WORLD DIPLOMACY

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 100, 24 October 1940, Page 12

WORLD DIPLOMACY

RECENT TRENDS

ADDRESS BY DR. SCHOLEFIELD

INTRIGUES OF POWERS

Sme interesting observations on the subject of "Open versus Secret Diplomacy" were given by Dr. G. H. Scholefield, Chief Parliamentary Librarian, at a largely-attended meeting of the League of Nations Union on Tuesday afternoon. ' Dr. Scholefield said diplomacy until j recently was a matter of awe and mys-j tery which the Foreign Office con-i trolled in sacred seclusion. It wasj not in the interest of the State to de-'j bate international negotiations while! they were pending, and many treaties j were not published until perhaps the outbreak of a war called for a White Paper or a Yellow Book. Most of | such negotiations, though secret, werej | quite harmless. It was only occasion-; i ally that secret agreements turned up j at the council table and caused trouble, j But even if treaties were secretly concluded in the days before 1914 they were generally observed. They were habitually regarded as binding and the nation which broke one flagrantly j was sent to Coventry, The historic cage was Germany's treatment of her pledge to Belgium as a scrap of paper. | With the growth of democratic con-j trol popular influence in foreign affairs increased, yet democracies generally were quite willing to accept and honour engagements which their j leaders had entered into, though they j knew nothing of the terroc at the time. ( Ordinary men and women felt they were in honour bound to fulfil them. The conference at Versailles in 1919 had made a big effort to abolish secret treaties (as distinct from secret diplomacy) by insisting, under Article 18 of the Covenant, that all treaties must be registered with the Secretariat of the League and published as early as possible; and none was held to be binding until it had been so dealt with, j The League had published something j like 200 volumes, containing over 44001 treaties and agreements . between nations. Post-war treaties were all based on the assumption of collective enforcement. THE RISE OF HITLER. | That era of open diplomacy lasted | about 15 years. It ceased on the rise of Hitler (though the Fuhrer had alwaj's paid lip loyalty to treaties) When collective security broke down—at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria—the smaller nations clung to the League because they feared the effects of revision of the peace treaties. The re-armament of Germany brought power politics back on the stage. Smaller Powers were uneasy and anxious to keep out of any alliances or guarantees for fear of offending Germany. The Scandinavian Powers and the Low Countries both decided on a common foreign policy, but declined even to make pacts of mutual assistance for the same reason. Diplomacy now dived underground. ?i The Laval-Mussolini understanding was a big factor in destroying open diplomacy. j The Non-intervention Pact, regard-1 ing the Spanish civil war was openly j negotiated, but while Britain and (France withdrew their help from Spain, Germany and Italy tried out their arms and aeroplanes and bombs jon the Spanish field almost unhinl dered, while Russia also played some J part. It looked as if the aggressors were again being appeased (as in the case of Abyssinia). ! GERMANY'S TACTICS. As Germany became stronger she made a series of non-aggression pacts which she cynically cast aside as soon as it suited her. France and Britain, on the other hand, gave open guarantees to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Greece. The bloc of ag- ! gressor Powers was welded together, j first, through the anti-Comintern Pact [ (in which Italy, Germany, and Japan! | drew together against Russia), and j then in the Axis Pact (Italy and Gerjmany), to which in recent weeks Japan had fully acceded, finally declaring her intention of acting in the event of any other nation entering the European war against Germany. Russia's foreign policy remained inscrutable. j Though we understood that her main I interest was peace, we knew also that i she lost no opportunity of extending | Sovietism whenever the chance prei tented itself. She was also anti-capi-talist; but her foreign policy remained as obscure today as it was when she suddenly signed a pact with Germany. The dangers of secret diplomacy were iess real in the democracies than in other States. In some, such as the United States, the head of the State was controlled by the Constitution. In all the Government of the day could be turned out of office at the next General Election if it followed any foreign policy which the people did not approve. Though foreign affairs! t were not generally debated in Engjland at least while negotiations were I in progress yet General Elections were often fought on that issue. Moreover, the foreign policy of Great Britain had now to meet with the approval also .of the British Dominions—another very important check. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. The action of a democratic Government in international affairs would almost certainly correspond to the agigregate desires and instincts of the common men and women of the nation. Therefore, both people and Government would consider very carefully what course they should take and would only go to war as a last resort. On the whole the action of a democracy would be humane, just, and courageous. And it would certainly be consistent. Democracies would not tolerate in their leaders the dangerous caprice which had been exhibited by dictators in our day, when offers j of friendship and guarantees of security were quickly followed by savage treachery iind foul dealing. The honest instincts of the common man \ and woman in a democracy would make such conduct impossible.