NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXXII, Issue 85, 7 October 1941, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

THE CASUALTIES

ENORMOUS NUMBERS

CQST OF ATTACK

Perhaps confirming Hitler's announcement ... of a great event soon to come, the news today records the opening of a fresh great German offensive directed against Moscow. The magnitude of this effort, added to the vast commitments on the whole Eastern Front, is a demonstration of the tremendous fund of energy that is still available to the Nazi command. But offensives are costly. In his speech last week, Hitler gava figures purporting to represent tae losses suffered by Russia, much on the lines of earlier German statements. There is no need to quote them here:, everybody who has commented on, them—outside the Axis countriesagrees, that they are grossly exaggerated, and their ridiculous inflation is illustrated by the fact that the alleged losses in the air are far more numerous than the aircraft the Soviet possessed when the war began. On the other hand, the Germans have made equally absurd statements about the smallness of their own casualties. The Russian reports present the picture on reverse. . \ One is tempted to say "a plague on both your houses! Why Taelieve either of you?" But we have had plenty of evidence that what Hitler means when he says the German communiques always tell the truth is not what ordinary people would mean; and no evidence that the Soviet authorities use words in the Hitlerian sense. Nor is there any. real need to trouble much about what either side says in actual figures: the conditions of the war speak for themselves. The truth must be far closer to the Russian than to the German estimate.. Strength of Defensive. One of the leading military authorities in Britain, Captain Liddell Hart, a man whose counsels" have played a great role in framing Britain's military policy, is famous for his adherence to the principle that defence is inevitably far stronger than attack, when the attackers and the defenders are equally matched. The theory is one that needs little argument to support it, because it is clear that, besides being otherwise equal to the attackers, the defenders have the advantage of the positions they have taken up or may retire upon,' of their superior opportunities to maintain their supplies, and their ability to bring about a "stalemate" s situatiofi. The theory is, historically, anew one, and arises from the fact that modern arms make it possible to set up a curtain of fire that cannot be penetrated. The theory found plenty of support in the battles of the' First World War; almost every major offensive on the Western Front was an obvious proof. Concentration of Attack. But in this war,- all the evidence seemed, until recently, to go the other way. The German atta ks were such swifl and sweeping successes that it looked as if the theory was completely shattered. In fact, it was not: rather it was confirmed. : The Germans believed in it too, and took great , care that the conditions were such. that it could not apply. The theory assumes equality, or near equality, of the opposing forces: the German attacks were made with overwhelming strength at. the point of attack. Yet this,-after all, was only replacing a modern doctrine with a far older one:* the way to beat the enemy is to concentrate the attack where he cannot muster a sufficient defence; and here too, it was argued, and has been demonstrated, that the, modern war machine can concentrate an irresistible force. The Wish and the Belief. There is a psychological, basis for each of these ideas of warfare. A general conscious of• his inferiority in numbers will naturally think defensively and.build the mental picture most favourable to his condition—that of the impregnable line; he that has the greater power behind him will think of the irresistible spearhead that will break that line. One "knows" he can hold on; the other "knows" he can break through. One idea is as good as the other. In France, last year, determination to hold the line and the'material in the line were insufficient, and the spearhead had a weight and speed that took the defenders by surprise. Hart's favourite theory thus became, a subject of some derision among those who overlooked its important condition of equality of power; it could not possibly stretch far enough to- fit the invasion of France. Real Test in Russia. On the other hand, the question is being really tested in Russia. There we have armies which, whatever their, exact numbers, are not hopelessly different in either man-power; equipment, or, leadership. Conscious of its vast strength, the Soviet adopted the plan of the counter-offensive—not to strike, but to strike back. Very broadly, it can be said that the vast extension of the front to be defended, as the result of the German control of Finland and the Balkans, forced Russia more frankly towards passive defence and led to an enormous withdrawal of the front. Here and there, on-the huge front, the attackers escaped from the deadlock of the impenetrable defence, because there were not enough Russian troops to make so long a line thrust-proof. Price Must Be Paid. But, wherever stability was reached —and that describes most of the front for most of the time—we have the spectacle of attack beating against defence under conditions approximating those required by Hart's pet doctrine. If we suppose that this condition becomes general and persists, the doctrine says that the Germans must exhaust themselves without winning; and that if the Russians then attack, the same thing should happen to them. This is most unlikely: the structure will break somewhere. But, in the meantime, we may be- sure that wherever there is a stable and sufficient defence and a persistent offensive against it, the logic of the "superiority of defence" is exacting its/full price. As long as the Germans rriaintain the offensive and cannot break through the Russian line, they wilt lose more men and spend more of their amterial [than the Russians.