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A PACT-BREAKERS' PACT

Subject to one obvious reservation, the German-Russian Pact is indeed a turning-point in the history of the last decade. By one stroke of the pen, all the anti-Communist "ideology" goes up in smoke; and Herr Hitler and Dr. Goebbels laugh like schoolboys as they burn publicly their old exercise books. An incalculable printed mass of Nazi antiCommunism, preached with fervent intensity, is now relegated to the domain of hoax literature; and the Nazi " ideology" is seen to be eyewash. This moral—or should we say immoral?—somersault all but makes Russia a German ally. Last century Bismarck only reluctantly allowed the advantages of the Triple Alliance (that is, of securing AustriaHungary and Italy as Germany's partners) to interfere with his plans for German co-operation with Russia; Bismarck was very doubtful, in the seventies and eighties, whether the Russo-French co-operation and eventual alliance were not too high a price for Germany to pay for the Triple Alliance. And now we see Herr Hitler marching back to the Bismarck standpoint through the torn pages of "Mem Kampf." Under one clause of the Pact Russia promises to "in no wise support" a third Power making war on Germany; and the reported clause permitting either Russia or Germany to denounce the Pact, if either commits an act of aggression, is not present in the Berlin published official text. These published terms make Russia "a friendly spectator" of German aggression—an ail-but ally.

The "one obvious reservation" to which we refer above—the one factor that can prevent the GermanRussian Pact from being a turningpoint in history—is the outstanding bad faith of both the parties. Moscow and Berlin are equally bankrupt of political honesty, and stand on a plane of duplicity which is all their own. Though the saving clause (power of either party to denounce the Pact if the other party commits an aggression) disappears, the power to denounce the Pact, or indeed any Pact, remains with both Berlin and Moscow; and Berlin did in fact denounce Herr> Hitler's "ten years" agreement with Poland just before putting the match to anti-Communist "ideology." As to Russia, after fighting a great fight in the Great War under the Tsar, she quitted the War under the very same leaders (Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, etc.) as created the new Russia; and Trotsky would certainly not acquit Stalin (nor would Stalin acquit Trotsky) of being willing to quit any war or any Pact on the slightest inducement. The complete bankruptcy of good faith that equally singles out Berlin and Moscow is the "one obvious reservation" which all who read it must attach to the German-Russian Pact. It can be a historical turning-point if the high contracting parties are a? good as their signatures.

By Article Two of the Pact, in which Russia undertakes to "in no wise support" a third Power engaged in "wai'like action" with Germany, Russia apparently undertakes not to support a Poland defending herself against German aggression; and the emoted words seem to mean that Poland will not only receive no qrmed help from Russia, but possibly no supplies whatever. Poland ; s thrown to the wolves, and one of the wolves may turn out in the finish to be Russia herself. A cabled story comes from Estonia to the effect that the three Baltic babes in the wood (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) are actually satisfied to see the fourth babe (Poland) in danger of being devoured by the active wolf and the waiting bear. These three babes, it is cabled, feel "relieved," because they do not think that "Russia and Germany trust each other in the Baltic," and may respect the status quo. And yet Russia and Germany trust each other sufficiently to sign a Pact which, on the wording of Article Two, is designed to destroy the biggest baby of the group, Poland! The hollow ring of this Estonian message, expressing joy in the threatened destruction of a neighbour, resembles the hollow ring

of the now defunct. Nazi "ideology." To buy Russian connivance (if not participation) in making Poland defenceless, Herr Hitler recants his whole philosophy. And these are the Powers in whose presence Estonia feels "relieved." Will her relief be echoed by the Pope as he contemplates the future of Catholic Poland? Will it be echoed by Catholic Italy and by Catholic Spain? Where now stand Italy and Signor Mussolini, and where Count Ciano? Does Signor Mussolini, like General Franco, regard the new Pact as annulling the Anti-Comintern Pact? If so, where stands the recent Axis alliance? And where Japan? Placing the best interpretation that can be put on the Pact as published in Berlin, Russia will give Poland no help whatever against Germany, arid will give no help whatever to any country that helps Poland against German aggression. It is still possible for Herr Hitler to avoid an immediate war by not pressing Poland to a point at which the Poles will resist "with their national forces." By that means, the immediate peril may be avoided. But the Pact does not apply merely to Poland; and as long as it exists, and if it, is honoured, it will remain a formidable grouping fa nearalliance) of . dictatorships against democracies. As many writers predicted, the more or less artificial distinctions between the Nazi and the Communist dictatorships have not prevented the foi'ming of a dictatorship front, to which the democratic front has no similar reply except by the full partnership of the United States. The peril confronting democracy is thus much more than Danzig and much more than Poland; it has all the elements of a world struggle, with Russia aiming to save her strength in the hope of intervening decisively when others are exhausted. To the success of this plot, one obstacle is the bad faith of the plotters; a better defence for j democracy would be the awakening of America. It will be seen that Mr. Chamberlain does not propose to pass final judgment on what, he admits is a bombshell until the British land the French Governments have consulted "as to the meaning and consequences of the affair," but he reaffirms that the obligations of Britain and France to Poland remain unaffected. To sum up—peace or war still rests with Herr Hitler, but his temptation to make war must be vastly increased by the diplomatic coup that has contracted-out Russia's intervention, and blown to pieces the Franco-Soviet Pact and his cnvn.antiComintern pretences.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19390825.2.61

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 48, 25 August 1939, Page 8

Word Count
1,067

A PACT-BREAKERS' PACT Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 48, 25 August 1939, Page 8

A PACT-BREAKERS' PACT Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 48, 25 August 1939, Page 8

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