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FUEL HANDICAP

GERMANY'S PROBLEM

LIMIT TO SYNTHETIC PRODUCTION

RUMANIAN SUPPLIES

An English authority, Mr. H. J. A. Wilson, in the January issue of the new aviation journal, "Aeronautics," discusses from new angles the question, of' Germany's fuel supplies. He concludes . that even .if Germany secures the rights—by force—to the full output of Rumanian wells, negotiates for all surplus Russian oil, and develops synthetic production to its practicable .limit, she would still be below wartime requirements, mainly because- .of extreme difficulties of transport of Rumanian and Russian petrol and oils.

German consumption is based on three sources: (1) Imports; (2) synthetic production from coal; and (3) crude oil production. As there are only very few figures available for 1939 those for 1938 are given; the 1939 statistics available are given in parentheses. German oil consumption in 1938 amounted to 6,627,000 tons, of which 4,971,000 tons (2.623,000 tons during the first six month of 1939) had to be imported. Principal suppliers were Venezuela, Mexico, U.S.A., Rumania, smaller quantities were imported from the Netherlands East Indies, Iran, Peru, and Russia (4000 tons during the first six months of 1939). With the exception of Rumania all these imports have been stopped by the swift action of the British Fleet. NO SOLUTION. Synthetic production of oil irom coal amounted to 2,100,000 tons in 1939; the product, a light fuel, is of 75 octanes and mainly reserved for the j use of *the. German Air Force. How much the synthetic production could be increased can hardly be calculated; ! in any acse if cannot become great enough to cdver Germany's wartime consumption. ! If; we. assume that Germany's war consumption will amount to between 12,500,000 and 15,000,000 tons a yearconsumption during the Polish campaign is given as over 1,000,000 tons— J and further consider that for the extraction of one ton of fuel 4.5 tons of * coal are required, the amount of coal to: be brought to bank only for fuel production is approximately 60,000,000 tons a'year. The amount of additional labour, yin- coal mines only for this purppse would amount to approximately ;110,000 "men, "while the number ; of' additional • workers in the extraction plants would be between 65,000 and 70,000. Furthermore, large numbers of workers will be required for .the erection of these plants. It is doubtful : whether Germany commands, this additional labour force or the raw materials for this purpose.' . Fuel production from crude oil amounted to 552,000 tons in 1938 from which* mainly lubricants are derived. In spite of great effort no new wells haVeJVbeeh discovered from which larger outputs could be expected. ; RESERVES NOT LARGE. ; Expert opinion is divided in regard to. the quantity of reserves. Stocks frdrn .official imports can only be small if German consumption,' production, and import statistics during the last years are "correct. But there is hardly any reason to assume that these statistics are hot correct; as to overstating the consumption figures it must not be overlooked that alone the number of private vehicles in Germany amounted to almost 3,500,000, not to speak of the numerous light and Heavy military vehicles. That the actual figures for home production and imports have been greater than those published by the German authorities is hardly believable. As to the home production, published figures might have been greater than the actual j ones due to Germans' love for record figures and to prove the economic achievements of the regime; regarding the official imports of oil into Germany figures can be proved by comparing them with the exports from* oil-producing countries. The difference between these figures is not large j enough for greater stocks. I Unquestionably, considerable quantities of oil, imported on Government orders, have never been published. There is at least one order which became known not long ago by which the German Government acquired ap- j; proximately 2,000,000 tons of oil in ex- < change for a number of tankers, built i in German shipyards. But it is doubtful whether these stocks, which are ( estimated at 3,000,000 tons, are large ]; enough to guarantee a continuous ■ supply for the fighting forces and j especially for industry for a long , period. • RUSSIAN OIL. j As supplies from overseas can no •■ longer reach Germany, she has to look : for Continental suppliers. There are ] two: Russia and Rumania, frton both j of whom Germany hopes to obtain j sufficient quantities. Russia's oil pro- ] duction amounted—according to the ] "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," Ber- | lin, May 4, 1939—t0 approximately j 30,000,000 tons in 1938, of which only i 2,500,000 tons were available for ex- { port.. Russia's mobilisation of her ] Western army, resulting in a consider- | ably larger consumption of oil, would - c not allow exportation of greater quan- j titles, even if her production could i be increased, or her transport prob- < lem could be solved. s But.even the Russians do not think * that production could be increased!' much in the near future as they have ! taken up the synthetic production of fuel. \ But even if Russia were to export oil to Germany, the question will arise how. Germany, is going to pay for these quantities. Her foreign exchange and'gold fund is too small to allow', the purchase of greater quantities. On \ the other hand barter agreements with j Russia are out of the question as the , goods required by Russia in exchange ~ for raw materials are either arms or ' machines, both of which, and especially ( the raw/ material for their construction, Germany needs badly in her \ present struggle. i ' RUMANIAN OIL OUTPUT. j German military writers have often i stressed the importance of the Rut mariian oil 'fields in case of Germany £ being compelled to fight. Rumanian J crude oil production in 1938 amounted i to 6,603,000 tons, showing a decline i of 2,200,000 tons since 1936. Produc- I tion during, the first six months of 1 1939 amounted to 3.099,789 tons. It is ; wrong to. assume that this decline in i output,was caused by the exhaustion s of the Rumanian oil wells. The real 't reason can be found in the fact that 11 the industry, because of the lack of { proper mining regulations, did not invest large amounts for boring ,new \ wells. If Germany were able to c command the complete present Ru \i manian production, she would not ob- t tain quantities large tjn-W* to -\<?jr £ her military and industry. .var ...-. 1 chine working at full capacity. But s the quantities at her disposal wuum I be sufficient to overcome many of her Jc today's deficiences. Again the trans- j z portation problem has to be solved c

beforehand. In peacetime .37 per cent, of Rumanian exports 'to Germany were transported by ship from Constantza to Hamburg. This route is closed. Seven and a half per cent, were transported by rail; lack of roll-ing-stock makes a considerable increase impossible. The remaining 55 per cent, were shipped on the Danube, from Giurgiu to Regensburg, a distance of 1170 miles. The Danubian States (including Germany) command a fleet of about 300 tankers and -oil barges totalling 220,000 tons. It is estimated that present transport capacity on the Danube amounts to only 1,000,000 tons a year (first eight months of 1939, 478,899 tons); the river is not navigable during three months. It is doubtful whether Germany will succeed in increasing today's tanker fleet to such an extent that the total Rumanian yield could be brought into the Reich during the remaining nine months.

Fuels of a higher octane number than 90 were not produced in Germany before the outbreak of hostilities in quantities worth mentioning. Dr. Gustav Egloff, the eminent American oil expert, has come to the following conclusion: "Not the guns of France and Great Britain, but the 'knocking' of her airplane motors will toll the doom of .Germany in this war. Germany has principally the gasoline she obtains from coal, a product which not only diminishes the speed and carrying power of planes, but cuts down their life span."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19400208.2.11

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 33, 8 February 1940, Page 5

Word Count
1,322

FUEL HANDICAP Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 33, 8 February 1940, Page 5

FUEL HANDICAP Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 33, 8 February 1940, Page 5

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