AUTHORITATIVE STORY

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 103, 3 May 1941, Page 10

AUTHORITATIVE STORY

GREEK CAMPAIGN

ALLIED WITHDRAWAL

THE CHANGES DAY

BY DAY

RUGBY, May 2. It is now possible to give an authoritative account v some detail of the campaign in Greece between the German aggression of April 6 and the embarkation of the forces of the British Empire which began in the last week of April.

At 5.45 a.m. on April 6 Germans crossed the Bulgarian-Greek frontier. There was no warning or ultimatum, but the probability of a German at-1 tack had been obvious for some time, and the Metaxas line, which runs along this frontier at five points—fronv the Struma Valley to the Rupel Pass, over the Nevrokop plateau towards Drama, towards Zanta, towards Domotika, and i from Syilengrad down the Marixa Valley. The last line of advance was not seriously opposed, nor was it intended to be, and the^nemy reached the sea at Dede Agach on April 9. Elsewhere the Greeks successfully withstood Italian and German attacks and .inflicted heavy casualties. At the Rupel Pass Germans employed parachute troops, dropping 150 behind the Greek lines. Of. these a hundred were quickly killed arid the remainder were' captured. The plan of the Greek and British commands was to make the high ground west of the Vardar Valley the main defensive position and delay the Germans on the Metaxas Line. It ( was intended to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy in eastern Macedonia and Greek Thrace, but if necessary to withdraw from that part of Greece which lies east' of the main defensive line, including, therefore, Salonika. It was expected that there would be an opportunity for an order- j ly withdrawal of the Greek forces in this area. However, simultaneously with the attack on Greece the Germans invaded Yugoslavia, which, though partly mobilised, was not ready for war. As with Greece, no ultimatum or other warning was given. NO TIME TO CHANGE PLANS. The disposal of the Yugoslav, forces appears to have been governed not alone by military but also by political considerations, and inadequate forces had been allotted to the south of the country, where the real threat proved to lie. This disposal had been planned by the Tsvetkovitch Government, and General Simovitch had ho time to revise the plans. > Consequently, the Germans were able. to ' advance rapidly up the Strumitza Valley, past both sides of Lake Doiran, and down the Vardar Valley. They reached Salonika on the evening of April 8. The three Greek j divisions in the east were cut off from the main body of the allied forces: But the rapidity of the German advance in Yugoslavia1 held a yet more serious threat. Skopljer and Veles were reached on .April 8, and it was evident that the Monastir Gap was threatened. Consideration jof the disposition of the Greek forces and the forces of the British Empire which had come to their aid reveals how serious this was. ■ . , By far the greater _part of, the Greek army was in Albania, some 30 to 40 miles away from the Greek frontier, with its left flank ,on the sea and its right flank on the' Yugoslav frontier. Two -Greek divisions and the ' Imperial troops, all under the command of General Wilson, who was under that of the Greek Commander, General Papagos, had taken up a. strong natural line of defence running from the sea near Katerini through Veria and Edessa to the Yugoslav frontier. The British armoured force was out to the east of this line, engaged in .demolition work and similar activities. The for,ce'under General Wilson, therefore, was opposing the Germans along a front of 60 to 70 miles on the east, while the main bulk of the Greek army was opposing the Italians along a front of similar length. Between two mountains, southern Yugoslavia formed a barrier which was pierced by the Monastir Gap. This frontier was manned only by Greek mountain guards. DISASTER APPARENT. By the evening of April 7 the disaster to the Yugoslav forces was apparent, and the1 threat to Monastir gap had become a reality. A small reserve under, a brigadier, consisting of a machine-gun battalion and some medium artillery was formed near Amintaion, south of Fiorina. Next morning General Mackay was sent with his divisional headquarters, one artillery and one anti-tank regiment and an Australian brigade, less one battalion, to augment this force, which remained in the neighbourhood of Arnintaion, to await the Germans. Meanwhile, an armoured force was ordered to withdraw to Edessa, behind the Australian division, under whose orders it was placed. Preparations to meet the threat through the Monastir Gap were made only just in time. On April 9 the Germans appeared south of Fiorina', and hotly engaged General Mackay's force' during this and the next day.* The Imperial force inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, but it became apparent that a stand could not be made indefinitely against the greatly superior German numbers. If the enemy could not be held at Amintaion, it was clear that the whole line on this front would have to be withdrawn, otherwise it would be outflanked.

On April .11, therefore, Imperial and Greek forces began to withdraw to a new line which ran from the sea southeast of Mount Olympus, north-west to Servia, and thence south-west along the Aliakmon River and finally northwest again along the high ground to the west of the plain of Kozani. At the same time General Mackay's mixed British and Anzac forces, which had suffered considerable losses, withdrew down the Kozani valley and behind'a new line, and the armoured force moVed to Grevena. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. The line from the sea to SerVia and along the Aliakmon River wa held by the Imperial troops, while the high ground along ; the Kozani Plain was held by two trreek divisions. These two divisions were heavily engaged by the enemy. Meanwhile, the enemy forces advancing down the Kozani Valley were engaged by our forces at j , Servia and suffered heavy losses. ;J The Greek divisions, having fought valiantly under overwhelming conditions and suffered very severe casualHies, had almost ceased to exist as a fighting force. The flank and rear of j the Imperial forces were accordingly threatened, and a further, withdrawal was necessary- Accordingly a withdrawal to the Thermopylae line south of Lamia was ordered. '

The Imperial force had now to withdraw without further aid from the Greek army. The Greek corps which had been fighting with the Imperial troops could do no more, and the rest of the Greek army was away beyond the Pindus mountains. '

On April 14 an Australian brigade was orderd to Kalabaka, at the head of the railway from the south, in order to cover the left flank of the withdrawal.

On April 15 a New Zealand brigade took up a covering position north of