Evening Post TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1942. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXXIII, Issue 22, 27 January 1942, Page 4

Evening Post TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1942. PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE WAR

Although the Japanese have rapidly achieved some resounding successes in the Asiatic area, the primary purpose of the present war is still the defeat of Germany. If Hitler is decisively beaten, Japan will not be in a position to retain her gains, unless the Allies, having defeated Hitler, show a lack of solidarity and energy. This reservation should not appal us. The people of New Zealand and Australia today are trusting Britain and the United States to complete the account with Hitler in Europe. The people at this end of the globe rely on the AngloAmerican alliance to do this because they trust Britain and America; but if such inter-racial trust did not exist, New Zealanders and Australians would still have to rely on AngloAmerican solidarity just the same — having no alternative. Now, if they rely on their English-speaking fellows to complete the account with Hitler in Europe, must not such reliance be extended to the Pacific, as constituting the only or main hope that the account with Japan in Asia shall be squared up also? Both by inclination and by necessity, New Zealand and Australia look to Britain, America, and Russia to tame Germany, and they rely on Britain and America — Russia, too, it is hoped—to tame Japan. That basic fact cannot be altered by any warlike action that New Zealand and Australia may take, even if their own war effort approach the figure of 100 per cent. - —as it should! i

1 The fundamental necessity of defeating Germany is not modified by the success of Japan. It is true that her success worries the peoples of the South-western Pacific. They see her military occupation line coming rapidly nearer to-them. As the Australian Minister to Washington has said, to keep the Japanese out of a territory (if it is physically possible at the moment to keep them out) is far better than to dig them out of it later on. If anyone fears that Britain and America, exhausted perhaps after the destruction of Hitler in Europe, will thereafter be unwilling (though able) to dig Japan, out, the best answer is that the United States is a Pacific Power quite as much as Britain is a Pacific Power. In other words, both honour and interest commit Britain and America to the task of completing democracy's victory, following up the liberation of Hitler's victims by liberating Japan's victims. What more do New Zealand and Australia require? What more can they expect to get, having regard to all the circumstances? To assume, quite wrongly, that Britain and America will be content with a half-victory over the Axis in Europe, without disciplining the Axis in Asia, would be a poor approach to the war situation which existed on December 7 and also to the changed war situation which exists today. Now, as then, the primary purpose of the war is the defeat of Germany. The new peril in the Western and Southwestern Pacific provides reason for the sending from Britain and America of all possible help, short of compromising victory over Hitler.

The immediate business of New Zealand and Australia is to do the best they can in their own selfdefence, while helping in the oversea efforts to keep Japan out of territory that, in Japanese hands, would constitute a strategic threat to countries south b£ the Equator. But it is not the business of either New Zealand or Australia to demand the diversion of British or American forces that, in the opinion of British or American responsible strategists, should not be diverted. The place where decisions should be made as to sending an American army to North Ireland or to the South Seas is not Wellington nor Canberra, Mr. J. L. Garvin drives that point home when he writes:

We cannot grapple with Japan by weakening our hands against Hitlerigm. Whatever else we may do, we cannot save any interest in the Pacific by committing suicide in the Atlantic. That ocean carries the lifeline of not only Britain but also the whole cause of the Allies.

A diversion of British forces to the Pacific, to the extent of compromising the effort against Hitler, might expose Britain to starvation or even to invasion; and the invasion of either Australia or New Zealand is actually preferable to an invasion of Britain, because the former might be temporary, but "a deadly blow at the heart of the Empire" represents the only chance the Axis Powers have of "finishing the whole war in their favour by a single stroke." Mr. Garvin adds: "The unshaken strength of the English-speaking Powers in the Western Hemisphere is at present the [ only solid and sure basis of all their ; present and future measures for grappling with Japan. That indispensable basis must be held intact land unshaken."

To sum up—the first purpose of the war i 3 to defeat Hitler. Notwithstanding the roar of Japan's guns, the Atlantic Ocean is for the time being more important than the Pacific Ocean. With the Atlantic Ocean must be bracketed the Mediterranean Sea. Here the British war effort is directly designed to defeat the Axis in Europe and to prevent its co-operation by sea with the Axis in Asia. It would be ridiculous to say that the British* war effort in the Mediterranean was not a New Zealand interest, and an Australian interest, up to December 7, when Japan struck her treacherous blow. And it would still be ridiculous to say so today. Nothing in the situation has removed the war's centre of gravity from the European theatre. Six months before Hitler started the European war in 1939,

Mr. Churchill, now Prime Minister, told the House of Commons that "the first main effort should be to secure and Jceep command of the Mediterranean." Mediterranean command was essential to victory, and must, he argued, be maintained even at the cost of temporary losses farther afield. He is reported as saying in this speech:

After the victory has been won there are ample resources which will be available to restore the position in the more distant theatres. If there is anything left over which is not restored, that could be settled at the peace conference. It should not be long before we were in the position to. restore the position in the more distant theatres.

The middle sentence of these three probably applies to minor negotiable territories, and does not impair the general firmness of this expression of the principle of deferred liberation.

The man who, as a member of the House of Commons, could make this speech in 1939 is quite capable, as Prime Minister, of, drafting a more complete formula fitting the present occasion. It is reasonable to hope that such will appear in the forthcoming debate on the extended war and its implications.