SPANIARDS AT SEA

Evening Post, Volume CXXIV, Issue 15, 17 July 1937, Page 11

SPANIARDS AT SEA

THE COURSE OF THE WAR

SUCCESSES OF THE REBELS

LACK OF TECHNICIANS

The apparent revival of the Spanish Government's fleet, after several months' inactivity, is a supremely important "factor in the war, writes-W. v. •Emanuel in "The Spectator." M genuine it means a complete alteration in the balance of forces. For although surprisingly little has been written about it, the part played by sea power in the Spanish War has been, and still is, considerable. News from Bilbao reminds us how vital control of the sea is. to both sides, ' "When the revolt broke out the various units of the. Spanish Navy were unevenly divided in their allegiance. One of the two old 15,000-lon battleships, botlv the heavy cruisers (the Canarias and Baleares), and two of the five smaller cruisers, together with two destroyers and a number of small 'craft, joined the rebels. This left in Government hands the other battleship, three small cruisers, fifteen out .of seventeen fine modern destroyers, all the thirteen submarines, and rather less than half the trawlers and- other small craft. As for naval bases, the rebels gained Ferrol, the chief naval dockyard, Cadiz, and Malaga, while the Government retains Cartagena, the second naval port. Thus in, numbers the Government has "a marked- advantage, though it .has no big ship last enough to' catch' the übiquitous Canarias' and Baleares. (The Baleares was commissioned so hastily in January that one of her after-turrets is still missing.)

.. On the other hand, the Government ships .have so far been conspicuously outmatched in morale and technical J skill. These disappeared with their officers, who have,almost all been mur- j dered or otherwise removed. Each ship was run by Soviets of the ship's company, who did what they "liked with the nominal captain—usually an ex- { petty officer —and took no notice of the orders of the Ministry of Marine. As the French found after their revolution and as-the Russians have found j recently, no fleet can: be an efficient' .fighting' instrument:"under these" conditions. An American who visited the cruiser Cervantes in August, 193G, described her as run by a commune of "eight" unshaven sailors, • with scars i showing through^l the stubble—"the prettiest gang of pirates you ever set "eyes on; honest fellows, but simple, misguided if you like." All' the officers had been, killed on July 19, but their cabins had been carefully sealed to prevent looting. The navigation and marksmanship of such ships has been extremely erratic and often dangerous to neutrals^ , " ' SHOOTING IMPROVED. _■".. The rebels' shooting was almost as bad, but German and Italian gunlayers have improved it-considerably. The rebels' chief defect at sea is-the same as .that of certain. Central. American armies, a shortage of rank- and. file. Cadets and .Fascist militia have had to man their ships, for even in normal times the deficiency of trained seamen kept most of the- Spanish fleet out .of commission. ,

• The course of hostilities serves to show how the initiative at sea passed from the. Government, ships. At the outbreak, of the revolt (June 19) their chief r ,function.'..was .obviously-,to.,,.pre-vent 'the* passage of the rebel troops from. Morocco to the mainland. Instead of blockading the comparatively short .coastline of Spanish Morocco they instituted a patrol of the straits, but employed on: it only two destroyers and a few submarines, while their big ships engaged in ineffective tip-and-run bombardments of rebel fortifications. Even this inadequate patrol for a time, reduced the rebels* to flying their troops over in small detachments, which hampered them considerably. But by August it was ceasing to Have any effect. The patrolling ships, especially the. submarines, harassed by lack of technical skill and a shortage of fuel-, were no-longer able to keep the seas against- the rebel aircraft, which attacked them constantly.

As an instance of the loyal ships' fighting qualities: On August. 6 the patrolling destroyer Alcala Galiano sighted four rebel transports on their way across the straits, escorted only by the much weaker gunboat Dato. The Galiano, instead of destroying-Hhe convoy, fled at futyl. speed as soon as the Dnto opened fire and aeroplanes appeared,' only firing her after-turrets when out of sight of the.convoy. ■ LOYALISTS AROUSED. Meanwhile, the rebel cruisers and battleship had been helping in the reduction of Irun and S. Sebastian. Most of the loyal seamen came from these northern .provinces, and the thought of their homes being shelled, in their absence proved too much for them. On ■September 26 the main Government fleet appeared suddenly off Bilbao, leaving • the- rebels free to pour men and arms across' the straits. ' There, three days,later, occurred the first decisive action at sea. The Government destroyers Gravina and Almirante Ferrandiz, while attempting to stop this traffic, were overpowered by two rebel cruisers, which had unexpectedly slipped south; the Ferrandiz and an armed trawler were sunk, the Gravina badly damaged. Since then Franco has been left in undisputed control of the straits. The Government ships, having achieved nothing in the north, returned to Malaga on October 17, but have not attempted to engage the enemy. '■••'■

"■" Cn the Biscay coast there have been a number of inconclusive sea fights, culminating in the rebels' capture,' on ' March 8, of the sorely-needed munition carrier, Mar Cantabrico. .Since then their blockade of the Government's isolated Basque supporters, who can only receive assistance by sea or air, has drawn tighter. The rebel cruisers have been bombarding the coast and stopping valuable supply ships apparently with impunity. Aeroplanes have occasionally attacked thorn, but the Government submarines seem incapable of delivering torpedo attacks: On October 22 occurred the mysterious torpedo attack on the Cervantes in Cartagena Havboutf. Government spokesmen said that the assailant must have been a foreigner, as all completed .. submarines' were in loyal hands. But probably one had changed sides, or else, an unfinished ship had been completed with foreign technical aid. On February 8 the rebels, helped largely by naval bombardments, captured Malaga, thereby gaining the western key to the straits and a most useful naval base. mSASTHOUS RESULTS. Clearly the command of the sea has been in rebel hands since September. The consequences have been disastrous to the Government, and have made possible Franco's so-called "blockade.'' A' steady stream of neutral and Government merchantmen have been intercepted, and one or two mined. More than 20 Scandinavian ships, for example, have had their cargoes confiscated, and merchantmen sailing through the straits on their lawful occasions have no easy task, with all the shore lights extinguished and numerous strange warships steaming about without lights. The Netherlands Government has been roused to send warships and institute convoys for their ■much-molested ships.' In fairness to Franco it should be remembered that

the attempted Government blockade of Cadiz in August also led to protests, on that occasion from 'Berlin. But the two cases are not on the same footing, since the rebel naval forces have no proper standing in international law.

So far two fad ors have deprived! Government warships of the command of 'the sea. The first is their own inefficiency and glaring lack of dis-1 cipline. This, if the latest reports are true, has now disappeared; the Government ships, remanned and reorganised, have been practising gunnery and seamanship, and have carried out successful raids on Malaga, Melilla, Ceuta, and the Balearics. Rebel sources report that foreign technical experts are | in charge, but it is far more likely i that the revival is due to a genuine! reinfusion of discipline by Spaniards, as has been happening in the militia. THE FOREIGN THREAT. The other obstacle which has immobilised the Government ships still remains. Supposing that they make use of their material superiority, still unaffected by minor- losses, to attack the rebel cruisers, for example, on the vital Biscay coast, they have to. face the possibility of hostile action by Italian and less probably by German warships. Whatever the accuracy of the various allegations made against these ships, ranging from mere spying to the alleged use of the Graf Spec as an aircraft carrier, the fact remains that they have acted, even if they had not actually opened fire, as a "fleet, in being" and as a serious check to Government activity. If the initiative has in fact returned to the Government naval forces, not only the course of the war but possibly foreign Powers also will be affected. In that sense at least the problem of who shall command the Spanish seas is international.