RATANA INQUIRY

Evening Post, Volume CXXV, Issue 150, 28 June 1938, Page 13

RATANA INQUIRY

COUNSEL'S ADDRESSES SURVEY OF POSSIBLE CAUSES THE SPEED FACTOR Comment upon the condition and position of the speed board marking th® sestriction at the curve where the Sstana railway wreck occurred was made by Mr. G. G. G. Watson, counsel lor the driver of the train (Mr. E. Percival) and the Engine Drivers' Association, when he continued his address before the Board of Inquiry yesterday afternoon. Mr. Watson submitted that the board, having regard to the visibility at the time of the accident (shortly after 2 a.m.), and the circumstances under which the driver made the trip, would be justified in holding that the driver was not blameworthy. Mr, H. F. O'Leary, K.C., representing the Bailway Department, opened his address, and remarked that though he felt it his duty to have led evidence on all possible causes for the derailment, speed was the one most likely to have been the cause of the disaster. The board consists of Sir Francis Frazer (chairman) and Messrs. H. * L. Cole and F. W. Furkert. Continuing his address, Mr. Watson said that the failure of the driver of the train to see the speed board was excusable under the circumstances of the journey. . The driver was practically a stranger to the road. It was eight years since he had last driven an engine over the section, and then it had only been five or six times at night. The driver had never had an opportunity of familiarising himself with landmarks. In the intervening eight years most of his driving had been by daylight over the Wellington - Palmerston section. The fireman had never been over the section of the line, with the result that the man had had to be given continuous instructions during the' trip, such as when to look for tablets and signals, and when to fire and when not to fire. NO SENSE OF LOCATION. A driver familiar with the section would have had something that Percival did not have—a sense of location by night. Except a speed board and a radius board, Percival had nothing to tell him when he approached the curve, as the mile pegs were on the fireman's side. The engine-drivers who had been called to give evidence all said that to a driver strange to the road the speed board was essential, and for that reason Percival looked for it and told the fireman to look also. The failure to see the radius board was surely bound up with the failure to see the speed board. . Why did not Percival see the speec board? asked Mr. Watson. There wen at least two factors: (1) The conditior of fog, and (2) the possibility tha the driver's attention was momentarily diverted to give some instructions t< his fireman, or. to answer a question The main point about the fog was, no was there fog after the accident, bu was there fog south Of the speed boari prior to the accident? The speet board was partially obscured by a tele graph pole in the day, and by th< shadow of the pole at night. "It is unfortunate, having regard t< the foggy conditions,. that .the boarc had been-allowed to become dingy ant almost grey," said Mr. Watson. "I is more unfortunate that the board i partially obscured by a telegraph pole and it is unfortunate that the boart is not in the place where the.spee< restriction commences. At least twi of the senior executive officers of thi Department admitted, in cross-examija tion, that it was unfortunate that th board was not further south, and tha it should be further south." For reasons apparently of econom: the Department, with weekend excui sion trains, departed from the usua rule of one driver operating over on section to Palmerston North, am changed, ,by asking the driver to tak the train to Aramoho, travelling ove unknown territory. The statement that the driver coul have had a pilot was only a "re herring," as a pilot taught new driven If a pilot had gone, there would hav been no need for Percival to go. M: Watson said he did not dispute thE Percival could have refused to take th train, but could it be said that h was blameworthy in not declining t take the train assigned to him? "The Department must have knowi or should have known, that Perciv: had no recent knowledge of the trac and that the firemap had never bee over it," said, Mr. Watson. s"With th; knowledge, or presuming that knov ledge, the ■ Department assigned th man to this particular work, and h naturally accepted the task assigne to him. I submit that Percival cann< be blamed for so doing, and cannot t blamed even if he thought he had greater knowledge of the track that I did have." No recklessness, negligenc or breach of duty could be attribute to Percival in failing to see tl board. Finally, Mr. Watson dealt with tl possibility of an obstruction causing tl derailment, and pointed out that thri officers of the Railway Department i said that nobody could absolutely e: elude the possibility of an obstructs on the line. It was significant that that district in the last two or thn years there had been three delibera attempts to derail trains, and presui ably the culprits were still at lari and probably in the district. One o struction derailed a train at the sar curve and at the same hour—2 a.m. the last five or six years there had be 60 or 70 cases of malicious attempts derailments. 