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CONDUCT OF WAR

BRITISH POLICY

DEFEAT OF POLAND

THE FOLLY OF DIRECT

AID

(British Official Wireless.) (Received September 23, 11 a.m.) RUGBY, September • 22. There is still some misconception in certain foreign countries of the underlying principles which govern the conduc#of the war by Britain. Notably, the failure to prevent the overrunning of Poland has given rise to comment in some quarters which betrays a complete misunderstanding of the basic British plan. In the Western and Allied countries, even in Poland itself, it had always been anticipated that large areas of Poland would quickly fall to the enemy. Nowhere was this, more frankly recognised than in the Polish High Command, as is shown by the words used by a famous Polish general who, in bidding farewell to the recent Allied Military Mission, said: "We shall ; fight. A large part of our country will be overrun, and we shall suffer terribly. But if you come in, we know we shall h.w> again" The geographical ; situation of Poland many hundreds of miles from Britain and surrounded by 'enemy or neutral countries, through which the transport of arms was impossible, was the fundamental reason, recognised from the outset by the Poles why the war could not be fought on a basis of direct help to Poland. Recognition of this inescapable fact, which lies at the root of the British war effort, is not affected by the overwhelming of Poland earlier than was anticipated. Britain's realistic view of what the war involves was illustrated in the first War Cabinet communique that Britain's policy was based on the assumption that .-the war"" would last three years or more. The importance of this preparedness for a long conflict lies in the fact that as time goes on Germany will find herself at a disadvantage, whereas the strength of Britain and the Allies will grow from month to month. Britain being prepared for a struggle of this magnitude, it becomes clear that to have squandered our efforts on a vain attempt to give Poland direct help would have been folly. The Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on September 20 said: "There is no sacrifice from which we will shrink. There is no operation the Government will not undertake, provided our responsible advisers, our Allies, and we ourselves are convinced that it will make an appropriate contribution to victory. But what we will! not do is to rush into adventures that | offer little prospect of -success ' and are! calculated to impair our resources and to' postpone ultimate' victory."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19390923.2.73

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 73, 23 September 1939, Page 12

Word Count
422

CONDUCT OF WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 73, 23 September 1939, Page 12

CONDUCT OF WAR Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 73, 23 September 1939, Page 12

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