USING THE DANUBE

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 26, 30 July 1940, Page 9

USING THE DANUBE

PROBLEM FOR GERMANY

TAKING GOODS UPSTREAM

THE ORDER REVERSED

The reopening of the Danube for navigation was about four weeks later than usual after the particularly severe winter from which South-eastern Europe is emerging, says a writer in the "Manchester Guardian." Above the Iron Gates, where the stream breaks through the Carpathians to run swiftly down on to the Moldavian plains, packed ice for twelve miles, in places fifteen feet thick, proved an unbreakable barrier, in spite of Yugoslav attempts to break it up with bombing and. mining. Sudden thaw in late March further impeded the progress upstream of the large numbers of convoys which Germany had prepared at Russe, in Bulgaria, and Orsova, in Rumania. When at the Budapest conference of the Danube navigation companies of the riparian States (Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia) the German delegates announced that this year they would ignore the decision of the Danube Commission as to the date on which navigation was considered safe, there were many present who anticipated that Germany would have difficulty with crews and pilots if she attempted to force them to attempt the dangerous waters just upstream ,of the Iron Qates while the riv.er was still in full Aood. This forecast has been proved right, and the congestion of German cargoes in ports on the Lower Danube was not eased by the German companies' unilateral decision to reopen navigation. THE GERMAN SCHEDULE. At the same Budapest conference the Germans submitted a schedule for the season's traffic. According to this it appeared that some two million tons of cereals, fodder, vegetables, and hazel nuts were to be. taken to Germany from the Iron Gates and below, and that, in' addition, 750,000 tons of oil were to be shipped. Reference to the tonnage barge capacity and haulage known to be at Germany's disposal shows this estimate to be conservative, and suggests that Germany is still considerably handicapped by shortage of tugs. This was not unexpected, for in normal times the flow of Danubeborne traffic is largely downstream,1 and barges in ballast were towed upstream by tugs of only moderate haulage power. Because of the Allied blockade, Germany is now faced with the immense task of reversing the natural order of river transport. If she had sufficient powerful tugs this problem could be solved without loss of time, though at heavy expense. The most powerful Danube tugs, however, are British owned, and have been out of commission since the beginning of the war. At one time it was thought that Germany would dismantle some of the large Rhine tugs and convey them in parts by rail and canal for reassembly at Regensburg and Vienna. At the Budapest conference, however, the German delegates announced that this plan had been abandoned. j NOT AT FULL CAPACITY. | In spite of German efforts to build {more Danube ships this winter, the I schedule for 1940's Danube traffic suggests that the Reich will not be able to make use of the waterway at anything like its full capacity. Nor are shippers in neutral riparian lands likely to be impressed by the German argument that shipment of goods upstream and transfer to German-, railways is the most economic trade route to Northern and North-western Europe from' the Balkans. 'An article in a recent issue of the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" strongly criticised Rumania for failing to provide icebreakers at the Delta and for neglecting the widening of channels and the removal of obstructions where the river encounters rapids. But the riparian States show little readiness to make heavy investments in the improvement of the waterway, which would be almost exclusively for the benefit of Germany. The carrying capacity available to Germany on which the 1940 schedule of Danube traffic is based is given at 800,000 tons and the length of the voyage from the Iron Gates to Regensburg is reckoned at from three to four weeks for a vessel travelling under its own power and six weeks for tug-drawn convoys. Allowing for the return journey and for loading time it is clear that only by avoiding all unnecessary or unexpected delays can Germany reach even the relatively small total planned for ■ this year. TOWARDS BETTER TIMES. At the same time it is known that Germany is looking ahead to a time when better loading facilities and more haulage power will permit her to increase the tonnage of goods drawn from the Balkan lands by waterway. Yugoslav barge-owners have been.invited to lease their craft from January 1, 1941, and reference to published statistics of the barge capacity of the riparian States shows that there is a considerable amount of tonnage which German agents could charter. The total barge capacity belonging to Germany and neutral States available for Middle Danube use (under 600 tons) was in 1938 1,273,360 tons, of oil tankers 184,704 tons, of freight steamers 23,274 tons, the number of tugs being 251. There have been few additions since 1938 except what Germany is- secretly building now. Of this neutral shipping the largest single holding is Rumania's. In 1938. Rumanian shipping suitable for Middle Danube use was barges 428,714 tons, tankers 63.884 tons, tugs 81. GERMAN SCHEMES. All South-east European States have introduced measures since the outbreak of war which prevent more than a certain proportion of their total tonnage of Danube craft being at one time in German waters in order to prevent what happened last autumn, when by careful preparation Germany had secured many hundred barges as well as thousands of railway trucks belonging to the Balkan States. Moreover, the sale of ships to belligerents is carefully controlled. But, as is the case with most things in the Balkans, there are ways and means of getting round regulations, and the greatest vigilance is required by the Allies .o prevent Germany making long-term arrangements to increase the Danube shipping available to her at a time when she will have completed the great ports that are being constructed at Linz, Vienna, and Regensburg.