GIBRALTAR
HAS ITS DAY PASSED?
INFLUENCE ON POLICY
Among the motives that are actuat ing the Powers in the manoeuvre! which centre in the Spanish civil wat none is more plain than that which is the preoccupation of Britain, writes A. G Gardiner in the "Sari Francisco Chronicle." It may be summed up in one word—Gibraltar. That famous rock looms in the background of all our diplomacy, and no incident of the struggle has produced such a sensation in Parliament as the rumour that German guns of high calibre had been emplaced to command the battlements of "Gib." The truth about; that rumour is still in doubt, but it has served to deepen the anxiety in political, circles and to draw from Mr. 'Eden the most uncompromising declaration on the freedom of the Mediterranean. It is over 150 years since the British possession of.the rock was last challenged. In the interval, its importance as the guardian of the western gate of the Mediterranean has vastly increased. Then the Mediterranean was an inland sea without an exit to the east. Now it is the greatest arterial route to tha Par East and the remotest south. To close that route at either end to the free movement of the world's shipping would be equivalent to severing the vertebrae of the British Commonwealth of Nations. ' - J ' THE TWO OBJECTS. The prevention of such a catastrophe has for a century and-a half been the mainspring of British policy in the peninsula. Two objects have been steadfastly pursued—friendship with Spain and non-intervention by outside Powers in her domestic quarrels. Both these objects are now imperilled. Franco's rebellion owes so much to the active support of Italy and Germany that, should it succeed, those Powers would look for material reward from the mineral riches of Spain and still more for active support in their political aims. And the chief of those aims so far as Mussolini is concerned, would be to.hold Gibraltar in. subjection and to command the western gateway of the Mediterranean. ..... Political opinionr in London is tnat Franco would not risk openly antagonising Britain and France in a conflict which, if those empires survived, would probably transfer Ceuta and the Canaries to Britain and the Balearic* and Spanish Morocco to France. In the view dJ the naval expertSr Franco, assuming that he wins, could make a much better bargain without risk of war with Britain than he could with Italy. In that bargain, Gibraltar would be the prime counter. The possession of that isolated rock by a foreign Power is a wound to the pride of Spain which, nearly two and a half centuries have not wholly healed. And circumstances have made its transfer to a friendly Spain a practicable idea. - _ Gibraltar is no longer the unchallenged guardian of the straits. Modern weapons, as Admiral Usborne says, have exploded the old idea that, because of its steepness and height, it is impregnable. Its cramped and isolated position makes it vulnerable from all sides, and,its harbour might well be a death trap. It has no hinterland admitting of an aerodrome and freeing the dockyard from shell fire. OTHER DEFENCES BETTER. As an effective defence of the straits, Cadiz,. Tangier, Ceuta, or Malaga, with ample hinterland, would, in the modern conditions of warfare, be superior and less vulnerable. As long as Spain is neutral or friendly, Gibraltar will continue to serve very well, and, in any circumstances, it would be held with grim tenacity and would.be a most formidable position to put out of action, especially in view of the fact that aerial fleets in the future will almost certainly be sea-borne. But the inherent weaknesses of the rock from the British point of view aT flagrant and incurable excep'. oy t«v grant af a hinterland which even * triendly Spain would not concede. But a friendly Spain might well be disposed to entertain a deal which, while restoring the historic rock to the possession of Spain, would give Britain a quid pro quo on the African shore of the straits which would provide an ample hinterland for a naval and aerial base that Gibraltar lacks. ( •Such an exchange would, of course, be ruled out if Mussolini, with his ambitious dream of making the, Mediterranean an Italian lake, became, as the result of the civil war, a formidable influence in Spanish policy. But that is unlikely. Spain, as Napoleon found, does not take .kindly to foreign rule, and, in the end, the countries which have stood for non-intervention in the present quarrel may well b» most popular wheu the quarrel is ovttb
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Bibliographic details
Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 110, 5 November 1937, Page 9
Word Count
765GIBRALTAR Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 110, 5 November 1937, Page 9
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