Evening Post MONDAY, SEPTEMBER19, 1938. PLEBISCITARY ZEAL

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 69, 19 September 1938, Page 8

Evening Post MONDAY, SEPTEMBERI9, 1938. PLEBISCITARY ZEAL

The National Council of Labour, it is cabled from London, "has agreed not to countenance the move for a plebiscite"; and Signor Mussolini, according to Trieste, is overwhelmingly convinced that in a plebiscite lies the solution of the crisis. The Labour-Fascist' war is therefore on, so far as plebiscites are concerned; and there is a peculiar irony in the fact that Signor Mussolini, who has suppressed free-choice institutions, is the knight-errant of plebiscites,, and that the opponent is Labour, under whose policy a generation ago the referendum was a kind of tinopener to human happiness. Circumstances, of course, alter cases; and tactical needs have a modifying effect upon principles. Dr. Hodza, Premier of Czechoslovakia, states that a plebiscite is unacceptable because it would create a series of nationality problems for the future. But Signor Mussolini does not mind that at all; "the solution," he said at Trieste, "has one simple name— plebiscites for all nationalities demanding them." But plebiscite singular, or plebiscites plural, sound as strange in the mouth of a Fascist or a Nazi as Scripture sounds in the mouth of Mephistopheles. When a Nazi or a Fascist talks of a plebiscite he means, for preference, one like the 98-100 per cent, plebiscite about Austria, with a German army in Austria. The next best thing, from the Nazi-Fascist point of view, is a plebiscite in a small democratic country, under the guns of a totalitarian army just across the border. Nazis and Fascists look for plebiscites in which they feel themselves to be sure winners, and their democracy goes no further than that. But Dr. Hodza, when he speaks of this plebiscite, speaks of something in which the German dice is loaded against him. He also sees that there is no argument-of-principle in favour of a Sudeten German plebiscite that would not be equally in favour of plebiscites of Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, and any other racial minority in Czechoslovakia. And as a plebiscite could be a^recurring thing, there seems to be small limit to either the number of races who could demand selfdetermination or to the number of times ; they could demand it. Plebiscitary arguments that could set up such a condition of instability in Czechoslovakia could also produce the same result in many other parts of Europe, where little racial islands often appear set in seas that are racially different. A New Zealand politician once said that the referendum was the sheet-anchor of the shuffler (the person proposing it). To the Nazis the plebiscite must be something admitting on the voters' part no shuffling at all. The plebiscite is a totalitarian weapon, or nothing. If a plebiscite as the Duce sees it were a plebiscite as democrats see it, Signor Mussolini's endorsement of "plebiscites, for all nationalities demanding them" would be lacking. Within his northern boundaries Signor Mussolini has a large German minority, and its irredentism was encouraged by Germany until the day when the Duce permitted the Fuhrer to march into Austria, after which came the Hitler-Mussolini telegraphed exchanges of affection and the Hitler promise that the Italian frontier would be for ever sacred. Signor Mussolini is unafraid of a German plebiscite in his German territory, but the source of his confidence is not the sacred ;oath sworn by the other Dictator of the BerlinRome axis; his confidence is founded on the fact that his iron hand is over German and Italian alike within his own Italian boundaries, that there will be no demand for a plebiscite from his Germans unless he wills it, and that there will be no plebiscite unless he knows the result in advance. "Plebiscites for all. nationalities demanding them would bring the whole democratic world into instability without endangering the Dictatorships. Surely the world will pause and wonder when men like the Duce and the Fuhrer become the priests and prophets of plebiscitary decisions. However, the naked ■ question remains i Supposing' that the Fuhrer, wordily encouraged by the Duce, makes a Sudeten German plebiscite the price of preventing an immediate march by the German • army, what shall be the decision of the British Government? Shall it decide for no-plebiscita| and war? No doubt there are many people who will say that on no calculation can the hypocrisy of a Hitler-backed plebiscite outweigh the enormity of a European war. No doubt there are many people who would prefer the lesser evil of the plebiscite. But the National Council of Labour is not among them, and at time of writing it appears that the Government of Czechoslovakia will itself refuse the plebiscite. Paris messages seem to suggest that feeling there on the question of plebiscite or war wavers, but in New York the rabbis are afraid that Mr. Chamberlain "may sell the Czechs down the street"; and if London-Paris pressure forced Czechoslovakia to a plebiscite, it seems, that many Americans would chorus that the sale down the street was complete. What, in this very real crisis, do the people of Britain

really want? The Trades Union Congress has undertaken to speak for them: Britain must leave no doubt in the mind of the German Government that she will unite with France and Russia to resist attack against Czechoslovakia. The British people would solidly support such a policy. Is that statement correct? It seems that the only plebiscite that would be really honest and worth while would be a plebiscite of the people of the British Isles, but is there' time for it against the time-factor which Herr Hitler is reported to have imposed and which Signor Mussolini confirms? There is difference of opinion as to whether the buying-off of HenHitler, by means of concessions by Czechoslovakia, would buy per^ manent peace. "Pravda" (Moscow) says "No." Moscow opinion scouts the possibility of satisfying the Nazi-Fascist appetite; it is an appetite that increases with eating. This is probably true. The issue of plebiscite or war should be weighed not in any hope that Nazi general policy hereafter is to be determined by such a concession. The issue is simply that civilisation faces an immediate catastrophe, and an immediate decision, for good or ill, appears to be unavoidable.