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HELP TO THETIS

MARKER BUOY NOT SEEN

EXCESSIVE CREW

AIR SUPPLY AFFECTED

(By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright.) (Received July 5, 9.20 a.m.) LONDON, July 4. Captain Oram was examined by Mr. R. Paget, representing the relatives of a Cammel Laird apprentice, William Smith, at the inquiry into the loss of the submarine Thetis, who suggested that the possibility of saving the submarine and the near certainty of saving the crew was lost by dilatoriness in sending ships to the scene. He replied: "I would not say dilatoriness."

Mr. Paget emphasised that instead of every available ship being rushed to the scene by 5.40 p.m., an hour after the submarine was due to come to the surface, the first ship asked was the destroyer Brazen, which was 55 miles away at 6.45 p.m. "I suggest," he said, "that the real cause of the disaster was dilatoriness in sending vessels to the rescue, and that another cause was the excessive crew." Captain Oram agreed that the effect of the overcrowding was that instead of having 48 hours' air the crew had only 24. He admitted that each time the Davis apparatus was used air escaped. Mr. Paget asked whether carbondioxide poisoning would become quicker than was expected. Would that not account for the failure of any more of the crew to escape? DEPARTURE FROM CUSTOM. Captain Oram said it might have been a contributory cause, and added: "The number of contractors' men on board was normal for the surface part of the trial, but it is a fact that nobody disembarked prior to the submerging, according to the customary procedure." Captain Oram agreed that it was inexplicable that the tug did not see the marker buoy. It was always a matter for immediate attention if a submarine did not send a surfacing signal within a specified period. Ships ought to have been in the vicinity by 8.30 p.m., in which event Captain Oram had no doubt the men would have escaped throughout the night: : STOKER'S IMPRESSION. Lieutenant Woods, describing the Davis escape jacket, said that Stoker Arnold, who followed him, thought he saw sparks and smoke through the scuttle of the escape chamber. When no others followed witness suggested tapping the hull to let the imprisoned men know help was at hand. This was done at 10.15 a.m., but there was .no. answer. Presumably the occupants were dead. Lieutenant Woods added that when he escaped the distress of the others was very bad, many of them being too weak to make their escape. ;

The inquiry was adjourned,

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19390705.2.65.1

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 4, 5 July 1939, Page 11

Word Count
423

HELP TO THETIS Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 4, 5 July 1939, Page 11

HELP TO THETIS Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 4, 5 July 1939, Page 11

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