Evening Post MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 1940. NEW TUNES AND OLD PERILS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 31, 5 August 1940, Page 6

Evening Post MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 1940. NEW TUNES AND OLD PERILS

Behind the camouflage of apparent abandonment of an evil intention the person who intends evil may get in his deadliest work; therefore it is well that the Prime Minister of Britain should warn his people and the world at large that "the possibility of German attempts at the invasion of Britain has by no means passed away." Simple souls may be alarmed by a picture of a Hitler poised to strike; or, again, they may be soothed by another picture of a Hitler—the striking hour passed— showering leaflets on England. But Hitlerian appearances must ever be distrusted. The code of the Nazis and of "Mem Kampf" is to keep a word when its keeping is not expected, and to break a word if and when its keeping is relied on. First and last, the intended victim must be tricked and surprised. Simplicity of soul may not enable ordinary people to penetrate Hitler designs, but should not prevent them from keeping in mind one simple rule—that Hitlerism must never be taken trustingly at its face value. The price of defeating the author of "Mem Kampf" is eternal vigilance. This fact he has himself advertised.

But even such warnings as Hitler issues—against himself—in. "Mem Kampf" are liable to go stale. Therefore it is timely that Mr. Churchill should issue his own specific warning:

The fact that the Germans are now putting about rumours that they do not intend to make an invasion should be regarded with the double dose of suspicion which attaches to all their utterances. Our sense of growing strength and preparedness must not lead to the slightest relaxation of vigilance or moral alertness.

When the Italian publicist, Signor Gayda, writing in mid-July of "the final attack against England," spoke of the preparations being completed in "a very few days," his statement could be read as meaning nothing' I less than a "final attack" before the present date. Commenting at that , time, we pointed out that Signor Gayda had ventured his journalistic reputation upon the issue, and suggested that if Gayda's journalism could be relied on, the "final attack" in July might be relied on in equal degree. As a matter of fact, neither has proved reliable. For the "final attack" Gayda has now substituted a "hammering at and wearing down," at the same time pleading that "the war against England cannot be of a lightning nature, or as spectacular as that against France." In short, the final attack within a few days has, in Gayda's changed mind, lost both its speediness and its finality.

The first conclusion to draw from this is that the July Gayda was unreliable. The second conclusion to draw is that the August Gayda may be equally unreliable. Gayda sacrificed his reputation when he flew his kite (speedy final attack) in July. He may be selling it again when he flies his August kit6—a wearing down and no lightning. For it is not yet to be assumed that Hitler will allow the date of destiny (August 4) to pass him by altogether. By that date 26 years ago the German legions were sweeping over Belgian and French borders; and the Nazis today must feel some temptation to use such a date for releasing the invading flood against Britain. So Gayda's present pose must not be taken as any guarantee that the invasion danger has passed away, for what guarantee did his former promise of a "final attack" amount to? A July smoke without fire is quite consistent with an August fire without smoke. Hence the timeliness of Mr. Churchill's

warning. The longer war which the Italian publicist is now dwelling on means a war of greater intensity in Africa. His Italian audience has witnessed a smart piece of timing by Mussolini. A knowledge of French internal conditions and of the impending collapse of France herself enabled Mussolini to join the land-war against Britain's ally at a psychological moment. The result was a rapid harvest—why should Italy conduct widespread operations against French African colonies when one blow at the parent tree (France, the homeland) would place the ripe colonial fruit at the mercy of the Axis? The result of Mussolini's timing of his participation in the blow at the heart of the French Empire was brilliant—he secured a victor position in an armistice which promises big colonial rewards for Italy at the final peace. And this success was won at comparatively little military cost to Italy, either in Europe or in Africa. Well might Gayda wish to see the British colonial fabric brought to the ground by a similar blow' at the British Empire's heart. But he is now facing the fact -that French history will not repeat itself on the other side of the Chan-

nel, and that any further Italian harvest at the expense of the British Empire will have to be fought for. An intensification of the African war, and of Italian losses therein, is an almost necessary consequence.