PALESTINIAN REBELS

Evening Post, Volume CXXVII, Issue 8, 11 January 1939, Page 9

PALESTINIAN REBELS

A DIVIDED CAMP

WAR OFFICE REVIEW

WORK OP TERRORISTS

LEADERS' DIFFERENCES

(British Official Wireless.)

RUGBY, January 9

The War Office, in the course of its statement on the position in Palestine, says that the authentic description of what is actually happening in Palestine today pbrovides a categorical answer to the accusations which have been made against the British troops. i

Referring to the manner in which the rebels and peaceful citizens are inextricably mixed, . the statement says that the total number of permanents active rebels in the whole country does not exceed 1000 or 1500 men split up in small bodies under the command of various leaders. These men are rebels under arms, often operate in uniform, and form the permanent nuclei of rebel gangs. These small parties are reinforced as required by temporary detachments of armed Fellahin from neighbouring villages.

Methods by which such reinforcements are obtained vary. In parts of the country where rebel sympathisers and organisations are strong,, definite village detachments with leaders and arms are in existence. Elsewhere villagers are pressed into service by permanent gangs for fixed periods and provided with arms. Elsewhere, again, no regular gangs exist, but small parties of rebel sympathisers combine by night for such activities as sniping and sabotage which have become a recognised and remunerative racket.

At present the rebels aim as far as possible to avoid being brought to action by troops. Except when a gang is surprised under arms-there is no organised fighting. Otherwise by day botii permanent and temporary rebels conceal their arms and uniforms and min^fle indistinguishably with peaceful citiKens.

ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN.

Practically every village in the country has at one time or another harboured or supported rebels and assisted in concealing their identity from the

Government forces. While in many cases this was done from sympathy, in the remainder of cases the same result has been achieved by terrorism. For months now a relentless campaign of assassination has been waged against all Arabs suspected of favouring the Government or of giving information against the rebels. Consequently villages where a majority of informants would be willing to assist the Government had been terrorised by the rebel minority into aiding them. There is no central co-operation or organisation of rebel bands. General policy is more or less directed by the Grand Mufti and the Higher Arab Committee, but within Palestine the fighting leaders are practically independent in their own areas. Two of the principal leaders are Abdul Rahim el Haj Mahtmed, titular commander-in-chief, who operates in Samara, and Aref Abdul Razzik, who commands rebel bands numerically almost as great in the same area. These two leaders are on such bad terms that on more than one occasion open hostilities have almost broken out between them. Their relations with the Grand Mufti are worth describing as they typify not only the complicated situation in Palestine, but also the two different faces displayed by the present rebellion on the one hand to the outside world and to the unfortunate Arab population on the other.

MAN OF GOOD FAMILY. Abdul Rahim is a man of good family and some education, and is a "more honest and genuine patriot than the majority of the rebels. He has, so far as possible within his rights, endeavoured to conduct the campaign on decent lines, and he dislikes intensely assassination and intimidation waged against all moderate Arabs who might oppose the Grand Mufti's policy. * He maintains an attitude of considerable independence to orders from the Grand Mufti, frequently refusing to carry them out when they offend his principles. For this reason, and because he formerly had moderate political connections, he is regarded with suspicion by the Grand Mufti, but is retained in his position, partly for his not inconsiderable organising ability, but still more because his known good character and high principles make him an admirable figurehead for external propaganda which seeks to represent the rebellion as a purely patriotic movement. Aref Abdul Razzik is a man of much lower integrity and less education than Rahim and entirely unprincipled. Starting as a very minor leader a year ago, he achieved his present position by a career of utter ruthlessness and implicit obedience to the Grand Mufti's orders. In consequence he enjoys the complete cohfidence of the rebel leaders outside Palestine and is their principal agent in the maintenance of the terrorist grip on the Arab population. Incidentally, .he undoubtedly pockets a large "rake-off" from forced contributions to rebel funds, which Rahim does not do.

\ FEW MAJOR LEADERS. \ Elsewhere there are practically no \ major rebel leaders, but various minor \ leaders almost completely independent \

and often in open enmity with each other. In addition to there being no standing armed rebel force against which troops can act, there is no central organisation whose destruction would cause the rebellion to collapse.

There are, moreover, definite signs that, as the grip of rebels on the countryside is weakened by military action, the position wili be further complicated by the entrance on the scene of Arab anti-rebel gangs who wish to take revenge on those who have supported the rebel, terror. One such gang is already active near Jenin.

In the urban areas there are two principal rebel elements —the more educated Effendi class, which is engaged in organising supplies, finances, and the general maintenance and administration of the gangs running the rebel courts and similar activities — and the lower class terrorist thugs who, by assassination, abduction,, and intimidation of all sorts, maintain a grip of terror on the town population as effective as +hat of the armed gangs on the villages.

Though the Effendis have in, the main acted in administrative capacities, they have not gained any real control as fighting leaders. In Jaffa, Abdul Rassik and the local leader, Hassam Salameh, have their own agents working for them and extorting money from the town with the result that quarrels over the division of the spoils and the allotment of victims for fleecing are continuous.