NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 144, 14 December 1940, Page 12

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

ITALIAN DEFEAT

THE ATTACK IN EGYPT

ERRORS OF ENEMY

: The details which continue to pile up about the brilliant offen- ' sive in the Western Desert show that the operation was far too comprehensive, rapid, and.well " planned for the Italians ; to ; counter it from the beginning; T and'that, in detail, it must rank . with the most successful of the Empire's operations on land. At the outset, it seems clear, the British plan was for a limited off ens-' ive, with the possible object of isolating Sidi Barrani and of throwing the Italians back ori\ their next strong point. Just where the plan stopped it is now impossible to guess, but it may be that the threat to the flank was intended to be a feint to enforce the withdrawal of the more advanced elements of the Fascist forces. Whatever the situation, it is clear that plans had been laid for an alternative which was to.' translate this pretended threat into a reality. Just, how this was done we dp not knowy but there is significant. silence about the doings of the Navy, and if we link the fact that the sea road is open to us and ciosed to Italy, with the report some two months ago (from! Italian sources) that Australians ana New Zealanders were practising embarking and disembarking on the coast, we may have a clue to what happened. Air Concentration. Simultaneously the Royal Air Force struck a series of blows which;, sent the Italians reeling. The sober account of the operations of the British squadrons makes it obvious that the Italians were overwhelmed in the air and that they have not even yet been able, to strike back effectively. In this field, as elsewhere they were taken by surprise. The air attack was made possible by the concentration of a huge area under the command of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore. It was not for nothing that he received authority over every squadron from Gibraltar to Aden. By means of this authority he has been able to concentrate a bigger air fleet in Egypt than we have ever had there in the past, and the accounts of the intensive bombing of the small Italian air bases,' from which their largely outmoded planes are forced to operate, proves the Near East force to be of consider able strength. False Security. . It is possible, .also, that the Italians were enjoying a false security. Just as the British, failure to attack the Italian battle fleet in harbour for many weeks resulted in the fatal error of assembling that fleet at Tarahtb and the chance of making a torpedo attack from the air, so the apparent acceptance by the Empire of a defensive role in Egypt and the greater attention, paid to events nearer home fooled the Fascist High Command. The result has been a brilliant'opportunity, which appears to have :beeri fully exploited. Finally, in estimating the position, we come to the tactics of the last fewmonths. The story of the Western Desert has been the . story of the Maginot Line in reverse. The Italians have been busy digging in, preparing bases for a vaguely-conceived future: assault. The British have been actively carrying out desert exercises, gaining mobility, proving their wear; pons, and developing the confidence which comes to an army capable of inflicting casualties of twenty to one,. Seeking a Base. . The Italian concern has been toi make the 60 to 70 mile stretch between, Sidi Barrani and the previous frontier posts secure and well provided. This has merely resulted in providing, rich prizes for the attacking force, that has moved against them. The preliminary fighting has also shown vast superiority of the British mobile artillery, manned by- gun crews that have drawn expressions of admiration from all who have seen them in action. The superior mobility of our guns would play a big part in such an offensive as that in the Western Desert. At the time of the first invasion of Egypt in force three months ago the Italians were believed to have about 300,000 men in the country, some of them native troops. The normal force of native troops in Libya has consisted of about 25,000 men. Not all of thesa were fighting units, and it is probable that since the war the force has been, increased. There are obvious limitations to the Use of native African troops against British and Empire units/, however, and it is certain that the territory' in. Egypt was held by strong Italian, forces. References to Black Shirt units show that these were present. The Black Shirts are not part of the regular army, they are known as the Voluntary Militia for National Security; in other words they are political troops. Until the Abyssinian War there was a marked rift between the regular army and the Black Shirts, and the but-_ come of that war is said to havfe ifusecl the two organisations, even though the. conduct of the Black Shirt troops won hearty contempt from the regulars early in the campaign. The Black Shirts were no great success in this war; they have recently been defeated in Greece arid they are now suffering a third blow in Africa, Abandoned Stores Used. It may prove that the crowning brTl» liance of the Western Desert move wasthe way the limited offensive was converted into- a drive on a much wider scale, and the determined wayin which the pursuit was developed. British genius for improvisation may have played its part here; one message suggested that the stores abandoned by the Italians in Sidi Barrani (including, no doubt, water, petrol, and food) were employed to continue the attack. Even if the repulse of the Italians had proved much less decisive* we should have had every reason to feel satisfied with its success. Especially pleasing is the fact that the admission of the surprise achieved by the Empire forces and the very large- totals of prisoners taken both suggest that the victory will be a cheap one. Units which are overwhelmed and surrender in such numbers can hardly have put up a stiff resistance, and consequently the British forces have probably won what may prove to be brie of the most satisfactory decisions *in our military history.