THE FINNS AND THEIR WAR

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 135, 5 December 1939, Page 10

THE FINNS AND THEIR WAR

The military strength of the Finns is largely based on the compulsory army, service which is common in Europe. Finns have had to serve for 350 days, and in this way a large reserve of trained man-power has been created. The total forces which could be mobilised exceed 300,000 men, and a considerable number of them had been called up before the fighting began. For example, the normal strength of the Finnish army consists of three divisions, and it was reported that there were seven divisions on the Karelian isthmus alone. In addition, there is a voluntary Finnish Territorial Force, which receives aid from the State, is equipped with uniforms and rifles, and concentrates on rifle training and physical exercises. It lays great emphasis on shooting, and about 15,000 competitors normally enter for its spring competitions. The total number of marksmanship cards handed in each year has exceeded 300,000. Even boys of 17 are provided for in this organisation, and there is a women's organisation to trai^i its members for nearly all the noi>combatant duties of wartime. In difficult country such an organisation might prove hard to dislodge from its chosen positions,1 provided it was adequately supplied. V . Some sidelights on the war-reveal that the Russians may not have an easy task. At Petsamo, up in the Arctic Circle, for example, there is an icefree port because of the effect of the Gulf Stream. In this region the opposing forces are now fighting a war lin twilight, and there are only a few hours of this each day (for in winter the sun never rises; in summer, it does not set). In Poland, when the Russians marched in, they also showed themselves as not yet a modem army; they were lacking in transport for the men1 and had to plough along on foot in the style of the forces of twenty years ago, and they lacked oil for the machines they owned. They ' had abundant artillery and tanks, but their mobility was -still only that of a man on foot. They had, also, the blessing of a political commissar riding along with every commanding officer to share the responsibility of directing any war, an interesting system when decisions are needed. The handling of the Russian troops so far does not give the impression of very good organisation. The waste of parachute troops, for example, looks like bad staff work. The proper use of these troops is to interrupt communication at strategic spots, to blind an enemy, or to paralyse a movement as part of a larger plan.