THE SUBMARINE

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 71, 21 September 1937, Page 7

THE SUBMARINE

RULES FOR ITS USE

ACCEPTED BY POWERS

Twelve Powers probably will meet shortly, at the invitation of France and Britain, to consider measures to be taken to meet submarine and aerial attacks on shioping in the Mediterranean, said a writer in the "Sydney Morning Herald" just before the anti-piracy conference.

A vital factor in these discussions will be the rules governing the action of submarines against merchant vessels in time of war which have been agreed to by most of the Powers.

Under international law as generally accepted up to 1915, men-of-war possessed in time of war the right of visit and search of merchant vessels, and, if the result of that process justified it, the right of arrest pending the decision of a Prize Court.

If a merchant ship failed to stop when summoned, or resisted visit and search, the man-of-war might use that degree of force necessary to overcome her resistance to search, but no greater degree. In certain exceptional circumstances the man-of-war might destroy the merchant vessel instead of sending her to port for prosecution, but only if all her occupants and the ship's papers were first removed to a place of safety.

The British Government and those allied with it in the Great War always contended that submarines were just as much bound by these rules as were warships of any other type. British submarines always acted in accordance with them during the late war when, as in the Baltic, they operated against enemy merchant ships.

THE NAVAL TREATIES

Several attempts were made in the post-war years to embody the rules in specific treaties relating to submarines. They were embodied in the Washington Treaty No. 2 of 1922, which was signed by the United States, Japan, France, Italy, and the British Empire.

If the treaty had consisted solely of a declaration that . these rules ' were accepted as part of international law, it would soon have been accepted by all the Powers. But as it contained also certain provisions which, did not then command general acceptance, it never came into force even between its original signatories.

The question was taken up again in 1930, and Part IV. of the London Naval Treaty of that year consisted of a simple definition of the law. It, too, if it had stood alone, would no doubt have come generally into force. But it was part of a treaty which France and Italy were unable to accept as a whole, and thus shared the fate of its predecessor. Though the London Treaty of 1930 expired on December 31 last, Part IV remained binding in perpetuity on those signatories—the United States, Japan, and the members of the British Commonwealth—who ratified the treaty. But the rules were not formally binding upon the other two 1930 signatories—France and Italy—who did not ratify.

France and Italy, however, signified their acceptance of the rules in a proces-verbal, signed in London by all the Washington Powers on November 6 last, in which the British Govern : ment was requested to invite the adherence to them of all other naval Powers. That invitation was accepted within a month ■by Germany—the originator of U-boat "frightfulness" in the "war —and later also by Belgium and Greece.

With [the adherence of Russia early this, year, ail. the great Powers had formally accepted the terms of international law in this matter, for which Britain and the United States had striven for the previous eighteen years. ' ,

THE RULES SET OUT.

The rules as to the action of submarines'with regard to merchant ships were -set out in the document in the following terms: —

"1. In their action with regard to merchant ships,' submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.

"2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose,.the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and Weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board."

Germany's.adherence to these rules attracted considerable attention at the time, for "unrestricted naval warfare" was, in fact, the supreme expression of the German war principle of "frighlfulness." They justified it on precisely the same grounds as the violation of neutral Belgium, namely, that necessity knows ho law.

The letter which conveyed Germany's decision to Mr. Lansing, the then American Secretary of State, actually began: "The Imperial Government—in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people—is now compelled to continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal."

The system of "unrestricted naval warfare" was responsible for the destruction of more than 11,000,000 tons of British and other shipping, and the death of 16,000 non-combatants at' sea.

The rules quoted restored the position, to that existing when first the Üboats began to act as commercedestroyers. They mean that the old rule of international law —that a ship must be sent in for juSgment by a Prize Court—has ' been officially waived. But the other law with regard to the safety of passengers and crew has been reaffirmed, and in more precise terms.