THE CZECH CRISIS

Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 96, 23 April 1940, Page 8

THE CZECH CRISIS

POSTPONEMENT OF WAR

HITLER FORCED TO YIELD

(By Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, 1937-39.) (World Copyright. Reproduction in whole or in part strictly forbidden.)

On Monday, September 26, the Prime Minister sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin with a personal letter to Hitler. In this, after stating that the German proposals, as they stood, had been rejected by the Czech Government, he again urged the Chancellor, since the difference was one of form and not of principle, to agree to negotiate rather than to resort to force.

He suggested a direct meeting between Germans and Czechs with a British representative as intermediary. Sir H. Wilson, accompanied by Kirkpatrick and myself, saw the Chancellor at 5 o'clock that afternoon. This interview also was stormy and unsatisfactory.

Herr Hitler could. only with difficulty be persuaded to listen to the Prime Minister's letter.

At one point he shouted: "It is no use talking any more," and he moved to the door as if to leave the room.

Eventually he returned, and the conversation was resumed, but it was impossible to reach any satisfactory conclusion.

On the same evening he made a speech in the Sportpalast. It contained a savage attack on Benes personally, and in it he finally burnt his boats by declaring that, if the Czech Government themselves had not ceded all the Sudeten lands by October 1, Germany would occupy them by that date, with himself as the first soldier of- the Reich. At the same time he made an appeal for British neutrality by friendly references to Mi*.. Chamberlain's efforts for peace. CHAMBERLAIN'S WARNING.. ;, Sir Horace Wilson spent that night in the Embassy, and in the course of it received instructions to deliver yet another xpersonal message. Therein Mr. Chamberlain, while acknowledging the references to himself in Hitler's speech, guaranteed, if Germany refrained,from force, to see that the Czech undertakings, already given, would be carried out. Sir H, Wilson accordingly saw Hitler for the second time at 12,15 on the ! morning of September 27. < He asked the Chancellor.if, yin the light of the Minister's statement, he could take any message back to London. Hitler replied that the Czechoslovak Government had only two courses: acceptance of the German memorandum; or rejection. • ' In the course of this conversation Hitler shouted savagely on two or three occasions: "Ich werde. die Tschechen zerschlagen," which Herr Schmidt, the interpreter, faithfully translated as: "I will smash-sh-sh the Czechs!" He showed by his demeanour that he was longing to chastise the Czechs for their insolence; bombs must fall on Prague; the Czech army must be put to rout; Dr. Benes must be forced to ignominious flight. ■ j When it was clear that Hitler's determination to go to war was quite inflexible, Sir H. Wilson said that he was charged by the Prime Minister to give him a message to the following effect: "If, in pursuit of her Treaty obligations, France became actively engaged in hostilities against Germany, the United Kingdom would feel obliged to support .her." Hitler's answer was that he could only take note of this communication. It meant, he said, that if France elected to attack N Germany, England felt obliged to attack Germany also. Sir H. Wilson attempted to refute this interpretation of his statement, but Hitler declined to be convinced. HITLER GETS A LESSON. "If France and England strike," he shouted, "let them do so. It is a matter of complete indifference to me, I am prepared for every eventuality. 1 can only take note of the position, It is Tuesday today, and by next Monday we shall all be at wax." On this depressing note the interview ended. Sir Horace . flew back to London early the same afternoon. Nevertheless, his conversations had made their effect, and I was officially informed that night by the State Secretary that Hitler had addressed, through the German Embassy in ' London, an immediate and important personal letter to the Prime Minister, i In this he attempted to justify his attitude, and begged Mr. Chamberlain to continue to use his good offices. Therein he gave the Prime Minister the definite assurance which he was so cynically to '■disregard six months later, to the effect that, once the Sudeten Germans were incorporated in the Reichr he would cease to he interested in the Czechs and would do nothing to infringe their independence. A chance episode had, as it happens, produced a salutary revulsion in Hitler's mind. In the afternoon of that Tuesday, a mechanised division had rumbled through the streets c. Berlin and up the Wilhelmstrasse past the Chancel*