1 In conclusion, Mr. Watson submitt that it would be contrary to the weig of evidence to find that the accide was due to any recklessness, negligent or culpable conduct on the part the driver or the fireman. TO PROTECT NOBODY. Mr. O'Leary said that his instructic were to assist the board in its € deavour to ascertain the djtuse of t disaster. It "was not hi 9 dtOty to c deavour to protect any individual the railway service who, by the e dence, might be shown to be at fat If the evidence had pointed to one mt than another being at fault, it was r because of any endeavour of 1 (counsel's), but it merely emerged fr< the mass of evidence. Mr. O'Leary said it would be i predated that the technical evidence 1 been presented in such a way that coi sel representing interested parties h been able to submit the evidence to < perts before the cross-examination v taken. Mr. O'Leary pointed out tl no attack could be made on any p of the case presented by the Depa ment, except the case which indica that speed entered largely into 1 cause of the accident. It was his ti to place evidence fairly before \ board, and as far as inferences f were concerned, to asi the board in coming to a conclusion to the cause of the accident. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ACCIDEI The cause of the accident could t fee approached by considering possi causes, such as the condition of carriage stock, the locomotive, and

track, the possibility of an obstruction S pe on the line, the speed of the train, be< fog, the speed board, and other rele- an vant factors. One by one a number wo of those things could be eliminated, rac Mr. Watson made no suggestion that pos the cause of the accident was the con- dri dition of the track, the locomotive, or nol the train generally, but had felt that] mi. the one thing that could be de- wa cided against his client was speed, and to he had concentrated on that. Mr. mg O'Leary said he felt it his duty to have coi led evidence on all possible causes of ore derailment, though speed was the one en< most likely to have been the cause of «" a the disaster. . ' Dealing first with the condition of '"t the carriage and vans, he submitted ro that the evidence showed that the stock was in serviceable order and the Westin*house brake was in order. He understood that the board had received a letter from the New Zealand Tourist League dealing with the suggestion that the cars should be all . steel. The Department had supplied the board with a statement which emphasised that it was not possible, on account of weight, to adopt very heavy ' steel in car construction. Parts of the cars, including the ends, were of steel. It was the desire of the Department to make all the improvements possible. Mr. O'Leary proceeded to deal with the condition of the locomotive, and Fsaid that anyone following the inquiry could not but be astounded with the ' ce care taken by the Railway Department to ensure safety to passengers. The ex locomotive had to be eliminated as fo: possible cause of the disaster, and ci< had been established beyond question of that there was nothing in the condition of the track that could in any way contribute to the derailment. wi The board adjourned till today. d o TODAY'S PROCEEDINGS. w] Continuing his address today, Mr. S p O'Leary said that at the most there hs was a very remote possibility of an th obstruction on the line sufficient to as cause the derailment. Definitely, there pi was no obstruction on the line at 1.40 he a.m. (approximately half an hour be- th fore the accident) when the south- or bound train passed over the line. In or 5i years there were 25 cases where ob- in structions were struck by trains or ar large passenger rail cars, but in no nc case was an engine or rail car de- cc railed. he Mr. O'Leary submitted that he had w eliminated the condition of the car- e\ riages, the engine, and the truck as b< likely causes of the derailment, and fr the possibility from obstruction had sc been placed in the category of being tl very remote. aj The position, said Mr. O'Leary, is that tr a train properly equipped, left the tt rails at the curve; and trains, if pro- di perly equipped and driven, did not ei overturn on the line. Some explana- si tion for the accident must be found, and the question he asked was: Was it di to be found in a consideration of the re question of speed? Incidentally, it was w to be noted that the Department, by the fi evidence it had tendered as to speed, ai had made it clear that the liability for. n damage and injury must be under- tl taken by the Department, but in pur- c) suance of its wish to have the true facts ascertained no consideration of avoiding or admitting liability had been 1 permitted to enter into the investiga- t\ • tion. ai 1 SPEED VITAL. n: \ Mr. O'Leary said he proposed to deal n with the question of speed from the p 1 point of view of the defendant's evi- n 2 dence, the passengers' evidence, and t other matters which had been put for- £ j ward as negativing