "The Americans were deceived, but we wouldn't be." But they are being deceived every hour. Tokio does not try to put over the Kurusu lie twice in the same way. The outrageous deception, having succeeded once, is not to be used again—at least not yet. Instead, there is the resort to more cunningly framed lies that are near the truth or that can be linked with truth. Not so much belief in Tokio or Berlin is aimed at, but doubt of London. The seeds of suspicion are sown, then carefully watered. Consider, for example, the protestations of Tokio against Allied occupation of Portuguese Timor—as a screen for Japanese invasion. The Portuguese have known how to judge this. They have accepted as honest British assurances of defensive occupation, but the Japanese excuses have been rejected. Or again, consider the little lie worked cunningly into Japanese celebrationssof the fall of Singapore—the statement that an envoy of Russia attended the Japanese reception and the Soviet sent a message of congratulation. Russia has absolutely and flatly contradicted this. No Soviet representative could attend such a reception, or congratulate Japan on any of her successes. Plainly, this lie was intended to create distrust, to check the growth of harmony between the Anglo-Saxon and Russian allies. Perhaps the most cunning approach to the creation c|f doubt, however, was the attempt' of the official Nazi naval spokesman, ViceAdmiral Lutzow, to capitalise Mr. Churchill's difficulties. Lutzow declared in a broadcast that Mr. Churchill, in his speech on November 30. revealed lo Germany Britain's plans in the Middle Eastj by the emphasis he laid on the Mediterranean front. This state-j merit might succeed in any one ofj several ways. It might bring Mr. Churchill criticism for an alleged indiscretion, it might build up the German reputation for prescience, it might cause nervous people to say that news —and especially the heartening Churchill broadcasts —j should be withheld from our own people lest the Germans should gain information. Success in any of these ways would be a blow at our morale. Are we to let the attempt succeed? Are we going to allow our morale to revolve round the lying axis of Berlin-Tokio? Surely we are not. Yet there is a spate of rumour. Loyal and otherwise sensible people are repeating what they heard, or someone else heard, from Tokio, and asking (of course, in the strictest confidence!) : "Do you think it is true? Do you \ think they are getting news by wireless from here?" All this tends to create uneasiness in timid minds, to shake confidence, and promote the nervous, useless criticism: "'Why don't our leaders do something!" This is just what the enemy wants. What we want is not cleverness, but confidence. nol silly repetition of rumours, but courageous trust in our leaders, our brave forces, and ourselves, and a resolute determination lo build up morale by action—beginning with "••••selves.