NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 16, 18 July 1940, Page 12

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

ATTACK ON BRITAIN

INVASION ATTEMPT

NAZIS MAKE READY

The fact that an Italian source has given July 19 as the date of the Axis attack on Britain may be traced to mere boasting, but it may mean that a real assault will be launched on that date. One aspect of this most curious war has been the publicity which the Germans have given to their plans. The move into Norway was heralded by a great Press campaign, and in the later stages ' of the operations on the Western Front the High Command did not even trouble to hide plans and maps from the eyes of newspapermen. Signs of Attack. Many signs exist, however, that an attack is being planned, though some sceptics continue to deny it. The first of these signs is the definite promise of the German leaders to the German people that they will aim a "knock-out blow," by land, sea, and air, at Britain. The second is the very evident concentration of shipping and of barges at various points in Norway, Belgium, and Holland. The third is the attack on British airfields which has now begun. From the end, of June, the Air Ministry has admitted, the German raiders appear to have been searching for British aerodromes, and the daily raiders might be expected to bring back some information besides carrying out their indiscriminate bombing. In addition,' the Royal Air Force has been hitting harder and harder at the points from which an attempt at invasion might be launched. Preparing to Resist. Meanwhile the British people _are preparing to resist the most serious threat to their shores since, over a century "ago, another army concentrated on the northern French coast waiting for the momentary command of the sea which would enable it to remove the chief enemy from its Emperor's path. In laying their plans to meet German1 attack the British leaders have to consider the probabilities. These appear to be that any German assaults on Britain would be made from at least four directions, undercover of darkness or of artificial fog, and that any or all of these may be intended to deliver a knock-out blow. When our Expeditionary Force landed at Gallipoli it took part in an attack which was launched at so many points that General Liman von Sanders reported the Turkish High Command as being thrown into confusion and unable to determine which was the main assault. Obviously the same tactics are desirable for an attack on Britain, if they can be brought into operation. The main obstacle to this attack, of course, is the British Fleet. Evasion, or temporary paralysis, of that fleet is therefore likely to be the first objective of the German High Command. The Easiest Crossing. The easiest point at which to cross into England is over the narrow stretch of water at the Straits of Dover, only 22 miles wide (little wider than Cook Strait at its narrowest point). From here the Germans may also have the advantage of close support from their land-based aircraft, which could be expected to launch a heavy double offensive, first against the fleet itself, and next against the nearest bases of the opposing aircraft. From here, also, the use of smoke screens on a large scale would make a heavy attack possible. At the same time it is likely that the tactics of evasion would be used to strike at the east coast of England, possibly the east coast of Scotland, and west coast of Ireland? With their love of surprise, the Germans might attempt to get ships right round the north of Scotland and attack as close to Glasgow as they could get. At Different Times? These tactics might be carried out at the same time as the main assault is launched in the south, or they might follow after British forces were heavily engaged there and worried by air infantry landed behind them. The object would be to exert as much pressure as possible at this point while aiming the other series of blows in different directions. The virtue of this plan would be, first, the element of surprise, 'second, the chance of establishment in more remote districts before adequate forces could be assembled, and third, the avoidance of the minefields which almost certainly exist about the main ports. That is why the policy of evasion commends itself as possible. It seems to receive some support from the heavy troop concentrations which have been reported in Norway recently and the visit of Grand Admiral von Raeder to that region. When our bombers raided Stavanger recently we lost seven machines, so powerful was the defence. The Irish Coast. Remoteness and vulnerability also suggest the west coast of Ireland, especially Galway, Connemara, and Limerick as a likely point of attack. Galway is a most possible place because of the deep water running up to the shore, the fact that the town is linked by railway with Dublin and stands on a lateral railway which serves most of the west coast, and because not far inland are Lough Mask and Lough Carrib, which could be used by flying-boats carrying air infantry, even if some of the fields of the region were not suitable for emergency landings. There are other excellent harbours on the same coast, and they have been used by the Atlantic Fleet. Moreover, the attack from this direction would make it possible to disperse the attacking force and approach from a variety of points on the Atlantic. These are risky tactics, but it must be remembered that Hitler did not hesitate to employ them in Norway even after the Navy went into action against him. It must also be remembered that no blockade is 100 per cent, proof. In the war against the much more limited Germany of 1918 about 10 per cent, of shipping managed to escape our naval net. The Main Aspects. The main aspects of the probable attack thus appear likely to be concealment, diversion, the choice of remote areas for subsidiary thrusts which may be developed according to their success, a heavy air attack on the Fleet and on our own air organisation, and also a submarine assault, on whatever scale the Germans can contrive, to cover their landing forces. In any event, the objective will be to push heavy war material ashore, and air operations will be co-ordinated to this end.