speed or at least , casting such a serious doubt on the " evidence of speed that the board should " > not find that the accident was due to " ' speed. If the engine left the track " while travelling a curve of 6.4 chains 11 ■ radius, the maximum speed for which [ was 25 miles per hour, the element i of speed was of vital importance. The ™ , speed rules of the Department were s definite that speeds must not be ex- ■ J ceeded. , The first question was whether the ° speed of 25 miles an hour for the " ' curve was a safe speed. The evidence " showed that the speed had been in £ I operation for ten years, and Mr. Wans- ( - I brough had stated that time-tables were s based on schedules of. standard running. In the making up of the time- 11 ; tables all material factors affecting the s " speed at which trains could safely run ® p had been taken into account. It was b ? suggested that Mr. Wansbrough was E a theorist, but some 3,000,000 trains t e had been running on his time-tables, c r and he was far from a theorist. Mr. c . Wansbrough fixed the time-table for ? the train concerned in the accident, ° 7 and the time-table was prepared in the j *' same manner as otlTer lime-tables. 1 e r :. ENGINEERS' CALCULATIONS. I g Mr. Wansbrough had carefully j, e checked the time-table from Marton, . 0 and had been satisfied that the train * could keep to the time-table without J j exceeding the authorised speed limits. He gave 56 miles an hour as the over- , k turning speed of an AB engine on . n that curve under what he termed perfeet conditions, and then he discussed f . circumstances which reduced the speed j ; s to 53 miles. He then proceeded to t e discuss the critical speed of an AB d engine on that curve, and the speed 5t at which it would be liable to mount ie the rail, and in doing so used the for- ( a mula that Mr. Spiller had used for ie engines similar to the AB type, that e was, 14 times the square root of the d radius of the curve, giving a speed of ie 35.5 miles an hour. Sir Francis remarked that Mr. Ie Spiller had reviewed his formula and ie had made it 19 times the square root ;e of the radius. On the revised forill mula, the speed on a 6.5 chain curve s- would be 47i miles an hour. in Mr. O'Leary submitted that the in speed of the train had been not less se than 44 miles an hour, but more probte ably 50 miles an hour. Mr. Gard, den- signing engineer, had approached the ;e, matter from a different .angle, having b- been asked to ascertain the speed at ie which an AB would leave the track. In He had ascertained that the overturn--2n ing speed due to centrifugal force at at the curve would be 50 miles an hour, and that the speed at which it would sd derail, due to side pressure, would be ht higher than 50 miles per hour. There nt W as an apparent conflict when Mr. :e, card said that the engine would overof turn before it would mount, but that was explained by Mr. Wansbrough when he pointed out that co-efficients suitable to the characteristics of the ns engine had to be taken into consideration. He said that Mr. Spiller's formula depended on characteristics of the engine and a variety of variable circumstances, and that if the right co,lt" efficients were put in, suitable to the characteristics of the engine, Spiller's 'vi formula would probably give a differ■l ent result from the result based on the ~ engine with which he made the investigation. Mr. Gard dealt with the same point, and said that he did not think that Spiller's formula was intended for any particular case, but was "d just a general formula. That meant ,t that, to apply Spiller's formula, allow- • ance would have to be made for varyiat ing factors of the particular type of ar t engine involved. r t Mr. Wansbrough had dealt with the ■ed computed speed of the train at the ' he time of the accident, and had referred : sk to the fact that the engine would overhe turn and that the leading bogey would ; nd not mount the rail. Mr. O'Leary subsist mitted that the board would find that ' as that was obvious from the facts placed before it, particularly as there were no marks of running wheels between * T - the tracks at or near the place of deest railmont. ble Mr. O'Leary submitted that the enthe gine would not have left the line had the it been travelling at the required

Ed, and consequently it must have in travelling at more than 25 miles hour. In practice, the speed board uld come into view long before the ius board did, but for practical pur- . les it would be sufficient if the ver observed the curve radius board ice and entered the curve at 25 es an hour. He submitted that there s very little that could be pointed in Mr. Wanbrough's evidence as bethe evidence of an advocate, as itended by Mr. Watson. Mr. WansiUgh had not taken into account the 2ct of the remaining parts of the in passing the derailed position, and v 1 taken the place where the remain- tl ; carriages struck the rear of the q nt portion as the place where the riages were at rest after the acciit, and he had apparently taken no c iice of the running gear of the car- a ges. He had assumed that that gear d s normal, whereas an inspection wed that that was not the case, and s gear must have had some retard- n I effect. t PASSENGERS' EVIDENCE. v Mr. O'Leary said that it was sugsted that the evidence of the exrts was nullified by the evidence of t ssengers. He agreed with Mr. Wat- j l that the evidence of passengers in j. :h a case would depend on their ing influenced by many factors. rst, there was the state of their i rakeness. He was prepared to ac- ] pt Mr. Watson's statement that not r e in four of the passengers spoke of ( cessive speed, because not one in ir of the passengers would be suffi- J mtly awake to give a lucid account { the speed. 