Evening Post TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1941. A BULGARIAN DAMPER

Evening Post, Volume CXXXI, Issue 11, 14 January 1941, Page 6

Evening Post TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1941. A BULGARIAN DAMPER

The smouldering Balkan firesreports of which we commented on yesterday—are the subject today of two damping-down statements. Prudence is the keynote of the Bulgarian Premier's broadcast, which can be taken as direct evidence that if there is in Berlin any desire to fan the fires, that desire is not shared at the present moment by Professor Filoff and his Government. A statement of this reassuring kind gains greatly in credibility if the actual situation behind it is such as justifies its moderate tone. If the circumstances of the war today were such as to constitute an urgent temptation to Bulgarians—that is to say, if some territorial prize were waiting tamely to be grabbed, and if Bulgaria were in danger of "missing the bus" by keeping out of the war—then one might hesitate to be reassured by Professor Filoff's peace broadcast. But there is no sure and easy prize waiting for a belligerent Bulgaria. Instead, Bulgaria is already partly satisfied by Rumania's bloodless concession of the Dobrudja; and the Professor's diagnosis of "a long, gigantic world war" with unpredictable results is far nearer to.reality than is any theory of a speedy Axis win. Holding that view, which is a far more reasonable view than the other, the Bulgarian Premier's leaning to prudence and peace fits neatly into the realistic background, and commends itself to the observer as a- sensible and sound Bulgarian standpoint. If Bulgaria is not for peace, she ought to be. We hope she is.

Compare Professor Filoff today with Mussolini's position on the eve of Italy's entry into, the war. It seems that the fear of "missing the bus" mastered Mussolini completely. He saw the impending fall of France; he was not above being mean enough to rush in and catch some of the pieces; in fact, he felt that at any cost he must join in the looting. He did. The result is that today the war has already become "long" and—in a Libya sense—"gigantic" compared with what Mussolini had calculated. [His miscalculation is a warning to Professor Filoff—if one were needed —to avoid the kind of gamble to which the sorely-tempted Mussolini succumbed. The Bulgarian Premier is not dazzled by such a prospect as the sacking of historic France; and he is specially indebted to Mussolini for proving to him—per medium of Greek bayonets—that the sacking of Greece, or the seizing of a corridor connecting Bulgaria with the Aegean Sea through Greece, is not a simple thing at all, and is not likely to become simple unless the whole trend of the war rapidly alters. Professor Filoff's debt to Mussolini is really immense. Mussolini is not only a horrible example, but is an example that Bulgaria can quote in Berlin if Berlin becomes too insistent on the advantages of Bulgarian belligerency. Less tempted than Mussolini was, and taught by spectacular experience, Filoff will fail in his duty to Bulgaria if he is in the least bit less peaceful than his broadcast. For his guidance he, has the experience not only of Mussolini in 1940 but of Bulgaria herself a generation ago, when ex-King Ferdinand picked the winner too early, and marched to eventual defeat at Germany's side. Early picking of winners ought not to be popular in Sofia today. Nevertheless, there is some sign of a gambling spirit among the Bulgarians, and it persists, notwithstanding Mussolini's successive and almost daily defeats in Albania. Consequently it is not surprising to learn from Sofia that while moderate Bulgarians are behind the Premier, proAxis elements in Bulgaria criticise him, inspired no doubt by Berlin. But his damping-down broadcast is quite in line with the Moscow radio statement that Germany has never asked the Soviet Government's consent to send German troops into Bulgaria, and that if such troops have arrived they have not arrived with the consent of the Soviet Government. In tone, the Moscow disclaimer is not provocative to Hitler, but is coldly correct; and the two state-ments-~that of the Moscow radio and of the Bulgarian Premier—together suggest prudence in Sofia and the absence in Moscow of any desire to promote the suggestion that Stalin is striking a looting bargain with Hitler for a Balkan drive. Besides damping down the immediate situation, the Bulgarian Premier went a little ;farther -by mentioning President Roosevelt and by declaring thai "the • National Socialist, Fascist, and CommunisL systems of government are . unsuitable to Bulgaria." This is a long-range statement not at all fay- , ourable to the Nazi "new order in ! Europe." Countries who welcome Nazi culture always receive, like , Italy and Rumania, far more than

they bargained for; and Professor Filoff's declaration that the Bulgarians stand detached from the new ideologies is, like the rest of his broadcast, soundly founded on the dictates of hard experience.