Evening Post FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1939. BRITAIN AND THE CRISIS
In his declaration of British policy, made to the House of Commons yesterday, Mr. Chamberlain was, as is his wont, both firm and conciliatory. His words were carefully chosen on the one hand to make perfectly clear where Britain stands
in the present crisis, and on the other to avoid giving unnecessary, offence. (Nothing in what he said was in any way calculated to enhance the already acute international tension. Indeed, the Effect should be all the other way—towards relief and relaxation of the tension, if the parties responsible for the situation are only prepared to listen to reason and meet the suggestion of peaceful methods of reconciling differences half way. Mr. Chamberlain is still the man of peace, even at this late hour. But he leaves no doubt that it is not
peace at any price. To Greece and
Rumania, the States most concerned in the recent seizure of Albania,- he
offers unilateral guarantees of support similar to that originally given to Poland. At the same time he comments severely on the Albanian affair as making it "difficult in the extreme for Britain to reconcile what happened in Albania with the preserva* tion of national sovereignty as contemplated in the Anglo-Italian Agreement" and as "causing a general uneasiness and shock to confidence." In such circumstances Britain felt
that it had "a duty and a service to perform" in leaving no doubt in the minds' of anybody as to its position. This he laid down in the following words: I therefore take~ this opportunity of saying on its behalf that his Majesty's Government attaches the greatest importance to the avoidance of disturbjarice by force or threats of force of jthe status quo in the Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula.
The Prime Minister then announced Britain's unilateral guarantees to Greece and Rumania.
Britain's attitude towards the Balkans—though it is significant that neither Yugoslavia nor Bulgaria was mentioned-—is therefore firmly laid down for all to know—thus far and no further. The Prime Minister then referred to the future of the AngloItalian Agreement in the light of the Albanian affair. He .frankly confessed his deep disappointment with Italy's action, which, he said, had "cast a,shadow over the genuineness of its intentions to carry out its undertakings." In these terms, temperately worded but on that account all the more penetrating, Mr. Chamberlain expresses the general feeling of the outside world. Should Britain therefore withdraw from the agreement with Italy? The offence is there, against world opinion, butj Mr. Chamberlain, taking the longer view, holds that there is all the greater need for the fulfilment of the remaining provisions of the agreement. These are of the utmost importance, and the main pledge to be j fulfilled by Italy is the withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain. It was here that Mr. Chamberlain had some information to give. Dealing with Spain, the Prime Minister said that assurances had been received from Signor Mussolini, confirmed by conversations between representatives in London and Rome, that all Italian volunteers would be withdrawn from Spain immediately after they had taken part in the Victory Parade at Madrid, and Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, had informed the British Ambassador at Rome that aeroplanes and pilots would leave also. If this pledge is faithfully observed by Signor Mussolini—and "faithfully" means that withdrawals will not be covered by replacements—then the gain to the cause of peace will be substantial. An official statement from Burgos today helps to strengthen hopes that the pledges given by General Franco will also be carried out. Spain has always been the particular danger zone for Britain and France and, if the strict neutrality of Spain could be assured, the prospects generally might be expected to improve.
Mr. Chamberlain's final reference to the intolerable state of international affairs was timely. This recurrent series of crises and alarms, he said, blighted commerce and industry, depressed social conditions, and poisoned every phase of social activities. There is no part of the world that does not feel the effects, and a continuance of the suspense and uncertainty would in the long run be found unbearable. It is the LDeaee that is really no peace and in
the end might easily drift into outright war as a preferable alternative. It1 is this state that Mr. Chamberlain is striving to end as well as to avoid war. All his efforts have been to that purpose and in them he is ably seconded by the Premier of France (M. Daladier), whose declaration to the French Parliament, reported today, is equally firm and conciliatory. The door to peace is still open to all who are ready to discuss their grievances and differences in the spirit of civilised communities.
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 87, 14 April 1939, Page 8
Word Count
793Evening Post FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1939. BRITAIN AND THE CRISIS Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 87, 14 April 1939, Page 8
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