THE ATTACK ON SHANGHAI

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 113, 9 November 1937, Page 9

THE ATTACK ON SHANGHAI

JAPAN'S SCHEME

A BLOW TO TRADE

The first steps in Japan's conception of the way to world conquest, as outlined in the famous Tanaka memorandum, are following each other, according to plan, writes George Taylor in the "New Statesman and Nation." In 1931 Manchukuo was added to the Japanese Empire; in 1933, the province of Jehol. In 1935 an attempt to lop off five provinces left Japan in practical, though not nominal, control of the two adjoining provinces of Hopoi and Chahar, while the six northern districts of Chahar were soon afterwards practically annexed. In 1936 an attempt to push forward into Inner Mongolia down to the Peking-Paotow railway was frustrated by General Fu Tso I with the aid of Nanking ' divisions. What then, judging by her actions, did Japan hope to accomplish in 1937? It is clear that one arm of Japanese advance is bent round the bulging frontier of Outer Mongolia and is designed to frustrate any expansion of the Soviet Republic as well as to block any movement for an amalgamation of the Mongol; people who are now divided between the territories of the U.S.S.R., China, and Japan. But the absence of railways on the route from Manchuria to Inner Mongolia makes the method of conquest attempted in November, 1936, too costly,- while the policy of buying off Mongol princes, pursued now for some years, has not brought permanent results. Control of the Peking-Paotow railway was therefore essential to domination of this area. Peking and Tientsin must be in Japanese hands so that troop? can be moved directly from Japan across North China to Inner Mongolia. Peking, which controls the . four big railways of the north, is the key to the strategical situation. Hence the incident at Wanping, the junction of the lines from Peking to Hankow and Shanghai. The possession of Peking with its railway junctions gives Japan complete control of the railway system of North China and a gateway to Inner Mongolia. "NECESSARY" TERRITORY. North China, say the Japanese, is necessary'to Manchukuo. The statement is not so true as its converse; the truth is that, historically, the power

which has controlled Manchuria has always been in a strong position to control China. And control of China, in the sense of ensuring a weak China, is essential to Japanese security. However important the economic ties which unite North China with Manchuria, the creation of an independent North China, for long a Japanese dream, is a necessary step in breaking up Chinese unity. It is one thing to conquer, it is another to govern North China. To bring the Emperor of Manchukuo to Peking is not necessarily the best solution, although the extension of the monarchical principle is dear to the Kwangtung army: It is more economical to rule through Chinese favourable to Japan; the HopeiChahar Political Council, for example, if it had worked out as Japan hoped, represented a much more practicable solution to the problem. But Nanking was too strong*; and the Central Government fast recovered its influence over that area. Whether the next few weeks are to see the creation of an "autonomous" area in the north, with Japanese bayonets supporting a "popular" movement against Nanking, whether the provinces of Hopei, Chahar, and perhaps Suiyuan are to be added to Manchukuo, whether a reconstituted Political Council is to be born, or whether the Japanese are to be driven north of the Great Wall depends on what "happens in Central China. It is difficult to believe that the "hasty action" of the navy alone explains the fighting in Shanghai. The Japanese know their Lord Mahon. When blocked on land, as they were when Nanking troops moved into Hopei province, they turned to the sea. A BOLD MANOEUVRE. The semi-circle of armies which General Chiang threw round Peking, based, according to reliable information, on a well-prepared line of forts, was a bold and important strategic move. The left flank of the Government armies was at Nankow, the famous pass in the Great Wall about fifty miles north of Peking, where the Peking-Paotow line cuts through the hills on which the wall is built., These troops moved down from Suiyuan where they had fought in November last year against the Japanese-sup-ported Manchukuo levies. If the Chinese blew up the railway tunnel at Nankow they would destroy the value of this line, essential to' control of Inner Mongolia, for several years. The centre of the semi-circle depends on Paotingfu, 100 miles south of Peking on the Hankow railway and almost equidistant from Tientsin. The right wing sweeps round to within thirty miles of Tientsin. Communications, except for railways, are: bad; the task of forcing the semi-circle very formidable. Hence the decision, from a strategic point of view, to undermine Chinese resistance by attacking Shanghai. If China has a heart, it is the financial and commercial centre at the mouth of the Yangtze. ,The reason for attacking Shanghai must have been stronger than the fears arising from inevitable damage to foreign interests. Few foreigners, of course, would fail to understand- the Japanese motive in destroying Greater Shanghai, the new commercial, industrial, and financial centre that the Chinese were building up between the International Settlement and the Woosung forts. Of this the recently destroyed Jukong Wharf and the beautiful Municipal Centre were the most important visible signs. ATTACK ON TRADE. Ultimately Greater Shanghai would have undermined the economic importance of Shanghai proper. It had to go. More important than this, Japan is- compelled to disorganise the for-eign-controlled industrial, commercial, and financial centre of China in order to imperil the economic basis of the Central Government, demoralise national feeling, and terrify the Chinese bourgeoisie. It was the obvious way to bring the war to a rapid conclusion, but as its effectiveness would depend on the extent of material damage and dislocation of trade, and as the losses in which it would involve China would bear some proportion to those of the Powers, the risks such an operation would involve would clearly increase enormously if the war were not soon over.

This choice, between a large-scale war and ceasing to interfere with even the smallest section of Chinese territory, constitutes the new factor China has brought into the situation. Japan, up to now, has been accustomed to severing prpv4nc'e after province, without facing the resistance of China as a whole. It is this new principle which Chiang has introduced—the principle which asserts that. to detach two or three northean provinces from.China proper is of consequence to Nanking— that Japan is trying to batter into nothingness near Shanghai. None, can predict whether China will be able to survive this bloody christening.