1 Sir Francis: The board agreed to r sregard the evidence of passengers 10 admitted that they had been 1 zing. Mr. O'Leary quoted one passenger l . io said he was definite as to the i eed just prior to the derailment, and < d stated in cross-examination thai i e impact had awakened him, and ' ked how many passengers could be • aced in the same class. Then one ' d to consider the frame of mind of i e passengers, and the fact whether ' not they were sympathetic to any- J ie whose actions might be called to question. "We are all human, id when disasters take place it is \ it uncommon for people to be un- ' nsciously influenced by sympathy," • > said. The strongest evidence, he said, as not evidence of speed merely, but ■idence of alarm. Would anybody : j alarmed at a train travelling at om 25 to 40 miles an hour? True, me said they were not alarmed, but ie evidence was of little value as [ainst those who were alarmed. No ibunal could find on the evidence of e passengers that the disaster was ie to speed, but when added to the ridence of experts their evidence lould be given weight. Dealing with the time of the acci;nt, he said that if the guard's estiate of 2.18 a.m. was credited, that ould mean that the train travelled om Turakina to the scene of the :cident at 15 miles an hour. The wit?sses Mr. Watson replied on for fixing ie time were totally unworthy of •edence in other matters. TIME OF ACCIDENT. Mr. O'Leary said that the time beteen Turakina and the scene of the :cident was more likely to be eight inutes, but the time was not of paraiount importance as the extra speed >uld have been put on in the last alf minute of the journey. In making p schedules watering was allowed for at not shown. The schedule time etween Marton and Turakina was 21 unutes, but this train had done the ■ip in 17£ minutes, and the driver had ot only made up on his schedule, ut. had improved on the New Plylouth express's time by 3i minutes. Mr. Wansbrough's estimate of the )eed was criticised, and he was taken ) task for saying that luggage would ave been thrown out of the racks, 3ut isn't that what happened," asked [r. O'Leary. At 50 miles an hour the istance travelled on the curve would ave taken 3 seconds. Referring to Mr. Watson's allegaons about the speed board, Mr. I'Leary said that that was the only jggestion about a departure from ractice, but the matter was of no loment. The driver knew that the peed board was there, but did not se it. According to the evidence, the oard was placed in the right spot for radical use. Mr. O'Leary contended nat a layman's impression of the accient would have been that it was aused by speed. Dealing with the allegations about sking the driver to take the train, and he section run over, Mr. O'Leary said hat the section to Aramoho was not un for cheeseparing economy's sake. Ivery reasonable precaution was taken hat a driver was acquainted with the oad, and the locomotive foreman was ustified in asking Percival to drive he train. Percival had said he made io complaint. On the question of fog, the driver iad very little support from the evi[ence. In connection with speedometers, he said that this was not a :ase where the driver said he did not mow his speed. He said he was able o judge with others. Replying, Mr. Watson said that if he retardation Mr. O'Leary said Mr. Wansbrough had not taken into ac:ount had been taken into account, the estimated speed at the time of the ac:ident would have been 60 miles an hour, which would have condemned itself. He pointed out that the E.F.C.A. had asked for speedometers. Mr. Watson also submitted that the costs of the inquiry should be borne by the Railway Department, but it was agreed that this should be dis:ussed later. TRIBUTES TO STAFF. At the conclusion of the sitting, both counsel thanked the commission for the courtesy extended to them, and made complimentary references to the work of the staff. Mr. Watson said that, speaking from a long experience, he could conscientiously say that he had never experienced secretarial work and recording work of a higher standard. Mr. O'Leary remarked thai the capable manner in which the evidence had been typed had saved the inquiry many days of sitting. Sir Francis expressed the commission's gratitude for the help frorr counsel, and said that it was fitting that the Commission should have the opportunity of expressing publicly it: thanks for the work of the secretarj (Mr. J. G. Whetton), and that of the stenographers (Misses G. Gunn ant M. Mawhinney). The board adjourned.