lor's window and those of the Embassy. . For three hours* Hitler. stood at his window and watched it pass. • The Germans love military display, but not a single individual in the streets applauded its passage. TJhe picture which it represented was almost that of a hostile army passing through a conquered city, Hitler was deeply impressed. At that moment, he realised for the first time that the cheers of his sycophants were far from representing the true spirit and feelings of the German people, , ; Late in the afternoon of September 27 I had been advised by the Foreign Office by telephone that instructions were on their way to me for yet another communication to the Chancel* lor. $■ j. ■ - I accordingly made arrangements to meet the State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 11 o'clock theit night, and handed to him a Note for immediate translation and submission to Hitler. It contained proposals, agreed to by the French Government and transmitted to Prague, pressing the Czech Government to agree to theimmediate transfer of the Sudeten territories on the basis of a time-table guaranteed by his Majesty's Government, HOW WAR WAS POSTPONED. The first areas were to be handed over on October 1, and the creation of an international boundary commission for the settlement of-details was also suggested. ■ The proposals went far to meet Hitler's demands, and in the end they constituted the main basis of the final settlement at Munich, With faint hope, I retired to bed on the Tuesday night, realising that, if nothing new intervened, the announced general mobilisation, of thej German army would take place the j following day at 2.p.m. Since the army was already concern trated and mobilised, in effect this meant the beginning of the march into Czecho-Slovakia. ♦ I was aroused at 7 the next morning (Wednesday) by M. Francois-Foncet, the French. Ambassador, who informed me by telephone that his instructions to make a similar communication to mine had reached him at 4 a.m. Three hours later, at 10 a.m., he rang me up again to say that he feared the worst, since he had had no- answer to his request for an audience and probably would not now receive one. I told him that I would come and see him at 10.30, I then asked' to be put into. con> munication with Goering by telephone, and was able to get into immediate touch with him. Fortunately the telephone was working well everywhere on that critical day. I began to describe the proposals, but Goering cut me short, , "You need not," he said, "say a word more. I am going immediately to see the Fuhrer." I then went round to see the French Ambassador, and while we were discussing the new proposals a message game from the Reichschancellery that Hitler would see Francois,-Poncet at U:ls. Simultaneously a secretary brought round to me at the French Embassy a telegram from London, instructing me to give immediately a final personal message from the Prime Minister to Hitler himself. Its gist was that, after reading Hitler's letter of the previous evening, Mr. Chamberlain was still convinced that Germany could obtain her essen* tial requirements without resort to war, and that he was ready to come to Berlin at once himself in order to discuss the whole question with Hit* let* and with representatives of France and Italy. Did Hitler, it .concluded, wish to take the responsibility of starting a world war for the sake of a few days' delay in settling the problem? GOERING'S ATTITUDE TO WAR. It is worth recalling the exact sequence of events on that critical day. Goering went to see Hitler between 10.15 and 11.15 and was joined there by Neurath, who- had forced his way in uninvited. I Both were in favour of a peaceful solution by negotiation. At » meeting of Hitler and his ad-

visers there had been some plain speaking, in which Goering had vehemently accused Ribbentrop of inciting to war. Among other things, it was related that Goering shouted that he knew what war was and he did not want to go through it again. If, however, the Fuhrer said "March," he would go himself in the first and leading aeroplane. All that he insisted upon was that Ribbentrop should be in the seat next to him. He did say this, or something like it, but it was not in the Fuhrer's presence. But I believe that he did call Ribbentrop on that occasion a "criminal fool." Nor, of the various factors which in^ duced Hitler to abandon his idea of a Czech war, was Goering's intervention the least important. Then came the Poncet interview, in the middle of which, at 11.40 a.m., Hitler left, the room to see the-Italian Ambassador, who had arrived with a preliminary urgent appeal from Musso-. lini for the postponement of the socalled general mobilisation for twentyfour hours. The Italian intervention proved the final and decisive factor for peace. It enabled Hitler to climb down without losing face. His first remark to ,me when I saw him at 12.15, immediately after Poncet, was: "At the request of" my great friend and ally, Mussolini, I have postponed mobilising my troops for twentyfour hours." ..■'■". MUSSOLINI INTERVENES. Before actually seeing Hitler himself, I had, however, realised that the situation had taken a turn for the better. When I entered the Chancellery, there was an atmosphere of relief in the faces of the less bellicose of the crowd of Nazi soldiers and aides-de-camp who filled the hall. -.•"/■ One friend of mine whispered in my ear: "It is going better; only stick to it!" ...-.■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ' I was at once ushered into Hitler's Cabinet room, where I met Goering and Neurath on their way out. I gave Hitler the Prime Minister's message, and his reply was that he must consult again with Mussolini before giving me a definite answer. We discussed fairly - amicably the latest proposals of the French and British Governments, arid the Chancellor,' though a little distrait, was not unreasonable. ■ : My interview with him, which lasted over an hour,'was also interrupted by a second visit from the Italian Ambassador, this time to say that Mussolini himself was prepared to accept the British proposals for a FourrPower meeting, which had been telegraphed to Rome. i But, as a matter of fact, everything was settled before ever I> reached the Reichschancellery that morning. Peace had been ensured when Hitler agreed at Mussolini's request -at 11.40 '■ a.m.-—exactly two hours and twenty minutes before zero hour-—to postpone his so:called general mobilisation. 7