CZECH SACRIFICE

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 73, 23 September 1938, Page 10

CZECH SACRIFICE

FOR GERMAN PACT

CHAMBERLAIN'S POLICY

SOME REVELATIONS

(By "Senex.")

On September 14 it was announced that Mr. Neville Chamberlain would make the "bold, humble move" of flying to Berchtesgaden to confer with Herr Hitler in the effort to settle the greatest international crisis since the World War. There were various views of this •step. In Germany some newspapers regarded it as a confession of loss of prestige; in Poland it was said to be worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize. Commonly it was regarded as an emergency measure to meet a desperate situation. But the viewpoints of some of the most celebrated of foreign correspondents, which have been arriving here within the past few days, is different. In the eyes of these men, "Pertinax," the famous French commentator, Robert Dell, the "Manchester Guardian's" Geneva correspondent, G. E. R. Gedye, for years the Central European correspondent of the London '"Daily Telegraph" and the "New York Times," whose treatment by the Nazis after the occupation of Austria was the subject of discussion in the House of Commons, Mr. Chamberlain's Berlin move was no expedient to meet Herr Hitler's threat to disturb the peace, It was part of a deliberate policy which would have been pursued whether the bellicose speech at the Nuremberg Congress had been made or not. THE RUNCIMAN MISSION. The story begins with the decision of the British Government to send its "unofficial official" emissary, Lord Runciman, to Prague. According to an article which Mr. Dell sent to the New York "Nation" from Geneva on August 11, Lord Runciman was being sent to Czechoslovakia "to persuade the Czechs to commit national suicide." The visit was surrounded by mists of optimism which were sharply dispelled 'by "Pertinax," who, in the course of jtwo articles, one in the Nationalist journal "I'Ordre," and one in 'TEurope Nouvelle," revealed that the Runciman mission had been imposed both on Prance and on Czechoslovakia. The first proposal of dispatching a British mediator to Prague in June had been received without enthusiasm by the French, who thought such a course would encourage the Henleinists in their demands. Nevertheless, according to this authority, Mr. Chamberlain decided to send Lord Runciman to Prague, and on July 20 Paris was informed of what was then a definite arrangement. From that moment the important fact was no longer the pledged support .of the Czechs by France but the tenour of the Runciman report. ''Pertinax," who has habitually pointed out the way in which the British Government has sought to release France from Central European ties, declared that the French Government had "once more capitulated to British pressure and sacrificed the interests of France, Czechoslovakia, and Europe." In the May crisis over the Czechs M. Daladier, the French Premier, threatened to mobilise. Mi\ Chamberlain had to fall in behind him in accordance with the Anglo-French conversations of April last. British action was successful and Herr Hitler, confronted by.such an array of force, backed down. CZECH SUSPICIONS. With the arrival of the Runciman mission in Prague, Czech suspicions were aroused at once. On August 6, Mr. Gedye radioed to the "New York Times" that "Lord Runciman's first day's work consisted of three twenty-minute courtesy calls on the President of the Republic and Cabinet Ministers, followed by a one and a half hour political conference with the Henleinists, followed again by an evening conference between members of his staff and the Henleinists. It created a strange impression that the man designated to the Czechoslovak Government as 'adviser and conciliator' should thus put that Government's bitterest enemies in the foreground of his negotiations." Even before this, the fact that 'apart from the representatives of the President, Premier and Foreign Minister, no Czech parties were represented at the station to meet the mediator, whereas the Henleinist leaders •stood by the side of Government officials and were introduced to Lord Runciman by the British Minister, conveyed the impression that the whole situation had been prejudged in London." The suspicion was heightened when, on August 19, it was announced officially that Lord Runciman had influenced the Czech Government to appoint a number of Germans to Government posts. "A LINE OF HIS OWN." The background to these events was provided by avi even earlier message. On July 25, with the announcement of i the Runciman mission, Mr. Gedye radioed that "it is suggested that British foreign policy is becoming more and more confused because Mr. Chamberlain is pursuing a line of his wn that is stated to differ greatly from that of the Foreign Office. Mr. Chamberlain is said to be working beSiind the scenes on lines for which Czechslovakia will have to pay a heavy price if she acquiesces in his personal policy. The general view held in Szech official circles seems to lie somewhere between a desire to stand in ivell with Great Britain and deep disrust of the real aims of her Prime Minister." Mr. Robert Dell was even nore emphatic. He declared in his article in the "New York Nation" that ust after Captain Wiedemann, Herr hitler's personal emissary, visited London the German Ambassador saw Mr. Chamberlain, who gave him "certain assurances" to the effect that the 3ritish Government was exercising a •estraining influence on the Czech Government. "Neville Chamberlain's >pinion on the Sudeten German quesion is known," wrote Mr. Dell. "He old the American journalists who net him at Lady Astor's famous uncheon party that he was in favour >f. a modification of the frontier beween Germany and Czechoslovakia >y the annexation of Czechoslovakian erritory near the frontier in which he Germans are the majority. . . . 3ne of Chamberlain's ideas is the teutralisation of Czechoslovakia, which vould thus be obliged to abandon the illiance with France and the pact vith Russia and the Little Entente and vould be an easy prey for Germany, n short, Chamberlain wishes to sacriLee Czechoslovakia to get an undertanding with Germany." In London, also, the news of Britain's' :ourse leaked out. On August 25, the lay before the British Cabinet met, Mr. Ferdinand Kuhn, London corres>ondent of the "New York Times," inormed his newspaper by radio that he Czechs would be told that they oust give real autonomy to the Sudeten Germans in the interests of European "appeasement." Why was his course being followed? Accordng to Mr. Dell, because the British land last May "was naturally resented n Berlin and Rome and compromised Chamberlain's agreement with Italy md his policy of an understanding vith the Fascist Powers. He was de-

termined never to be put in such a position again." And why did the Czechs accept the Runciman mission, feeling as they did? According to "Pertinax,' because if President Benes had refused to do so his published refusal would have ranged British public opinion against Czechoslovakia and made French support of the Czechs difficult. Even the technique' of Mr. Chamberlain in going to Berlin is explained if one accepts the views of Mr. Victor Gordon Lennox, political correspondent of the London "Daily Telegraph," as set out in the July issue of "Foreign Affairs." Mr. Chamberlain, says Mr. Lennox, has "a certain admiration for the efficiency of dio tators," he "came to the highest offlctt imbued with the idea that he would make his mark as the pacificator of Europe," and a passion for the "frank and friendly" and personal approach. And so to Berchtesgaden.